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When, in Book II, Chapter VII, the King of Brobdingnag says to Gulliver “As for 
yourself […] who have spent the greatest part of your life travelling; I am well disposed 
to hope you may hitherto have escaped many vices of your country” (Book II, Ch. VII: 
121), he raises an important question—that of the value of travel as a means to correct the 
individual. The primary original contribution of this dissertation is to take Gulliver’s 
Travels by Jonathan Swift (1726) seriously as a work of political theory, specifically on 
the question of the value of travel as a means of individual edification. This dissertation 
extracts from the text a political argument concerning the pitfalls of the assumption that 
travel is of benefit to individuals in all circumstances. In doing so, it places Swift in 
dialogue with Locke, Shaftesbury, the proponents of the Baconian scientific project, and 
Montaigne, as well as extracting an overarching criticism of liberal and enlightenment 
values through the critique of travel. Through a close reading of Gulliver’s Travels, 
alongside key political and religious contextual analysis, the dissertation assesses the 
text’s treatment of the relationship between travel, education, science, and politics. This 
dissertation extracts from Swift’s text an argument that travel can only be edifying if 
pursued in a disciplined manner as part of an organic hierarchical society, opening up a 
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Published in 1726, Gulliver’s Travels predates the era in which European intellectual life 
self-consciously understood itself to be participating in the Enlightenment. Yet, Swift’s 
most famous text was forged in the fires of emergent political, scientific, and cultural 
change that provided the foundation for the Enlightenment thought as it gathered steam 
from the 1740s onward. Gulliver’s Travels prefigures many of the debates and currents to 
come, and Swift emerges as an early counter-Enlightenment counter-puncher, opposing 
Latitudinarianism and Anglican rationalism, accurately predicting the more developed 
Enlightenment guises that these movements would lead to. If James Simpson is correct in 
arguing that “Protestantism is a powerfully and necessarily self-conflicted tradition, 
precisely because its anti-formalism repudiates tradition,” then we can identify Swift in 
the corner of High Church Anglicanism that understood this trait and sought to defend 
against it (Simpson 2019: xi). Swift, however, saw the germs of Dissenting Protestantism 
spreading into political and scientific affairs, also. The fulcrum for his over-arching 
critique of modernist threats to tradition is the central narrative device of travel.  
On the topic of travel, Swift’s text has more practically relevant insight than has 
typically been acknowledged by scholars and commentators. Most profoundly, Gulliver’s 
Travels offers a critical examination of travel that is especially relevant in age where 
assumptions of the positive value of individual travel remain broadly unquestioned. 
Melinda A. Cro opened a recently published paper on Montaigne’s travel journals with a 
quintessential expression of contemporary liberal norms concerning travel, the likes of 
which Gulliver’s Travels contests. “The impetus for travel is hardwired into humanity”, 
Cro asserts, expressing a central liberal assumption that “experience is the best teacher—
there is no better way to know another land and people (and even oneself) than to travel 
and explore” (Cro 2013: 150). This is a fully developed iteration of the narrative 
concerning travel that was gaining traction in Swift’s time and was soon to be allied to 
significant projects in individualist politics and experimental science. 
Gulliver’s Travels rejects both the argument that the need to travel is innate in all 
humanity, and that experiential learning is a pathway to edification. Throughout the text 
it is clear that the intersection of the revolutionary tendencies in science, politics, and 
religion are at the forefront of Swift’s concern and travels operates as useful and 
instructive point of convergence to highlight what he sees as problematic in these 
intellectual currents. While this may seem like a conservative argument destined for 
defeat in its own time and doomed to reside in the scrapheap of history evermore, the 
brilliance of Swift’s satirical writing secured the vitality of his work over the centuries 
and one can review his political argumentation anew in the present political and 
intellectual climate.  
In 2020, in the face of the international public health crisis of the Covid-19 
pandemic, borders have been shut all around the world, bringing several decades of 
increasingly free movement to a temporary standstill in much of the world. Time will tell 
if this harrowing experience will sharpen minds against the universal merits of travel, as I 
argue Swift strongly intimates in Gulliver’s Travels. The goal of this dissertation is to 
draw out an argument concerning the political importance of travel through a close 
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reading of Gulliver’s Travels. At times, in order to state and develop the argument that I 
believe can be derived from the text, it is necessary to express criticisms of central liberal 
values (such as, for example, natural equality) through the conservative lens appropriate 
to Swift. To do otherwise would be to treat the text on terms other than its own, 
artificially facilitating a straw man engagement with Swift’s arguments and insights, even 
when extending their implications beyond the text alone. However, this does not 
necessarily render the author as entirely in agreement with this ontological perspective in 
general, nor Swift’s particular set of political values. The dissertation seeks to amplify an 
underappreciated aspect of the political implications of the text not as ideological nor 
political advocacy but rather as an appreciative student of Swift’s undeniable intellectual 
significance. The central argument of this dissertation operates as a conduit through 
which the politics inherent to Swift’s presentation of travel can be expressed and 
understood, highlighting how and why it is an argument worthy of serious consideration 
by advocates and detractors of liberalism alike. 
 
1.2. Swift on Religion and Politics: Contexts and Conflicts 
Parsing out what in Gulliver’s Travels may be stylistic indulgence in popular writing that 
amused Swift from more directly politically purposeful content is no easy task. Swift’s 
legacy remains both celebrated yet not easily co-opted by any one political camp, as “his 
work alienates left- and right-wingers, agnostics and dogmatists” alike (Stubbs 2017: 
628.) As such, the interpretive battle to claim Swift includes those who see him as a 
Lockean liberal determined to defend political authority grounded in individual consent 
(Ehrenpreis 1952) and a Tory authoritarian who vindicated the idea of society as an 
organic hierarchy in direct opposition to the materialism of commercial society (Montag 
1994). The complexity of Swift’s work means that there are elements available to 
textually support aspects of each of these interpretations, even if claiming either as an 
authoritative portrait is caricature at best. Swift also published political writings over a 
long period of time, much of which was politically turbulent, and warranted a certain 
degree of unavoidable nuancing of his contemporary political opinions. F.P. Lock notes 
that this has made him an easy target for the charge of “political inconsistency” or even 
being “a political turncoat” for his shift from Whig to Tory pamphleteer (Lock 1983: 
134). Warren Montag makes the point that chasms in political interpretation are the result 
of the contradictory and confused views held by Swift himself across his writings and 
explicit political interjections, in particular. Montag’s general argument is that Swift did 
not have a guiding set of ideas, but rather ought to be understood as deriving his 
principles from his position in the weakest point of the Anglican Church, the Church of 
Ireland (Montag 1994: 17).  
Whilst I strongly disagree with Montag’s contention that Swift’s writings were 
not particularly shaped by a set of guiding ideas, it is accurate in my estimation to place 
his core political values as chiefly tied to a defence of the established Church and its role 
as custodian of traditional order. Montag astutely recognises that Anglicanism remained 
riven with divisions in Swift’s time and that was, even from its Reformation origins, 
“confused, radically disarticulated and riven with contradictions” (Montag 1994: 17). 
However, despite the excellent insights into Swift’s writing drawn from dense historical 
and religious contextualisation, Montag overplays the significance of Swift’s defense of 
Anglicanism as the sole purpose of his writings. This is derived from a materialist 
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reading that views all political interjection as advocacy in an ideological struggle. He 
also, like Harth (1961) sees Swift as sympathetic to the toleration and Rationalism of the 
Anglican Latitudinarians, a view that cannot stand up in light of the blitz unleashed upon 
scientific projection in Book III of Gulliver’s Travels. John Stubbs also points out that 
even after 1714 when Swift was effectively locked out of overt participation in political 
pamphleteering and interjection, “the Church, as ever, presented a rather fearsome 
battleground” (Stubbs 2017: 414) and debates on these issues formed an ever-present 
permeating filter on his thought and writing. 
I discuss the particularities of the siege mentality of members of the Church of 
Ireland in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and the impact that this has 
on Swift’s political philosophy in more detail in my extended analysis of Book II. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile here to briefly elaborate on the context and importance of 
how the core political principles that can be inferred from Gulliver’s Travels clearly 
relate to a combination of High Church Anglicanism and Old Whig political philosophy. 
The historian of eighteenth-century Ireland Ian Higgins (1994) argues against this 
interpretation, pointing to clear consonances between Swift’s political and literary 
writings and the Jacobite Tory position on Church, state, and politics. Higgins instead 
characterises Swift as “a disaffected High Church Anglican extremist with Jacobite 
inclinations” (Higgins 1994: 1). Whether or not Swift was in fact a Jacobite supporter of 
a restoration of the Stuart monarchy or not is primarily a matter of historical debate and 
generally falls outside of the purview of the present work. However, I will say here that 
Gulliver’s Travels conveys a respect for a more hardline authoritarian monarchy which is 
in keeping with Jacobite thinking. However, this is presented as desirable due to the 
public veneration and societal continuity that hereditary monarchy engenders and the 
intractable link between the crown and hereditary church. Divine right formed a 
cornerstone of Jacobite thought but Gulliver’s Travels presents the necessity of both 
monarchy and religion through the prism of their conferring of social and political order, 
rather than any cosmological or spiritual argument. Nonetheless, it is fair to identify that 
Swift was far more authoritarian and less liberal than any branch of Whig politics, Old or 
New, but was nonetheless firmly committed to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as he 
saw it, especially from his vantage point in Ireland.  
Swift wrote in a time where the sustaining national myth of the newly fashioned 
British nation following the 1707 Act of Union identified Britain as a modern-day Israel, 
divinely selected for prosperity and glory. The religious character of this vision, however, 
coalesced with the secular trends in science and politics to form the identity of the newly 
United Kingdom. The idea that Britain was uniquely fruitful as a chosen land had strong 
purchase across rich and poor and north and south, and was not merely propaganda 
pushed by an intellectual, political, or affluent elite (Colley 2005: 33). This generated a 
narrative current that linked developments in politics, religion, and science to a 
teleological realisation of the country’s destiny of divinely ordained liberty. Travel could 
be utilised to make favourable comparisons between Britain and elsewhere.  
Comparison could also bring negative facets of the country to light, however. 
Even a passionate publicist for the image of Britain as a modern-day Israel such as Daniel 
Defoe could not help but to notice that “notwithstanding we are a nation of liberty”, 
London contained more prisons than “any city in Europe, perhaps as many as in all the 
capital cities of Europe put together” (Defoe 1991: 157). Notably, Defoe jotted down this 
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observation as part of his popular travelogue A Tour Through the Whole Island of Great 
Britain, published in three volumes from 1724 and 1727. There was tension, thus, in early 
eighteenth-century Britain’s developing confidence in itself as an emergent prosperous 
commercial and liberal society divinely rewarded for its upstanding Protestant character.  
Swift did not share in the Irenicist view of a pluralist but unified Protestant nation. 
Rather, for Swift the intolerance and zealousness of the Puritans was to blame for the 
bloodshed and instability of the seventeenth-century English Civil War. They could thus 
not be trusted in public office nor offered a general rapprochement. Latitudinarian 
Anglicans eager to extend the umbrella of the Church to cover more than just its base, on 
the other hand, represented opportunist hacks, far too willing to compromise with the 
materialism of scientific Rationalists—equally singular in their enthusiasm—in order to 
sail with the prevailing winds of power. Much as he despised religious fanatics who 
claimed they spoke to God, the claims of modernist science to have unlocked the 
universal key to human potential struck Swift as dangerous (Damrosch 2013: 149). Thus, 
while Britain was indeed blessed with the genius of the mixed constitution from the 
settlement of 1689, the inevitable march toward the fulfilment of science and progress 
was by no means assured and should even be seen as suspect. In this regard, Swift’s 
political values were firmly rooted in the late seventeenth century, prioritising stability 
and order over innovation and commercial prosperity, distrustful of pluralist toleration, 
and inherently defensive of the virtue embedded in the landed aristocracy through 
property ownership (Ehrenpreis 1952: 146). The ascent of the nouveau-riche in the guises 
of financial speculators, tradesmen, and merchants represented not just a threat to this 
settlement, but also a slipping into degeneration. 
The influence of Swift’s position as an ordained priest in the Church of Ireland on 
his writings has received comparatively little attention from scholars. It was 1954 before 
Louis Landa produced the first sustained monograph on Swift’s religious views from the 
perspective of the complex politico-religious context of eighteenth-century Ireland. The 
most insightful work published in recent years on the topic is Christopher J. Fauske’s 
Jonathan Swift and the Church of Ireland (2002), which primarily focuses on Swift’s 
religious writings and provides robust historical context for Swift’s beliefs and activities 
as a churchman. Most significantly, Fauske argues persuasively that doctrine was entirely 
secondary to the social functions of the church in Swift’s mind, a point echoed by Todd 
C. Parker, editor of the excellent recent collection of essays entitled Swift as Priest and 
Satirist (Parker 2009).  
These works reinforce the centrality of Swift’s position as a clergyman and the 
realities of the established church’s vulnerabilities in an Ireland chiefly populated by 
Catholics in the south and Presbyterians in Ulster who were “deliberately difficult” in 
their relationships with the Church of Ireland (Foster 1989: 123). In Martin’s words, 
“Swift’s theology thus becomes less an affirmation of divine principle and more an 
expression of the realpolitik of the Church of Ireland” (Martin 2009: 13). Indeed, while 
Swift sincerely saw Anglicanism as both the true form of Christianity and most pleasing 
to God, he also appreciated that this remained “a question of holding ground, maintaining 
numbers, calculating religious and political arithmetic” (Boyce 2001: 83). This highlights 
how Swift’s pragmatic theological approach was conditioned by the nominally 
Established Church lacking the same political or economic favour enjoyed by its 
counterparts on the island of Britain.  
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Though nominally a state church, the Church of Ireland’s precedence in Swift’s 
time was mostly of the de jure variety rather than de facto, as overall numerical 
superiority favoured the Catholic population and the parishioners of dissenting churches 
in Ulster enjoyed significant economic advantage (Parker 2009: 19). Even in the 
predominantly Catholic areas in the south of the island, nonconforming Protestant sects 
could carve out spheres of economic might, such as the Quaker merchants of Cork City. 
The Church of Ireland did receive the regium donum, a state subsidy from 1672 onwards. 
These payments, however, could be irregular and unreliable, and Presbyterians in Ireland 
received this also, despite not receiving official protections under a Toleration Act until 
1719 (Foster 1989: 123; 156). Financial hardships and unequal distributions of 
parishioners and resources both material and human made it so that “the contrast between 
episcopal grandeur and local churches falling into disuse, manned by underpaid clergy 
who needed to be pluralists in order to survive” was all too vivid (Foster 1989: 123).  
Marcus Walsh goes so far as to describe the Church of Ireland at the turn of the 
century as “an embattled institution, under severe economic strain, politically dominated 
by England and the English church hierarchy, struggling to maintain its devotional and 
pastoral position as a minority group of believers (Walsh 2003: 162). Compounding this 
further was the Church of England’s practice of appointing English clergy to episcopal 
positions in Ireland, rendering the tasks of community outreach and the forging of social 
solidarity with local parishioners even more challenging. Swift was wholly on the side of 
the Church of Ireland gentry against their English counterparts on this issue (Parker 2009: 
21–22). In this regard, he represented the beginnings of a distinctly Irish Protestant 
intellectual tradition.  
A formative experience in shaping Swift’s devotion to the Church of Ireland came 
in 1707 when he was appointed by Archbishop William King to negotiate a remission of 
the taxes called the First Fruits levied by London upon the established church in Ireland. 
The Whig government offered a quid pro quo deal that would exchange the removal of 
the tax for the church’s endorsement of the repeal of the Test Act that excluded 
dissenting Protestants from state appointment. Such an arrangement was unacceptable to 
the Anglican hierarchy in Ireland and the tedium and humiliation of the negotiations 
“confirmed Swift’s unconditional loyalty to his church, and his lifelong sense of the fatal 
difference in religious culture between England and Ireland” (McMinn 2003: 20). The 
difference in self-understanding between the Established Church in England and Ireland 
is a vital context here, not least on the issue of travel as developed in the dissertation, but 
also on the question of religious and political toleration. 
The perception of encirclement by Catholics and Dissenters on the island of 
Ireland rendered Irish Anglicans—with Swift a particularly vociferous voice in sermon 
and tract in this regard—wholly opposed to the broad measures of toleration that were 
forming the spine of Anglican Latitudinarianism in his lifetime. Swift was not alone in 
voicing such concerns. Irish Bishops and landlords alike feared that the uncompromising 
religious and political culture of Presbyterianism was a serious threat to their authority 
(Foster 1989: 158). Whilst Swift’s nominal religious concerns could often be traced on a 
topical commitment to the present needs of his Church amidst a perceived hostile climate, 
one can also identify a consistent over-arching abstract argument for High Church 
Anglicanism on the basis of its civil duty and, crucially, capacity to reinforce the 
structures of authority necessary to societal order. Thus, the argument that an Established 
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Church protected by but also operating to check monarchical power is indispensable. 
Todd Parker summarises this view succinctly: “whether or not the Church here is Christ’s 
body or God’s agency on Earth is irrelevant; it functions, vis-à-vis the king, as an 
institutional counterbalance” (Parker 2009: 15). 
This is a highly pragmatic view of religion, rooted in the communitarian 
governing processes made possible by an Established Church working hand in glove with 
government power—the sword and the word united for the purposes of enforcing the 
norms and values of organic hierarchy and politico-religious authority. This proto-liberal-
minded measure of using an Established Church to counterbalance political power sits 
neatly alongside a more conservative communitarian vision of government as custodian 
of order through tradition and hierarchy. Swift’s theological grounding in the Established 
Church provided him with a strong preference for seeing humans’ natural sociability is 
best served by a hierarchical organic society wherein society is viewed not as an artifice 
but rather exists by nature and prior to the individual. This, he believed, facilitated a 
communitarian social solidarity in which all members of society have a clear role to play 
in a context of mutual appreciation and certainty. This rests on a commitment to natural 
inequality and the ordering of society in line with those who fit to rule wielding political 
power over those who are fit to be ruled. I will argue in this dissertation that Swift’s 
quarrel with ideas associated with modernist thought, though immense, is not without 
recognition of the benefits of certain facets of political liberalization—he did of course 
declare himself “Libertatis Vindicatorem” (champion/avenger of liberty) in his self-
penned epitaph—but only if they remained nested among and limited by custom, 
tradition, and the tenets of the faith. 
If the latter half of Fauske’s pronouncement that “theology and political 
philosophy Swift left to others” (Fauske 2002: 39-40) were accurate, the entire premise of 
this dissertation would be upended. However, whilst it is unquestionably true that Swift 
appears to have had minimal interest in the deeper questions of theological concern, his 
repeated defense of the social functions of religion—explicitly in sermons and pamphlets 
and, I argue, implicitly throughout Gulliver’s Travels—are of huge political significance. 
David Nokes’ analysis of Swift’s sermons concludes that they are predominantly: 
 
homilies on social rather than spiritual topics. They seek to encourage dutiful behaviour 
and orthodox opinions by eschewing theological problems and recommending instead a 
simple, deferential and conservative code of conduct to his parishioners (Nokes 1976: 
219). 
 
It may be tempting to side with the likes of Phillip Harth who view Swift’s sermons as 
indicative of his minimal to weak skills as a theologian (Harth 1961: 46–51). But, again, 
Swift’s view of religion is drawn upon social and civic, rather than theological concerns; 
rooted more strongly in the relationship between God and the state than individual 
experiences of the divine or individual relationships to the Church (Parker 2009: 29). As 
such, Swift’s politics and religion were largely interchangeable and each pronouncement 
in one sphere can be taken to apply equally to the other. 
Swift’s politico-religious interjections occurred amidst two hallmark 
characteristics of post-Restoration Anglicanism: the “internal contradictions” referred to 
above and “a vigorous external Protestant critique” unseen anywhere else in Europe other 
than the Netherlands (MacCulloch 2016: 360). On the issue of divisions within 
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Anglicanism, Swift was a High Church Anglican who highly valued the Church of 
England’s via media or middle way between the Magisterial Reformers and the Roman 
Catholic Church. His religious positions almost always defaulted to the social and civic 
benefits of avoiding what he perceived to be the excesses of Puritan enthusiasm and 
Catholic superstition and idolatry. The historian of the Reformation Diarmuid 
MacCulloch describes the via media as a “double helix, intertwining two mutually 
antagonistic strands of Christianity, which elsewhere bitterly clashed in the Reformation 
(MacCulloch 2016: 360). No doubt, it is because of this precise balancing act that Swift 
and his ilk would celebrate the genius of Anglicanism as uniquely capable to ensure 
political stability and resolve religious disputes through its association with the crown.  
Harth claims that Swift’s religious sympathies lay with what have been called the 
Anglican Rationalists, many of whom were active in the intellectual circle of Cambridge 
Platonists, who can be summarised as falling “between the English millennialist tradition 
and the deist emphasis on rationalism and historical argumentation” (Olson 1982: 203). 
These included Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, George Rust, and Henry Hallywell, 
amongst others (Harth 1961). It’s important to distinguish between what Harth refers to 
as Rationalists in the Anglican Church at this time and scientific Rationalists of the 
Enlightenment tradition, whom Swift squarely takes aim at in the Voyage to Laputa. It is 
fair to say that Swift’s religious and political views dovetailed with the Cambridge 
Platonists’ advocacy of a reasonable religion in opposition to atheists, deists, Puritans, 
and Catholics. However, the thinkers Harth calls Anglican Rationalists are just as easily 
referred to as Latitudinarians, a disposition markedly at odds with Swift’s core values as 
a defensive, conservative Church of Ireland clergyman. 
 Swift agreed with the Latitudinarian belief that reason was a product of common 
sense, custom, and tradition, all of which could work in tandem and even harmony with 
faith and revelation (Paulson 1962: 408). However, as developed in detail elsewhere in 
this dissertation, he was highly disagreeable to notions of reason as an independent or 
speculative force. This was far too permissive to elements outside of the finely struck via 
media balance, be they the creeping materialism of scientific rationalism or the potential 
moral relativism of broad toleration. In the perpetual intellectual clashes for the heart and 
soul of Anglicanism, Swift represented a more conservative and oppositional strain than 
ascendant Latitudinarianism. Ronald Paulson correctly concludes, contra Harth: 
 
If his enemies were the extremes of Puritanism-Catholicism, the chief danger he (Swift) 
saw from 1690 on was the unfastening of the gates to these disruptive elements that was 
advocated by the Latitudinarians in religion and the “New Whigs” in politics (Paulson 
1962: 408). 
 
In the battleground of Anglicanism from the mid-1710s onward, “the pendulum had by 
now swung right away from the High Church faction; indeed it seemed to have risen 
beyond its acme on the other side, and frozen in mid-air” (Stubbs 2017: 414). 
Latitudinarians were thus largely able to set the agenda in the sphere of religion and their 
advocated positions such as moderation toward purportedly reasonable dissent were not 
seen as acceptable at all by the encircled clergy of the Church of Ireland or High Church 
Tories and Old Whigs in Britain. All told, many of Swift’s contemporaries defended their 
positions with sluggishness in contrast to the aggressive embrace of modernity by 
Latitudinarians. Only the writing talent and genius of Swift allowed him to vividly 
 8 
animate arguments that were running on borrowed time such that they retain their 
potency and significance even today. 
Gulliver’s Travels was written in an age of theological speculation and flutters of 
deistic tendencies all across intellectual life. The rise of advocations of natural (rather 
than revealed) religion such as John Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1697) fuelled 
polemical division and intensified Tory cries that “The Church is in danger!” (Langford 
2000: 9–10). Events such as the “Bangorian Crisis” further sharpened these minds to the 
forces against them. The crisis erupted when the Bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly, 
published a sermon in which he argued for the divestment of the ecclesiastical realm from 
the temporal affairs of legal, political and social life. This envisaged the path toward the 
wholly secular state of modern liberal democracies, the likes of which conservative 
Anglicans viewed as a wholly unacceptable worst-case scenario. John Stubbs astutely 
notes that this type of permissive Latitudinarianism arguably drew more from Locke’s 
writings on government than it from the gospels (Stubbs 2017: 414-415) and serves as 
but one example of the contemporary events that shaped the rear-guard mentality of 
Swift’s politico-religious views.  
It is vital to restate that these religious controversies and battles were particularly 
keenly felt in a Church of Ireland anxious of its stability and status as the Established 
Church. High Church Anglicans in Britain also criticized the Latitudinarian submission to 
the social function of religion and the retreat of spiritualism as the chief mission of the 
Church but were unequivocally on the backfoot in such public controversies. Swift’s 
prioritisation of the social functions of religion in the context of a financially and 
demographically weak Church of Ireland cannot be considered equivalent to this view of 
the Church as a form of moral conscience to a society en route to intractable secularism. 
Indeed, these incremental moves toward acquiescence to a tolerant pluralist society could 
only be seen as directly counter to the privileges and authority of the Established Church 
(Langford 2000: 9). Thus, Swift’s writings are certainly fiercely individual in style but 
profoundly Classical or Ancient in temperament—countering modernist tendencies—and 
always “conditioned by the difficulties of an age in which the tradition to which he owed 
allegiance was under steady attack from all sides” (Williams 1967: ii). 
All this being said, it is unquestionably noteworthy that religion is only passingly 
referred to throughout Gulliver’s Travels. However, Fauske argues that, to paraphrase 
James Joyce, the absence of direct references to religion in Gulliver’s Travels is the 
highest form of presence. Implicit evocations of the universal depravity of mankind are 
found throughout Gulliver’s voyages in the form of political misgovernment, subjugation, 
domination, and prideful intellectual folly, all pointing to the stained soul of original sin. 
Beyond this, I make the case that the spectre of toleration and the licentious 
Latitudinarianism that it breeds is to be felt in many key sections of the text, especially in 
the arguments concerning the pitfalls of travel and the ironic similarities between 
dissenting Protestantism and the New Science. Fauske argues, correctly in my estimation, 
that the absence of established churches and the authority and stability that they provide 
in the lands visited by Gulliver is a demonstration of how these places have fallen from 
their ordained condition as civic institutions and arbitrary power cannot be held in check 
by established religion (Fauske 2002: 107–110).  
 
1.3. Gulliver’s Travels and Intellectual History 
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Although challenging, it is not impossible to distil and articulate Swift’s central values, or 
to distinguish them from those of his church. The generally agreed upon biographical 
consensus is that Swift can be classified as a Tory on religious questions: upholding soft 
authoritarian views in support of the Established Church with political exclusion for 
Catholics and dissenting Protestants, yearning for a return to a national church, but an 
Old Whig in politics: supportive of the mixed constitution that promotes liberty in the 
context of personal responsibility and robust traditional institutions conferring moral 
limitations on individual license and fiercely opposed to the toleration and political 
compromises of the New Whigs. 
The claims required to support the over-arching argument made throughout this 
dissertation concerning Swift’s politico-religious views will be mostly derived those that 
find textual expression and support in Gulliver’s Travels. Other texts from Swift’s corpus 
are occasionally referenced and engaged, as well as illuminating historical context, but 
the predominant goal of this work is to extract and analyse the political arguments 
concerning travel as found in Gulliver’s Travels, rather than fashion a biographically 
accurate portrayal of the thoughts of Jonathan Swift the man. When relevant or insightful, 
I have juxtaposed ideas from Gulliver’s Travels with those of sympathetic or 
unsympathetic interlocutors for the purposes of sharpening the analysis of a specific point 
by contrast or comparison. 
In order to further situate Swift in his intellectual context, several thinkers from 
the history of political thought both before and after the Augustan age in which the 
Irishman wrote are drawn upon throughout the dissertation. Montaigne, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Shaftesbury all make for important interlocutors with Swift, as their writings 
established core facets of the political and intellectual currents to which he contributed. 
For the purposes of my argument, the significance to Gulliver’s Travels of Locke on 
travel and education and Shaftesbury on politeness and travel writing are especially 
important. Scholars have also long understood the important influence of both Montaigne 
and Hobbes on Swift’s thought as expressed across his corpus (Rawson 1992; Ward 
2011) and here I draw out some important links between Gulliver’s Travels’ presentation 
of otherness in travel and the individual in modern society that represent these influences. 
The liberal political tradition to which some ideas referenced throughout Gulliver’s 
Travels might be read to overlap are found in the vital later eighteenth century thinkers 
Montesquieu, Smith, and Burke. Montesquieu’s Persian Letters offers an interesting 
companion piece to Gulliver’s Travels in that the two texts are satirical novels published 
immediately prior to the onset of the Enlightenment proper yet both reflect an awareness 
of coming intellectual trends in their embryonic form. Burke expresses political ideals 
hinted at through the layers of Swift’s irony and satire in a form more familiar to texts 
typically studied as part of the history of political thought. Thus, the two Irish thinkers 
complement one another’s writings in highly instructive ways; Swift thrills and vexes in 
the poetics of the sublime and the more direct incision of Burke’s writing shines some 
light through the fog to help gain understanding and appreciation of the political 
significance of Swift. Tocqueville offers us a lens through which to present comparisons 
with aspects of modernity that Swift distrusted in the mid 1720s and their realization as 
seen by the French writer a century later in the first mass democracy of the United States. 
Such connections are made judiciously and always with an eye to further unlocking the 
broader intellectual contributions of Gulliver’s Travels to the history of political thought. 
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The argument that will be put forward in this dissertation draws upon several key 
themes that have been addressed in the secondary literature on Swift’s writing and on 
Gulliver’s Travels in particular: travel, education, and the broader Enlightenment project 
with particular emphasis on the New Science. Here I seek to demonstrate some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature, building upon it to highlight the 
interpretative space for my original argument. I argue that the political implication of 
Gulliver’s Travels is that global travel, enabled by assumptions of either individual 
edification or contribution to scientific knowledge, is not likely to be an edifying 
experience unless the individual has pursued an ordered education that respects the moral 
limits proper to humanity. This critique of the assumed universal edifying effects of 
travels connects to a broader critical engagement with characteristically liberal ideas of 
individual self-education through the use of instrumental reason (adopting means suitable 
to achieving one’s desired ends) outside and the denial of an organic hierarchy where 
some are fit to rule and others to be ruled. This is contrasted with the idea of a more 
holistic reason through which individuals can use their own judgment and capacity to 
think, rather than custom or received wisdom, to decide for themselves what is right, 
what is true, and what should be done. 
Claude Rawson notes that “Swift’s works are a meeting place for some of the 
most troubling moral nightmares of European intellectual history in the last five hundred 
years: war, imperial conquest, the impulse to exterminate” (Rawson 2001: 1). To this list 
I would add the moral ambiguities of cross-cultural engagement, the effects of travel on 
the individual, the extension of polite society, and the political and cultural currents of the 
early Enlightenment and Modernist projects. As such, Gulliver’s Travels offers almost as 
many avenues of inquiry as there are scholars who have studied it. More broadly still, one 
could break down critical responses to Gulliver’s Travels in three general categories: 
author-centred approaches, formal and rhetorical approaches, and historical and 
contextual approaches (Tippett 1989: 12–15). These approaches are primarily 
distinguished methodologically. However, the forthcoming survey of secondary literature 
will primarily focus on travel literature and the role of travel in the text, as this is the 
most relevant for situating and distinguishing the present study. There is an abundance of 
excellent scholarly work on both Swift in general and Gulliver’s Travels in particular, but 
in the interest of brevity and feasibility secondary literature directly relevant to this 
particular topic will be engaged here. 
 
1.4. Gulliver’s Travels and Travel Literature 
Travel literature provides a vital context in which to place and understand the satirical 
and political content in Gulliver’s Travels. Indeed, as Carole Fabricant notes, “Gulliver’s 
Travels is in many ways the quintessential travel book, alternately reproducing and 
parodying the conventions of the genre, and forcefully demonstrating both its capabilities 
and limitations as an instrument for disseminating knowledge (Fabricant 2005: 744). 
Importantly, the knowledge Fabricant refers to here is multi-faceted. Gulliver’s Travels 
uses travel as a means to engage questions of self-knowledge, and the epistemology of 
empire as both a disseminating and information-gathering practice. Too few studies of 
Gulliver’s Travels link these issues, either intentionally disaggregating travel, empire, 
and epistemology, or overemphasising one at the expense of others. Rather than focusing 
on the genre of travel writing, the primary original contribution of this dissertation is to 
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take the coverage of travel in Gulliver’s Travels seriously and to seek to elucidate what 
we can take away from Swift’s treatment of the topic as it relates to political matters. In 
particular, the seriousness of travel as an endeavour that can have very real and even 
grave consequences for those who partake in it.  
Much commentary on the historical significance and evolution of the genre of 
travel writing has tended to prioritise analysis of style over the arguments being made 
concerning the substance of travel itself. Elizabeth A. Bohls rightly points out that “travel 
fulfils obligations and enhances status, but it also feeds dangerous desires. A traveller 
might come back transformed—for better or worse—or might not come back at all” 
(Bohls 2005: xiv). Thus, the form of travel writing is in an important stylistic component 
of Gulliver’s Travels, but it also a book that proffers an argument about what ought to 
worry us about the effects we might expect from encouraging open travel for all. 
As has been long established, Swift greatly enjoyed books of travel and possessed 
well-loved anthologies of influential Elizabethan travel writing from the likes of Purchas 
and Hakluyt (Damrosch 2013: 358). Indeed, both fictional and historical accounts of 
travel made up a significant portion of Swift’s library (Le Fanu 1896). The extent of 
Swift’s reading on the topic is reflected in many passages that directly mimic and/or 
obliquely reference travel writing and its tropes of ethnographic, cartographic, and 
nautical discourse (Rawson 2001: 1–3). Mastering such stylings was more than a simple 
exercise of flexing his writing muscles; Swift loved a good hoax. Indeed, many of his 
most famous works were written under pseudonyms for such purposes (and also when it 
was prudent to do so given political circumstances). The supposed factuality of travel 
writing draped a veneer of authenticity over the fantastic for the amusement of the author 
and savvy readers. It would appear that one of the defining characteristics of Swift’s 
writing was a determination to poke, prod, and provoke narrow-minded factional interests 
whilst vexing more careful readers (Stubbs 2017). Written pseudonymously in a style or 
styles typified by supposed factuality, Gulliver’s Travels and several other key works in 
Swift’s oeuvre intentionally couch their meaning and significance in many rhetorical 
exercises and deliberate red herrings. Travel writing offers such a frame for Gulliver’s 
Travels, but it is also the case that there is a distinct argument concerning the validity of 
travel as a means to individual edification and how it might be disciplined in order to do 
so. 
Since Swift ‘s corpus is full of intentionally obscurantist writing, designed to 
operate at multiple levels for multiple audiences that satirically and politically engage the 
writings in different ways to different purposes it becomes all the more important to 
establish a solidly situated understanding of how and why Gulliver’s Travels makes use 
of genre conventions and tropes. Travel writing and travel itself occupies a more 
important functional context to the political significance of the text. The genre of travel 
writing provides Swift with a means to engage two important themes: 1) the edifying or 
corrupting effects of travel on the traveller, and 2) authenticity of experience at the 
individual and collective levels. This section will engage scholarship on this these and 
other related questions in order to situate the argument presented in this dissertation 
within the field of studies related to Gulliver’s Travels, travel literature, and eighteenth-
century political ideas. 
Interestingly, Swift by and large eschews debates around contemporary economic 
and religious justifications for the colonial enterprise, indeed outside from the famous 
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fleeting yet scathing portrayal of imperialism right at the book’s conclusion (Book IV, 
Ch. XII: 275), it is more of a backdrop than an actively engaged facet of the text. He 
instead uses the facade of factuality afforded by the genre of travel writing as a means to 
dig into how individuals stand up to the rigours of global travel. The ostensible veracity 
that comes with the style of travel writing provides the perfect medium through which to 
convey a veneer of earnestness to satirical critiques of contemporary political and 
academic matters. Furthermore, Swift satirizes the idea that the verisimilitude seemingly 
possessed by travel writing could yield any significant analysis into human nature along 
lines that we would now consider empirical sociology or anthropology. The 
documentarian chronicling employed by Gulliver demonstrates an understanding of the 
style of evidence gathering in travel preferred by the Royal Society and other innovators 
of the new Science (Shanahan 2009: 193–194). This element of the satire is directed at 
the folly of ordering travel for the purposes of science amidst the trickery of travellers 
seeking to make their name with fictitious tales. In this regard, form combines with 
content to generate the substance of the political commentary on travel and science. 
 In general, Gulliver’s Travels draws upon and contributes to two sub-genres of 
travel writing. The first is that of the castaway narrative, typified by Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe in fiction and its supposed real-life inspiration Alexander Selkirk, a Scottish 
sailor who survived four years on an uninhabited island in the South Pacific Ocean. 
Defoe, like Swift, drew upon a wide range of travel sources beyond Selkirk’s tale, and 
Crusoe is rather a complex compound of buccaneer survival stories than a singular 
homage to any one base. Core themes in castaway narratives are that of survival against 
the odds in an unfamiliar setting, and the use of ingenuity and cunning by protagonists to 
best terrifying dangers proffered by the elements (Rawson 2012). Rebecca Weaver-
Hightower also notes that the character tropes of the genre such as pirates, cannibals, and 
savages often fell into one of two Manichaean characterisations; either wholly reformed 
or irredeemable; entirely noble or ignoble (Weaver-Hightower 2007: 146–47). Swift 
plays with these conventions, particularly in Book IV in ways that render a 
straightforward diagnosis of the character of Gulliver disconcertingly tricky. Gulliver 
combines a certain savvy in the arts of improvisation and survival with an undiscerning 
consumption of the cultures he encounters (Deane 1986) in a fashion that directly 
employs and parodies the tropes of castaway literature.  
The second sub-genre of travel writing is exotic voyage literature—real life tales 
of so-called oriental exploration in which “the traveller possesses a relative degree of 
immunity from danger and thus can dedicate himself, as a detached observer, to the task 
of capturing the prodigious wealth and diversity of the habits, beliefs, and customs he has 
noted” (Hinnant 1987: 8). Swift plays with the conventions and tensions that the 
established tropes of these literary genres offer as material for political commentary on 
the mental pressures placed on travellers who find themselves required to be both a 
survivalist castaway and an objective explorer and documenter of foreign lands. This 
tension between being changed by one’s experiences and yet documenting them in an 
ordered and disciplined fashion for the sake of veracity and scientific coherence is a key 
anchor of Swift’s criticism of travel in general.  
As Damrosch notes, “in an age that valued factuality, voyagers were encouraged 
to describe wonders in a matter-of-fact way” (Damrosch 2013: 358) and Swift directly 
plays with this expectation having Gulliver explicitly say that his goal in recounting his 
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travels is “to inform and not to amuse thee” (Book IV, Ch. 12: 272). Needless to say, 
despite the consistency of his removed and objective narrative voice, Gulliver is unable to 
maintain such objective distance in the face of his experiences. This highlighting of the 
problematic relationship between form and content of travel writing provides the 
groundwork for the political significance of the changeability of the traveller as an 
intractable facet of travel. 
 In surveying the field of scholarship on eighteenth-century travel writing, Morgan 
Vanek (2015) establishes an interesting contradiction that strikes at the heart of how and 
why Gulliver’s Travels remains a puzzling and stimulating read. Vanek summarises that 
English travel writing of the Eighteenth Century typically oscillates around one of two 
central assumptions about the traveller’s experience. Vanek’s summary of the 
contradiction at the centre of travel and documentation for scientific purposes strikes at 
the heart of the key gap in the literature on Gulliver’s Travels: both sets of thinking 
regarding travel are engaged throughout in generating the text’s argument and notably 
operate at both textual and contextual levels in Gulliver’s Travels. 
The first assumption is that the traveller is a neutral, objective and resolute 
observer/information-gatherer in the name of either British imperial authority or the more 
general scientific project of “enlarging the bounds of human empire” in the form of 
knowledge (Bacon 2008: 177). In this viewpoint, travel writing is a necessary means to 
establish, legitimize and aggrandize the British imperial project (Rawson 2012: 7–10) 
through the extension of the rigorous norms of scientific data collection to the act of 
travel. This is the context in which travel is recontextualized and repurposed by scientific 
projectors, the likes of whom are satirized as dangerous crackpots in Laputa and 
Balnibarbi in Book III. This analysis is furthered in the dissertation chapter on Swift’s 
argument against science’s proposed disciplining of travel for its purposes. The second is 
far more conscious of the traveller’s vulnerability to change from external influence. This 
second approach can be divided further based on whether or not such changeability is 
positive or negative. Seen positively, travel is a meaningful and necessary portal to 
personal edification. Seen negatively, contact with debased peoples/places could result in 
problematic degradation of values (Vanek 2015: 555–558). The expectation that travel is 
a primarily edifying form of experiential learning that can root out prejudice will form 
key Enlightenment assumptions about autonomous individuality and human perfectability 
through education. This is analysed in the dissertation chapter on Book II of Gulliver’s 
Travels, in which the most profound presentation of the argument against the universal 
benefits of travel are established. 
Bauer (2003) and Neil (2002) both establish the desire for the traveller in colonial 
situations to be resistant to change from external stimulus. The traveller should ideally be 
able to safely export European systems of knowledge whilst neutrally encountering and, 
if required, absorbing commercial and scientific information from the colonial territory. 
However, within such assumptions, they argue, are serious concerns regarding the 
potential degradation of the travelling subject as a result of unfiltered exposure to 
external influence (Vanek 2015: 558). Not only would travellers be physically far from 
the order and stability of their originating society, but their task demanded an intellectual 
distance also. Michael McKeon notes the importance of the emergence of scientific 
objectivity as a means to untether the observer from tradition: “equipped only with the 
basic physical accessories of universal, unheroic humanity, he is distinguished by those 
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private virtues of honesty, sincerity, naturalness, and integrity that guarantee the 
perspicuous observation and documentation of truth” (McKeon 2002: 104). 
Contemporary critics of liberalism such as Mark T. Mitchell (2019) and Patrick J. 
Deneen (2018) have made more holistic claims concerning the importance of 
communitarian traditions and the dangers of fully embracing such a rationalist 
perspective. Investigating the ways in which these twenty-first century anti-liberal 
perspectives overlap with Swift’s portrayal of the risks involved in travel might offer 
fruitful analysis but to fully do so would extend beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
It will be argued here that Gulliver’s Travels offers an instructive example of 
exactly the types of misadventure and ruin that can befall an individual whom so fluidly 
seeks such untethering from the boundaries of society. Martin Price writes that for Swift, 
“the art of politics is the art of moderating moral heroism, of making it unnecessary for 
the man who can never achieve it” (Price 1964: 182). Price makes such a comment in the 
context of Swift’s views regarding the necessity of an Established Church as the spine of 
political society, but it is equally applicable to the power of organic society to morally 
orient and ground individuals in ways that freeform travel would wholly undo.  
Contemporary travel writing and secondary documentation on the topic display a 
deep concern for the ability (and necessity) of travellers to uphold the required qualities 
under the strains of their voyages (Vanek 2015). Such thinking primarily applied to 
travellers in the service of the scientific and commercial exploits of empire, travellers of 
leisure and of experience, but was arguably at its most heightened in reference to those 
who were to settle new lands. The questionable character of settlers was raised in 
contemporary thought as particularly problematic when matters of degeneration arose. 
Indeed, as Jack P. Greene, has argued, eighteenth-century discourse around colonial 
settlers centred on their lowly social origins and religious and social deviancy (Greene 
2013: 50–55). They were deemed to have left England to share far-flung wilderness 
territories with any number of savage peoples, terminally disconnected from the ordering 
cultural and religious amenities of English life. As a result of the lowly character of those 
founding them, formative colonial societies could emerge only as crude pastiches of 
metropolitan norms and would inevitably degenerate from there. They would debase 
further through the adoption of local savage practices, the continued influx of unsavoury 
characters from the metropole, and the unbridled pursuit of narrow material economic 
gain (Greene 2013: 51).  
Gulliver describes his reason for travel as born of an “insatiable desire of seeing 
foreign countries” (Book I, Ch. VIII: 71), undoubtedly a dig at the shallow appetite for 
the new over the tried and true. The threat of travel as a character-altering phenomenon, 
as likely to unhinge as to edify (Fabricant 2005: 744), is an important theme with which 
to frame the interaction of Gulliver’s Travels with travel literature. The origins and 
reason for travel of those who venture into the unknown can—and perhaps should—be 
causes of concern, especially when we know that they face the pressure of maintaining 
civility and objectivity in the face of base cultures as time away from home goes by. The 
tension is a hitherto underexplored dimension of the political argument of the Travels. 
 However, the idea of the change brought about by travel being positive and 
desirable has a long history. Writers such as Fabricant and Bohls have identified the 
importance of ‘the grand tour’ and writing on the topic to the development of modern 
British notions of personhood and conscience in transit. Such writing is presented as 
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indicative of positive affirmations of character changing over time through experience 
(Fabricant 2005; Bohls 2005). Both authors also present travel narratives as anchored by 
the political functions provided by documentations of personal transformations helping to 
define national identity in an age of growing empire (Vanek 2015: 560–561). Gulliver’s 
Travels certainly references such an idea, presenting Gulliver’s famous anti-imperial 
speech in Book IV right at the base of the summit of his madness. Rather than affirming 
identity following personal transformation voyaging for empire, Gulliver is changed for 
the worse by his experiences, and the extent of his mounting madness has all been 
meticulously chronicled.  
Locke argued in Some Thoughts Concerning Education that the potential of travel 
to affect positive change was entirely contingent on the character of the traveller to begin 
with and, crucially, when in life they embarked on the trip. There is a sweet spot, 
according to Locke, between being too young and impressionable to be positively 
affected by the experience of travel, and being too old and set in one’s ways to have one’s 
pride in place lowered enough to see what is of value in other places and cultures. As will 
be fully articulated in a later chapter, Locke’s argument recognises the traveller’s 
capacity for change as a liability when done under less than ideal circumstances (Locke 
1996: 158–161). A weak person that is poorly educated or not yet sufficiently educated is 
likely to degrade under the pressures of travel, it seems. The project of the New Science 
professed the desire to extend the “bounds of human empire” across the globe (Bacon 
2008: 177). Thus, the problem of ordering travel for the betterment of science does not 
resolve Swift’s antipathy toward travel in general as this forms an absolutist project that 
not only seeks to undermine his commitments of religious faith and tradition, but also 
allies to political absolutism through innovations in technological capacity that make 
terrifying tyrannies such as Laputa a reality.  
Building upon this, I claim that Gulliver’s Travels essentially argues that the 
wrong person, travelling at the wrong time, encouraged to disassociate from their 
originating context in order to better document their new encounters and surroundings, 
results in negative consequences. This is further exacerbated by the fact that global 
expansionism in the context of imperialism is an ongoing phenomenon, thus allowing 
Gulliver multiple chances to travel after returning home from differing levels of 
transformative experiences. 
Interestingly, the documentation of this changeability, according to Fabricant & 
Bohls, provided much of the groundwork for the thematic anchor of personal 
development (and/or transformation in the face of conflict) that was to become the 
foundation of the modern novel (Fabricant 2005; Bohls 2005). Furthermore, Percy G. 
Adams, also exploring the significance of travel writing to the development of the 
modern novel, points out the interesting juxtaposition to the reader of the perceived 
authority of travel reports with cognizance of the potential for the traveller’s own 
changeability affecting the account of what happened. He then goes further by noting the 
litany of fictitious travel books feigning veracity that were available at the time, adding 
yet another layer of possible illegitimacy to the reader’s experience. (Adams 1962: 186). 
Gulliver’s Travels undoubtedly plays with these multi-faceted expectations and 
suspicions, adding an evolving unreliable narrator as the book unfolds.  
In this regard, one intriguing contribution of Gulliver’s Travels to intellectual 
history is its anticipation and pre-emptive subversion of conventions that would shortly 
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become established as hallmarks of the English novel. Michael Seidel argues as much, 
adding that the germination of the novel in the literary experimentation of the 1720s 
featured many of Swift’s chief dislikes and subsequent targets (individually as concepts 
and collectively as a critique of form) in his writing Gulliver’s Travels: “from Swift's 
satiric viewpoint, the novel was exactly the narrative form his age deserved, one that 
removed the time-tested values of cultural inheritance and substituted the subjective 
experience of a serviceably dim and limited commercial intelligence” (Seidel 1979: 73). 
This subjective experience is liable to create change, a change documented with fanfare 
alongside an aggrandizement of a degradation of societal values that Gulliver’s Travels 
seeks to castigate. Seidel utilizes this to generate the contribution of Swift to the 
emergence of modern subjectivity and personhood in the genre of the novel. This is 
certainly a salient point, but Seidel does so without engaging the importance of travel as a 
destabilizing element to the potential of meaningful personhood in a well-situated 
society.  
 
1.5. Travel and the Body 
The notable documentation of bodily functions and of the viscerality of the human body 
in Gulliver’s Travels notably links to Jonathan Lamb’s documentation the obsession of 
British travellers to the South Seas with illness, physical degradation and the potential for 
concurrent debilitation of the mind (Lamb 2001). Lamb discusses the infatuation of 
travellers with the idea that nutritional deficiencies away from home would weaken their 
physical and eventually mental resolve to meet the topographical and scientific 
challenges asked of them. The vulnerability of body and mind to crack under the pressure 
of travel and illness is clear: “with scurvy rampant, discipline, cartography, 
measurement—and the dreams of commercial and scientific progress depending on 
them—all suffer because the eye, and the ‘I’, can no longer be trusted” (Lamb 2001: 
128). Gulliver’s obsessive documentation of bodily functions operates alongside a log of 
his increasingly failing mind. Travel wreaks havoc on Gulliver’s mind and his existence 
as a foreign body in a foreign land overwhelms him by the time of his encounter with 
Houyhnhmns and Yahoos of Book IV. 
Gulliver’s Travels grabs hold of the tensions identified in this literature on the 
demands and effects of travel, presenting a central character who oscillates between 
foolish national pride and a willingness to forego all affinities and beg acceptance of a 
new society. The medium of travel literature is an ideal literary means to satirise and 
politically comment upon the potential damage done by the scope for individualistic 
indulgence that travel affords. While there are shadows of Anglican theology in the 
treatment of other themes in the text (see below), in my view the text offers a refutation 
of Puritan or dissenting Protestant conscience as a source of moral authority. Indeed, as I 
outline in my analytical chapter on Book III, Swift saw strong parallels in the projects of 
the New Science and freethinking dissent, most clearly represented by the references to 
the religious toleration and scientific modernism of the Dutch (Palomo 1977: 28). Lotte 
Mulligan (1973) and Barbara Shapiro (1968; 1975) have demonstrated the heterogeneity 
of political and religious views within the membership of the Royal Society, but 
Gulliver’s Travels refers to an idealized version of the society that serves Swift’s satirical 
and political aims, rather than a portrait that is strictly accurate at the specific time of 
writing. Thus, while the actual Royal Society of the 1720s was neither as Puritan nor as 
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single-mindedly committed to so-called Baconianism as Swift’s allusions may summon, 
the parallel between these two intellectual strains made throughout the text is assisted by 
their intentional conflation into a recurring reference point.  
 Gulliver’s Travels is unquestionably vehement and brutal in its rejection of 
individual authenticity as something established by knowledge of oneself through 
meeting other cultures. The idea of the authentic self (insofar as it can be realised at all) 
as uncovered and perfected by travel experience is presented as an indulgent and prideful 
myth. The idea of foreign lands as housing more pure and honest ways of life is also 
conveyed as misguided optimism or foolish hubris. Swift utilises the fantastic voyaging 
of Gulliver’s Travels to critique the nascent ‘grass-is-greener’-style thinking of the 
politics of authenticity that was emergent in a nascent pre-Rousseauvian form with the 
advent of the discovery and documentation of pre-civilisation cultures in the New World 
(Lindholm 2008:1–10). Following Marshall Berman, the politics of authenticity are 
defined as the attribution of high political importance to the idea of “an ideal community 
in which individuality will not be subsumed and sacrificed, but fully developed and 
expressed” (Berman 1970: xvii).  
Swift’s view of such matters—like his disposition more generally—was decidedly 
unromantic, most likely because from his vantage point he lived on the frontlines of the 
ongoing “war between barbarity and civilisation” (McMinn 1994: 82). Swift satirically 
prefigures much of the more calculated political implications of the noble savage thesis 
by parodying traveller’s tales of encountering non-European peoples. The perspective on 
such thinking referenced in Gulliver’s Travels culminates in a defence of the institutions 
of hierarchically ordered English society as stabilizing, rather than corrupting influences. 
The litany of satirical criticisms of contemporary England and Europe are cast in the 
attempt to salvage what Swift sees as vitally necessary for lives of responsible freedom to 
be possible. The modern innovations of licentious individualism, materialism, crass 
commercialism and even religious toleration represent hubris and folly that lead to moral 
and political degeneration, as they have done in the likes of Holland, for example. 
Living in Ireland, where much of the ‘native Irish’ population lived in abject 
poverty and whom Swift and his Anglo-Irish class had been conditioned by literally 
centuries of anthropological writing to see as a morally barren, idle, base, and degenerate 
race (Stubbs 15–17), the prospect of voyaging to faraway lands to see how the other side 
lived held little appeal. Strange and deviant lifestyles, somewhat sublime and somewhat 
loathsome were available on the island where Swift was born and forced to call home. 
And, as documented by Joseph McMinn, Swift was a sufficiently storied traveller of the 
Emerald Isle to be genuinely acquainted with a people and way of life he generally found 
“loathsome and incomprehensible” (McMinn 1994: 102). Gulliver’s Travels brings 
together Swift’s joy at playfully jibing the naïve realism of travel writing and his lived 
experience of how patently unromantic supposedly lower societies really lived. 
 
1.6. Individual, Society, Tradition 
Travel is also a means to engage questions of universality in human affairs. This is 
certainly a theme that readers and critics of Gulliver’s Travels have long debated. As 
Warren Montag (2001: 17) notes, Gulliver never encounters the terra nulla envisioned by 
Hobbes and Locke as an essential characteristic of the state of nature in the New World. 
Gulliver instead encounters a range of societies that each demonstrates some version or 
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another of organic hierarchy. Montag reads this as a direct theoretical refutation of the 
state of nature. Montag’s argument is that Swift favoured a particular brand of Anglican 
authoritarianism, and that the absence of any true ‘natural society’ across the globe is 
designed as a vindication of the sanctity and security of order (Montag 2001). Swift’s 
writing certainly approvingly conveys authoritarian ideas in certain important ways, not 
least his support for the Test Act that excluded non-Anglicans from political power and 
his chauvinistic attitudes toward the native Irish population. However, it is extremely 
important to note that Gulliver’s Travels clearly criticizes political absolutism and the 
aspiration toward universal control and understanding of the material world possessed by 
the scientific project. Although Swift is certainly authoritarian by the standards of 
modern Liberal Democratic norms, he can nonetheless be seen to stand for a particular 
strain of limited individual liberty as freedom from the state within the confines of a 
strong established church. This is predicated on a strong communitarian ethos that rejects 
perceived licentious individualism. 
Montag is certainly astute in making this point, although Swift actually takes this 
further, presenting the reader with the very real dangers of what happens when an 
individual as prideful and of a questionable education as Gulliver leaves their originating 
society for the open space of travel. Montag does correctly, in my view, note that 
Gulliver’s Travels is an argument in favour of a viewpoint that accepts the irreducible 
sociability of mankind (Montag 1994: 129–130; 2001: 11). However, in “Gulliver’s 
Solitude: the Paradoxes of Swift’s Anti-Individualism,” Montag deduces a degree of self-
contradiction in the argument against individualism presented in the Travels. He argues 
that the recognition of the falsehood of individualist philosophies is juxtaposed with the 
singular failure of the institutions of societal sociability, most notably the family, to 
comfort or stabilise Gulliver (Montag 2001: 11–14). This, according to Montag, is most 
notably the case at the culmination of the book in that Gulliver’s isolating madness 
occurs amidst his wife and children. Thus, the family—that basic unit of human 
sociability, per Aristotle—is of no consolation in the face of his antipathy to the 
sympathetic world around him (Montag 2001: 11–14). For Montag this is a curious self-
contradiction and a problem for the strength of Swift’s anti-individualist argument.  
While I agree that Swift’s anti-individualism is nuanced and complex, the key 
factor omitted by Montag is the changeability of the traveller—Gulliver returns to his 
organic society transformed in ways that prevent the efficacy of its natural sociability to 
take root and reorient him. Gulliver has been negatively affected by radical individualism 
and unscrupulous consumption of foreign cultures to an extent that renders him beyond 
repair by the positive influence of traditional institutions. 
 
1.7. The Body and the Body Politic 
The body represents a classic venue for the micro and macro struggles of politics to play 
out, literally in the case of the individual body and metaphorically for the body politic. In 
very broad terms, the Christian and Humanist traditions upheld the body as a mere vessel 
for the soul whereas emergent modern thinking increasingly rendered it a strictly 
empirical, corporeal entity (Hillman & Maude 2015: 1–6). In typically Swiftian fashion, 
Gulliver’s Travels makes the case for the former whilst indulging the most gross and 
exaggerated iterations of the latter. What Knowles and other scholars (notably Houlihan 
Flynn 1990) omit, however, is the centrality of travel and empire as the engine behind 
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Swift’s depiction of these corrupting influences and its primacy in sending men far away 
from society where conservative, intellectual, and anti-scientific values can preserve their 
body and mind. 
Several commentators have noted that Swift’s treatment of the body in Gulliver’s 
Travel’s is fixated most notably on the potential and actual infirmities that human 
physicality suffers. Carol Houlihan Flynn argues that the work of Swift and Defoe 
represents a crystallization of the breakdown of the idealised body in a more materialistic 
age and a move toward a more physically intrusive and corrupting presence. The body is 
seen as primarily a consuming entity that collides with others, taking up space and 
draining scarce resources as it simultaneously pumps waste out into the world (Houlihan 
Flynn 1990). Gulliver’s Travels certainly focuses on the gross physicality of the human 
condition, in order to express its sometimes crass and uncomfortable functional 
necessities in starkly literal terms. However, this is done with typically Swiftian double-
handedness; the goal is to undermine those who advocate seeing the world in purely 
materialist terms by indulging in the full extent of how observing humanity through such 
a prism would look. The Travels shows us that humans are irreducibly physical, but that 
doesn’t mean we should reduce ourselves to the merely physical.  
The fascination with disease and defilement in the text is extremely noteworthy 
and makes up for a significant amount of the coverage of the body across the four 
voyages. A key interpretive battleground has been in making sense of the connection 
between expressions of the nauseous and putrid capacities of the human body in both 
everyday actions and in decay, and Swift’s portrayal of human nature more generally. Is 
the gross detail with which the human body is presented an indication of the stained soul 
of original sin expressing its capacity for horror laid bare when separated from the façade 
of society? Or, is it more of a critique of a materialistic view of humanity, emergent 
within contemporary modern scientific thinking? 
Annette Leddy argues that the treatment of the body in Gulliver’s Travels is a 
reaction to the social manipulation of the body perpetrated by a solidifying capitalist 
society freed of the demands of objective reason (Leddy 1990: 114). While this reads to 
me as an anachronistic, it is true that elsewhere in his corpus Swift demonstrates a dislike 
for emergent modern economical thinking. The Modest Proposal of 1729 unquestionably 
directs a significant portion of its satirical force toward practitioners of political 
arithmetik. This satirical pamphlet essentially argues that those who ideationally reduce 
humans to mere numbers are sufficiently down the path of mass dehumanisation to be 
open to a project where children are a food source. Such ideas are referenced in the 
critique of scientific projection found in Book II, wherein technological mastery provides 
the physical capacity for tyranny and a culture of “intense speculation” of abstract 
matters quashes the any humane inclination to refrain from destructive use of power. 
Gulliver’s Travels is, in my view, politically situated as a defence of organic society and 
the stability and assuredness that it can provide to the role of individuals in community. 
Swift offers a criticism of several aspects of modern society and a defence of a version of 
ancient virtue (Knowles 1996: 29).  
It is undoubtedly clear that Swift was ambivalent at best about many aspects of 
the modern project, with financial speculation and the unrestricted potential of the 
bourgeoisie to reshape society in its interests providing considerable pause for concern. 
However, to argue that Gulliver’s Travels utilises the manipulation of the body as an 
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argument against contemporary capitalism is anachronistic and also disregards the net 
positive light in which British society (despite indulging in displaying its faults) is 
presented in comparison to the chaos and horror of venturing into the unknown. Even the 
most desirable society Gulliver comes across, The Land of the Houhynhnms, is 
ultimately led by unflinching reason toward a genocidal impulse toward its Yahoo 
population (Rawson 2001). Gulliver is utilised as a representative of modern attitudes and 
impulses—commercial, urban, mercantile—to satiric effect (Knowles 1996: 30). This is 
because Swift is a nuanced writer who has multiple targets across the text. However, to 
argue, as Ronald Knowles does, that the synthesised argument of the Travels is Swift’s 
declaration in favour of an “ancient” humanism in favour of modernity in a battle 
between progress and development is to miss out somewhat on how much Gulliver’s 
Travels actually defends the institutions of modern Britain, despite some heavy criticism 
of them. If anything, the greatest scepticism is directed toward attempts to “progress” 
beyond the peace and order established in 1688 through the constitution of church and 
state. 
Claude Rawson (2005) argues that Swift’s presentation of the bleakly low ceiling 
of human improvability means that we should be wary of investing optimism in the 
capacity of any institutions and laws to dull the corruption of the human condition. The 
role of institutions mediating the potential for human depravity is an important theme in 
the history of political thought and Gulliver’s Travels engages it interestingly. I argue that 
while Swift is certainly worried and grim with regards to human nature he certainly has a 
preference for how it can be best housed and organised and England offers much of this, 
flawed as it may be. Human nature being what it is, from Swift’s perspective social and 
political institutions are prone to corruption and degradation and thus the mixed 
government of crown, parliament, and nobility, kept in check by an established church 
must be defended.  
Indeed, Gulliver’s Travels conveys certain aspects of how the post-revolutionary 
era tended to see the cyclical degeneration or decline of society as inevitable—an idea 
that has its origins in the most formative political studies of the ancient world (Fink 1947: 
160; Minogue 1995). However, Gulliver’s Travels still demonstrates that we are best 
when housed in societies that are preserved and protected through time-honoured 
traditional institutions, curbing the potential for radical excess and baseness. The 
monarchy operated in such a fashion, drawing out a veneration from the public through 
the legitimacy of its long unbroken line of succession, quelling revolt and inspiring 
political obligation. 
Original sin definitely casts a shadow upon Swift’s depiction of human nature, but 
it is at best a partial explanation for the ways in which human physicality is presented in 
the book. Original sin as a generalized radical, universal, and incurable phenomenon is an 
undercurrent for the human depravity dreamt up across the four voyages. It is noteworthy 
that the book doesn’t include any direct Biblical allegory, nor any heavy-handed religious 
messaging or subtext, as is the case in Robinson Crusoe. However, the treatment of the 
body is in keeping with wariness of squalor, bodily complacence and misplaced pride in 
the body that we can take the sense of inherent human depravity to be “a secular analogue 
to original sin”, in the words of Claude Rawson (2005: xxxii).  
In this regard, Houlihan Flynn’s work comparing Swift and Defoe on the body 
fails to acknowledge the significance of Gulliver being a surgeon, trained to witness and 
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tackle human physicality at its worst. Houlihan Flynn does note that both Swift and 
Defoe wrote in response to the increased materiality of their world. Swift, in particular, 
dwells on the problems of sensation as a means to attain reliable perception, questioning 
the information about the world that our bodies give our minds (Houlihan Flynn 1990: 1–
2). This is an important aspect of Swift’s engagement with the body, but it is notably 
treated as such, I will argue, because of the removal of the body from its original society 
through travel. The satiric irony at the culmination of the book, of course, is that the true 
casualty of Gulliver’s Travels is less Gulliver’s body than his mind—the non-material 
entity that (allegedly or potentially) houses the definitively human characteristic of 
reason. Perception, reliability and the loosening of mind and body occurs as a result of 
travel and the indulgence of individuality that the imperial endeavour affords Gulliver. 
James Ward argues that Swift’s writing uses comparisons between the natural and 
political bodies as a means to insist that “sovereignty and integrity are problematic 
guarantors of personal, as much as political identity” (Ward 2011: 40). The animating 
fiction of the universal resemblance between the individual human body and the body 
politic is used as a critique of the strains placed on individuality by political and 
economic modernity. The analogue is established in order to demonstrate that the 
aberrations or faults of individual bodies throughout the text (primarily through 
degeneration and decay) reflect the faults of the wider body politic. The primary culprit 
for this twofold decay is the innovation wrought by modernity (Ward 2011: 40–42). It’s 
worth noting that Ward cites Richard Braveman’s 1993 study of the literary use of the 
body politic from 1660–1730, in which it is claimed that the trope of the body politic was 
unfashionable or outdated by the time Swift was writing Gulliver’s Travels (Ward 2011; 
Braverman 1993). Thus, Ward claims that this constitutes intentional anachronism on 
Swift’s part, harking back to an earlier model of political metaphor to subvert modernist 
discourse. The goal, according to Ward, is to present an anti-modern discourse that 
presents political bodies as battered, bruised, inherently ugly, and prone to infirmity as a 
direct consequence of the onslaught of modernity (Ward 2011).  
As such, Swift intensifies the depiction of natural degeneration in order to further 
impress the violent harms of modern utilitarian, mercantile, and individualistic life on 
body and soul alike. This also further reinforces Swift as an Old Whig in political 
matters, despondent at the individualism, materialism, and rationalist currents gathering 
momentum in the 1720s ahead of their more developed articulation in the decades to 
come (Lock 1983: 134). 
Ward argues that Swift builds upon Hobbes’s discussion of personations in the 
modern state in generating such an argument. Personation, for Hobbes, is the necessary 
set of fictitious disguising persona or roles played by individuals when interacting with 
each other and government in the context of the early modern state. Evidence for this 
claim is drawn from the list of supposedly odious roles and professions that Gulliver 
declares himself happy to be away from when in Houyhnhmnland (Ward 2011: 45–50). 
Such roles are all seen as examples of how modern society is built upon the established 
and understood fiction of personation rather than full personhood, which Ward then sees 
as an argument against how modernity detracts from individuality. Ward does not 
necessarily comment on Hobbes’s intention in depicting personation positively or 
negatively, but he argues that Gulliver’s Travels presents the link between degradation 
and decay of the individual body and of the body politic as a criticism of the denial of full 
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personhood that is perpetrated by modern society. Such less-than-full persons constitute 
wasteful excess in the body politic, represented in images of tumours and bile, 
reminiscent of Milton’s Of Reformation Touching Church Discipline in England from 
1641 (Forsyth 2008: 70). 
While Ward has many useful insights into the character and context of Swift’s 
engagement with individual and political bodies, to claim that Gulliver’s Travels reads 
Hobbes on personation as an attack on full personhood and individuality cannot be 
substantiated by the text. Gulliver’s Travels is at its most basic level a blistering attack on 
individual pride (Damrosch 2013). The multi-faceted nature of this attack, the chaotic and 
imaginative imagery used throughout, and the multiple layers involved in generating the 
argument render the text a head-scratching bone of contention for readers across the 
centuries. But the central message in its most simple and direct form is not so much under 
debate. In my reading Gulliver’s Travels is not a critique of modern politics’ inability to 
preserve/protect personal and political identity. It is rather a scathing criticism of how 
modernist ideas of self-directed travel as a means to scientific discovery encourage and 
facilitate the loss of the societal context in which human improvement can be fruitfully 
directed. In this regard, the political body is certainly challenged by some of the travails 
of modernity but the natural sociability of man, conditioned by moral limitations and 
barriers to improvement, nonetheless necessarily demands a solid base rooted in the 
organic hierarchy of society.  
Gulliver’s Travels is far less concerned with the potential reduction of full 
personhood that comes with personation in modern society than it is with the unleashing 
of radical individualism and the potential for degeneration both physical and mental when 
travellers untether from society and unscrupulously consume culture and experience. 
Swift’s degraded bodies are not, as Ward claims, “material signifiers of modernity’s 
damaging innovations (…) informed by Hobbes’s notion of personation,” but are rather 
representations of excess of individualism and its susceptibility to transformation 
(physical, mental, and perceptive) when radically separated from society. In Swift’s A 
Tale of a Tub there is a strong focus on the contempt for the self-interested indulgence of 
appetite that is hypocritically concealed behind the rectitude of moral reform. I argue that 
a similar conservative ethical argument, fuelled by distaste for hypocrisy, is waged in 
Gulliver’s Travels, but levelled at those who would indulge the appetite of the self-
indulgent fiction of full-personhood rather than the political fiction of personation. Per 
Hobbes, personation is what makes modern societal order possible. Rather than 
condemning this fiction, Swift demonstrates contempt for those who wish to recklessly 
travel in order to indulge their appetites under the guise of seeking personal 
transformation and regaining a fictive full personhood or selfishly enriching themselves 
under the pretence of extending the imperium of Britain. Furthermore, the satiric target is 
romantic notions of the supposed authenticity of full personhood to be found in travel. 
Many of the authoritative biographical accounts of Swift suggest that he had a 
personal dislike of hypocrisy and penchant for cleanliness to an extent altogether outside 
the realms of normalcy for his age (Ehrenpreis 1952; Nokes 1985; Damrosch 2013; 
Stubbs 2017). This is said to account for the particular revulsion with which the body and 
its capacity for filth is treated in Gulliver’s Travels. This is, at absolute best, a shallow 
explanation of how the body contributes to the over-arching argument(s) that we can take 
out of the book. More importantly, however, methodologically this study seeks to extract 
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textual meaning in ways that may exceed or surpass initial authorial intention (if that may 
even be identified with any degree of certainty) and thus even if this was definitively the 
case, the text demonstrates meaning and significance beyond this regardless. 
Leo Damrosch suggests that the treatment of the physicality of the human body 
and its functions in Gulliver’s Travels and elsewhere in Swift’s oeuvre is the result of the 
modern maxim of ‘write what you know.’ Damrosch describes Swift’s Dublin as quite 
simply a place where material decay and defilement was commonplace and difficult to 
avoid. Thus, Swift simply observed and recreated this in his writing, partially because 
this is the world he knew and partially to stir the pot amongst those who believed that 
polite society should not comment on such aspects of human life (Damrosch 2013). 
James Ward also comments on this, suggesting that the body horror and scrupulous 
attention paid to public displays of decay and degradation is not necessarily as peculiarly 
Swiftian as is often thought to be the case, but rather a more true-to-life representation of 
the brutality and strangeness of the omnipresence of death in the 18th Century (Ward 
2014). However, as most biographers of Swift note, the man cherished “cleanliness, 
rationality, benevolence, decency, and restraint” (Nokes 1985: 328) despite littering his 
writings with the most outrageous depictions of filth, impulsiveness, wickedness, chaos, 
and indulgence. Ward correctly points out that in doing so to the extent that he did, Swift 
was taken for highly unusual by his contemporaries. Indeed, despite a high public profile 
as a popular political figure in Ireland and as a bestselling and beloved author in Britain 
and elsewhere, his critical reputation was primarily that of an excessive misanthrope for 
much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
1.8. Empire and Utopia 
Another key literary theme is the idea of empire as a metaphor for the extension of 
absolute sovereignty across the globe. This involves more than just political power 
following the tradition of the Roman understanding of imperium. Thus, empire does not 
always strictly apply as the growth of dominion of conquered territory and peoples. It 
also has the important association of “an aspiration toward universality” (Howe 2002: 
13). We see this universal aspiration demonstrated in explicit Christian usage of the term 
beginning in the Middle Ages and in scientific discourse from the early modern period 
onward. Swift knowingly plays with the problems of such a universalization as Gulliver’s 
Travels presents contrasts of natural universal truths with the hubris of man in seeking to 
impose unnatural universalizations upon the world.  
Gulliver’s Travels’ engagement with the perils of travel and empire tackles both 
in a synthesised argument that is built throughout the four voyages. Frances D. Louis 
makes the case that the overarching argument of the Travels, above all else, is an 
epistemological one, suggesting that as the text unfurls we witness “a man fumbling his 
way toward knowledge” (Louis 1981: 123). Whilst this is true, it is also the case that the 
text highlights the problems of experiential learning through travel and ordering this 
process to serve the ends of the scientific project Swift engages epistemological problems 
of the universalising impulse by demonstrating "how easily human judgment could be 
distorted: his satire illustrates just how men can mistake all motion for progress, all 
seeing for knowing, all division for knowledge, and any individual as the measure of all 
men" (Louis 1981: 35). It will be argued here that Book III of Gulliver’s Travels makes a 
strong case that the aspiration of science toward a universal method and unified language 
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through which a rational world can be fully comprehended and mastered (Mitchell 2019: 
94) is not just hubris, but also a corollary to political absolutism, opposition to which all 
biographers of Swift agree was his primary and unflappable political commitment (Lock 
1980; 1983; Downie 1984; Higgins 1994; Oakleaf 2008). 
The idea of Christianity—High Church Anglicanism in particular—as a universal 
truth is unequivocally found elsewhere in Swift’s writings but exactly how it should be 
understood in Gulliver’s Travels in relation to the metaphor of empire more generally is 
interestingly opaque and warrants investigation. This is an important facet of how Swift 
engages the idea of empire as the metaphorical stretching of human agency across the 
world. On one hand, he arguably presents human nature as unified by inherent corruption 
across a wide range of fantastic worlds, depicting organically hierarchical societies in the 
process (Carey 2002); on the other hand, there is also a critique of the universalising 
desires of empire as both the physical and political control of territory and the notion of 
bringing the innumerable intangibles that make up the world under the control and 
discipline of science. Yet again, this is a tension or contradiction that is too often taken as 
an either/or equation in secondary literature evaluating the politics of the Travels. I argue 
that Swift sees human nature as universally fallen, but that the answer is not then to 
universalise our approach or attempts to know or control the world. 
 Such thinking notably intersects with another key literary genre that Swift pivots 
off of in Gulliver’s Travels: Utopian literature. A relevant example of this is found in 
Bacon’s New Atlantis, where human knowledge and human power are presented as 
unified in an imperial endeavour of sorts: “the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, 
to the effecting of all things possible” (Bacon 2008: 177). Swift directly dialogues with 
such an understanding of both Utopian fiction and the purpose/meaning of empire when 
conflating the extension of political power and scientific knowledge in the flying island 
and experimentation of the Laputa episode of Book III (Higgitt 2013). Book III is also a 
contemporary criticism of the scientific program of the Royal Society “that threatened to 
reduce all of life to materialist explanation” (Damrosch 2013: 135). It is important to 
fully comprehend the integrated nature of the universalising tendencies and desires of the 
scientific and imperial projects. As we have seen in surveying travel literature, they are 
one and the same in many ways and at the very least importantly intertwined endeavours. 
As discussed in more depth in the analysis chapter of Book III, the scientific project 
sought to reorder travel in order to better serve its purposes, something I argue Swift 
opposes vehemently as antithetical to the prudence of traditional morality.  
 Anthony Pagden’s Lord of All the World argued that all three major colonial 
powers saw imperialism as a “universal project” of Christianisation and civilisation, in 
return for which economic and political control over occupied territories would be 
granted. Whilst some contemporary British theorists, notably James Harrington, saw the 
English empire as “a protectorate of several interests rather than a universal state”, 
Gulliver’s Travels clearly engages the problem of the lure and seemingly inevitable 
endpoint of universalization that comes with the imperial project (Pagden 1995: 126–
127). From a biographical standpoint, Swift looked with distaste upon the Union of the 
English and Scottish crowns as something that would devalue the practical and symbolic 
independence of the Irish crown (Stubbs 2016). This demonstrates the problem of 
straying from the Harringtonian concept of multiple interests under one umbrella and the 
drive toward universalization. Gulliver’s Travels carries such a critique of the aspirations 
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toward universalism in politics, rationality, and science.  
 The primary original contribution of this dissertation is to highlight how Swift uses 
travel as a point of instructive convergence for these intellectual currents, fashioning a 
critique of the assumptions that rest at the heart of Enlightenment ideas of education and 
modernist developments in scientific rationalism. In working carefully through the 
critique of travel as a necessarily edifying endeavour, a broader criticism of modernity 
emerges. This relates to Swift’s presentation of human nature and science, both of which 
have been discussed extensively in the secondary literature referenced above and in the 
substantive chapters on these topics. However, whilst other scholars have situated 
Gulliver’s Travels within relevant theoretical and historical contexts, it has seldom been 
analysed as a text that offers a political criticism of travel itself. In particular, this 
dissertation tracks travel as a means to bring together the currents of travel writing, the 
relevant religious context of Irish Anglicanism, as well as developments in modernist 
science as vital concerns featured throughout the text. Focusing on the possibility of 
individual experiential edification through travel allows Swift to crack open questions of 
individualism, organic hierarchy, and freedom. This culminates in an argument that sheds 
light on some of the problems that ideas concerning the human capacity for self-directed 
individual experiential edification have outside of the communitarian norms provided by 
tradition. Travel can provide individuals with vital edification under the optimal 
circumstances—i.e. when pursued as part of an orderly and appropriate education—but 
Swift is unwilling to generalize from this best-case scenario Ultimately, I conclude that 
Swift’s skepticism of travel as a guaranteed means of individual improvement opens up a 
wider argument concerning the deceptions of instrumental reason (which he sees as 
purely goal-oriented cleverness devoid of moral character) as evidence for the 
inevitability of progress, pointing instead to the vitality of tradition and prudence to rein 
in the march of modernism.  
 
1.9. Methodological Approach 
The primary methodological aim of this dissertation is to assess and elucidate the 
meaning and significance of the text on its own terms: synthesising the timely and 
timeless components of its political content in order to generate an over-arching 
argument. Peter J. Ahrensdorf (1994) has noted the importance of distinguishing between 
the historically contingent and broader theoretical qualities of a text, making the case that 
studying the former can draw out the profundity of the latter, rather than the two being 
incompatible as the famous argument made by Quentin Skinner (1969) goes. This 
distinction is particularly important when reading a work by an author such as Swift who 
published prolifically as a topical satirist, political polemicist, and who packed all of his 
writings with a rich cast of references drawn from his library of classics, hotly debated 
current publications, and the news of the day. In seeking to draw insight from Gulliver’s 
Travels, I have followed Ahrensdorf’s mandate, using historical context where 
appropriate in the attempt to draw out the enduring significance of Swift’s work. Irvin 
Ehrenpreis’ three volume biography of Swift entitled Swift: The Man, His Works, and the 
Age, reigned supreme as the definitive account of the Dean’s life for much of the latter 
half of the 20th Century. Alongside this extremely influential work, more recently 
published biographies of Swift by Leo Damrosch (2013) and John Stubbs (2017) are the 
key texts used for biographical information relating to Swift history and personality in the 
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writing of this dissertation. Ehrenpreis made the case that locating and locking Gulliver’s 
Travellers into an explanatory scheme of pure topical allusions and satire undercuts the 
complexity of argument that Swift achieves in the work. We ought not, he argues to 
simply connect “his attacks with their objects in the life of his time” so as to “infer the 
doctrines he is advocating,” even if this is a satisfactory method of interrogating other 
works in Swift’s corpus (Ehrenpreis 1983: 452–453).  
The purpose of this dissertation is to extract and examine the facets of Gulliver’s 
Travels that generate an overarching commentary and argument concerning the merits of 
travel and its place in political and scientific innovations of the early eighteenth century. 
As such, certain topical satirical allusions and references that are in the text will not be 
identified or highlighted. The fact is that Gulliver’s Travels is a deceptively dense text 
and the task of drawing the specific targets and allegories throughout the work is best 
pursued as an endeavour of pure editorial contextualization.  
 Above all else, this study has been conducted seeking to avoid methodological 
dogmatism and the arrogance of allowing a pre-understood ‘correct’ means of reading 
and understanding a text to eliminate potentially valuable routes of scholarly 
investigation. Thus, whilst careful examination of the primary textual source, Gulliver’s 
Travels, forms the central backbone of the research method, secondary sources that 
elucidate relevant historical and cultural contexts, as well as kindle avenues of analytic 
import have also been consulted. Following Ian Shapiro’s (2002) recommendation of 
“problem-oriented political science,” the method chosen here is not professed to be the 
catchall approach to deciphering the significance of an argument contained within a text. 
Rather, the goal is to utilise the most appropriate method to achieve the goal at hand—in 
this case surveying Swift’s argument concerning the value of travel and its relationship to 
education and science. 
Quentin Skinner’s (1969) famous articulation of the contextualist or historicist 
methodological approach contended that the arbitrary juxtaposition of statements by 
thinkers across the gamut of time resulted in both a distortion of the individual thinkers 
and the creation of a false pantheon of “perennial questions.” Such concerns were and 
remain valid at face value at the very least. The arbitrary linking of Swift or any other 
author to thinkers past and present may well warp one’s reading of the text and might be 
best avoided. However, fruitful analytic connections across great political and literary 
texts can also assist in clarifying or further illustrating an insight that is still evidentially 
predicated on textual analysis of the primary source material, in this case Gulliver’s 
Travels. Equally so, to entirely eschew knowledge of the political and cultural context in 
which Swift wrote would largely remove the humour from the satirical portions of the 
text as these require context to be understood. Reading in a vacuum, then, is also likely to 
strip any text—but especially a satire—of much of its (decipherable) authorial intent. 
David Armitage (2000) argues that situating Swift or his contemporaries outside of 
debates concerning the specificities of British party politics in the early 18th century is to 
entirely betray and lose the significance of what Pocock (1989) called their “political 
language.” A focus on the intellectual historic conditions of the production of the text is a 
fruitful means through which to understand the contingent sources of meaning in 
historical circumstance, and also how these change over time. Such an understanding is 
an excellent means of “thickening” the descriptive capacities of one’s engagement with 
the text.  
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However, to arbitrarily restrict the potential significance of ideas and arguments 
that a text raises to a given historical moment or discussion serves primarily to assert an 
authoritative critical interpretative hegemony to scholars utilising such a method, rather 
than “protect” the sanctity or integrity of the text. Of course, an engaged understanding of 
relevant biographical information and historical contextualisation can kindle interesting 
and exciting avenues of inquiry. However, to isolate and restrict the resonance of 
potential findings to within these contexts damages our ability to draw out the arguments 
that offer resonant theoretical value contained within a given text (Ahrensdorf 1994). To 
exclusively domicile any inferences or critically significant interpretation of ideas present 
in the text to a historically isolated moment or language seems to me to strip the text of 
much of its value as a living document in the present day and serves, ultimately, to defy 
the text itself. 
 A close cousin of the contextualist method discussed above is the biographical 
approach, perhaps best exemplified by the work of David Dunn. Again, whilst a deep 
knowledge of the biographical information of a given author will never necessarily hurt 
one’s reading of their work, to present biographical findings as evidence for textual 
interpretation/argument is very problematic. The unifying conflation of authorial intent, 
textual product and sentiments expressed in public or private correspondence raised by 
the biographical approach to political/literary studies will thus be avoided. 
Conversely, of course, it is vitally important to be wary of anachronistic 
arguments. To this end, the historicist methodological toolkit of thick contextualisation 
remains relevant and useful for this study. A key downfall of contemporary postcolonial 
readings of Gulliver’s Travels and Swift more generally is that the seeming goal is to 
reclaim Swift as a firebrand anticolonial thinker when such a worldview simply did not 
exist in his lifetime. Postcolonial arguments such as Zach (2000) who claim that 
Gulliver’s Travels resolves tensions from Swift’s Irish Protestant identity into a spirit of 
liberty and anti-colonialism exemplify such distorting methods. This is because they 
insert ideas and arguments into the text that exist outside of Swift’s political and 
conceptual vocabulary. 
Gulliver’s Travels does explicitly present a pejorative position concerning 
indigenous peoples and at the very least a degree of certitude of European superiority 
over them and of them, though this is tempered somewhat by its positioning within a 
wider berth of seeming misanthropy for the most scandalous corruptions into which 
people are fallen by the degenerate nature of man” in general (Book I, Ch.VI: 54). 
Beyond this, it is clear that Swift’s vast array of prejudices and preferences concerning 
matters of caste, class, and religion are to be found throughout the text. These are 
absolutely of importance because although they can be related to contingent political and 
social circumstances relevant to Swift’s position in the Church of Ireland, they also 
explicitly and implicitly draw upon and fashion standalone arguments and insights. I also 
assert that there are philosophical insights that can be extracted from the work that can be 
decoupled both morally and in argumentative content and character from the prejudices 
that contemporary liberal democratic norms find objectionable (however justified such 
objections may be)—for example, religious exclusion—without sacrificing what is 
valuable and insightful about Swift’s writing. Simplifying such a complex text to fit to a 
pre-existing mould of a contemporary political position—such as liberal universalism, 
cultural relativism, a commitment to reclaiming subaltern voices etc.—far beyond the 
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horizon of Swift’s thought is to pursue ideology, rather than literary or political theory 
(Minogue 2000: 118). 
Another problematic anachronism that I seek to avoid is to attribute Swift’s 
criticisms of materialism, rationalism, and individualism to a wider and more holistic 
critique of political liberalism. Swift cannot be understood to have anticipated the fully 
formed political ideology of liberalism. One can meaningfully assert that Gulliver’s 
Travels consciously interacts with modernist and early Enlightenment intellectual 
currents, and even suggests some of the ways in which these apply to political matters in 
ways that resonate with the later development of political liberalism. However, to grant 
the Irish writer such powers of prescience cannot stand up to historical scrutiny. It also 
reifies an intellectual tradition that was not available to Swift in his own life and times for 
the purposes of generating a theoretical argument. 
Historical context can certainly draw out such anticipatory notes in a text, but as 
Carey and Festa argue, the surplus of meaning in the rhetorical construction of a given 
text “complicates the task of treating (it) straightforwardly as representative of historical 
truths external to the text” (Carey and Festa 2009: 105). As a result, it is often more 
productive to stay closer to the text itself (without necessarily remaining exclusive to it) 
and to address the core issues at hand as they manifest themselves thematically on the 
pages themselves.  
It would also be problematically anachronistic to expect from Gulliver’s Travels 
the kinds of unity, character arcs or development and finite thematic presentation that 
became standard tropes of the novel later in the 18th Century. The text was written and 
published in the period where Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678) and Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe (1719) (amongst others) were laying the foundation for a literary genre 
but its crystallisation was far from complete and the majority of scholars are in agreement 
that Gulliver’s Travels is not a novel proper. John Richetti argues that the characteristics 
that we now recognise as specific and intrinsic to the novel—“a long prose narrative 
about largely fictional if usually realistic and plausible events—did not solidify in the 
minds of readers and writers as a literary type or a set of expectations for narrative in the 
English-speaking world until the beginning of the Nineteenth Century” (Richetti 2003: 
1). As such, it is most important is to bear in mind that the somewhat scattered and 
episodic nature of Gulliver’s Travels is a factor of its construction as a full-length fiction 
in the generative pre-novel era, and that the imposition of unifying frames upon this is 
likely to result in distorted conclusions.  
Whilst I am seeking to draw out an over-arching argument from the presentation 
of key themes and ideas in the text, I have avoided utilising the structure of the text or its 
lack of qualities/characteristics traditionally associated with the novel as evidence for 
claims made in the dissertation. To this end, assumptions associated with the genre, 
structure and formatting of the novel, in particular, cannot form the basis of a credible 
critical approach to rendering arguments about Gulliver’s Travels. For example, most 
critics point to the fractured nature of Gulliver’s perspective and psychology as crafted 
almost entirely by the needs of the satire rather than any holistic or credible attempt at 
genuine characterisation. However, while I don’t entirely disagree with Claude Rawson’s 
assertion that “though Gulliver has a wife, family, home address, and elements of a 
biographical record, he does not come over as a fully human personality” (Rawson 2008: 
xxii), the information provided about Gulliver’s educational and travel history does form 
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a vital component of the central argument mobilised in this dissertation. 
I have pursued a thematic, rather than chronological analysis of the text, pursuing 
an argumentative thread that begins with travel before moving along to education, human 
nature, and science. Thus, the order of Books of the text under discussion moves from the 
voyage to Brobdingnag, to Houyhnhmnland, to Laputa, before concluding with a 
discussion of the contemporary relevance of the over-arching argument. References to 
Lilliput are made throughout, but given the particularly topical and allegorical nature of 
that voyage, it receives less analysis than do the other three voyages as they engage the 
questions of a broader nature under investigation in this dissertation in a more direct and 
sustained manner. 
Again, per Ahrensdorf (1994: 113–135), every text presents a timely (contextually 
contingent) and timeless argument. As such, the integration of contextual information to a 
primarily textual analysis can draw out significant arguments into a wider context of 
ideas and debates that cross historically contingent barriers. Thus, information about the 
debates concerning the dangers of imperialism to its participants that were present in 
Swift’s time are vitally useful but cannot be allowed to supplant what ended up on the 
pages themselves as evidence for the significance of what Swift presents. Pairing textual 
analysis with historical context facilitates a reading of Gulliver’s Travels that can 
establish both enduring and contextually contingent facets of the text. It also allows for a 
defensible means of distinguishing between authorial intent in speaking to contemporary 
debates and surpluses of meaning that extend beyond these historical confines. This 
dissertation project seeks to bridge divides between a strictly literary, historicist, and 
political reading of Swift. 
The method most directly used throughout this dissertation is that of textual 
analysis of primary sources, in this case the 1735 edition of Gulliver’s Travels. In this 
regard, I follow Claude Rawson (2012) in viewing this edition as the best combination of 
the originally published 1726 text and some of the later revisions that most closely 
represent Swift’s final thoughts and ideas for the book. Direct and careful textual analysis 
(without strict adherence to any particular school of textual interpretation) is pursued in 
order to draw out the meaning and significance of the text on its own terms. Another 
significant primary source under analysis for the purpose of the argument presented in the 
dissertation is Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Unlike a straightforward 
historicist reading, the meaning and interpretation proffered in this dissertation is not 
assumed to be hermetically sealed into the relevant historical context. Rather, I have 
sought to draw it out into the wider base of meaning that the presentation of ideas in the 
text generates. When relevant, key ideas are thickened up through contextualisation in the 
history of political thought on relevant issues as they arise in the text—notably travel, 
education, Enlightenment and Modernist thought, and the New Scientific movements of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth Centuries. The broader context of the history of 
political and intellectual thought is important in justifying the study of Swift in the realm 
of political science, especially to situate him amidst the standard canon both 
chronologically and ideationally. The over-arching argument is, however, primarily 
predicated on a close reading of the primary source material of Gulliver’s Travels in 




2. Travel as Education: Necessary for polite society or a hazard to the individual 
and collective alike? 
 
Frustra vitium viaveris illud, sit e alio pravus detorseris. 
(In vain do you avoid one fault if you perversely turn aside into another.) 
—Horace, A Discourse on Plain Living 
 
I would say, then, that to study human nature to purpose, a traveller must enlarge 
his circuit beyond the bounds of Europe. (…) It is from a wider and more 
extensive view of mankind that a just estimate is to be made of human nature. 
—Richard Hurd, Dialogues on the Uses of Foreign Travel; Considered as a Part 




This chapter establishes the central argument of the dissertation concerning the value of 
travel and its effects on the traveller by carefully analysing Gulliver’s interactions with 
the King of Brobdingnag in Book II of Gulliver’s Travels. In establishing these questions, 
the chapter draws upon early eighteenth-century ideas concerning the value of travel as 
educational tool in a polite society. Travel might be seen as likely to result in the 
edification of the traveller as they learn and improve themselves through a wider base of 
experience—assessed relatively—than that available to them in their homeland. 
However, assuming this variance (partially or entirely) falls universally under the criteria 
of an objective moral hierarchy, then travel necessarily involves risk to the traveller, as 
one could encounter vicious habits and may end up adopting them to their detriment. This 
chapter argues that Gulliver’s Travels draws upon the insights of Locke and Shaftesbury 
into travel as an educational endeavour in the context of a polite society to present a case 
against the universal benefit of travel, whilst also acknowledging that the possibility of 
travel to edify still exists. However, ultimately the text offers a grim prognostication for 
the likelihood of the existence of the type of traveller who would be improved rather than 
corrupted by their experience. 
 When, in Book II, Chapter VII, the King of Brobdingnag says to Gulliver 
“As for yourself […] who have spent the greatest part of your life travelling; I am well 
disposed to hope you may hitherto have escaped many vices of your country” (Book II, 
Ch. VII: 121), he raises an important question—that of the value of travel as a means to 
correct the corruptive forces committed upon the individual by a fallen society. The 
implication here is that following a scathing rebuke of all the virtues Gulliver portrays in 
English society to in fact be vices, the King wonders whether Gulliver’s time away from 
England may well reduce the corruption placed in him by his originating society. 
However, equally present throughout Gulliver’s Travels is a pervasive sense of the 
seemingly unlimited scope for degeneration brought about by travel and cross-cultural 
contact. Indeed, by the end of his travels Gulliver is a mental wreck, pathetically 
imitating a horse in attempt of virtue and left with a misanthropic view of humanity as “a 
lump of deformity” (Book IV, Ch. XII: 121). Thus, travel can be both a means of 
improving oneself as an escape from the vices of home, but also a path to corruption 
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through the adoption of even more deviant practices found abroad. Swift offers a 
fascinating satirical and literary presentation of some of the issues raised by the idea of 
travel for the purpose of cleansing oneself of a problematic originating society.  
Here I will address how Swift’s early counter-Enlightenment satire tackles 
questions of universality across the variance of human experience to be found when one 
travels. Is travel always a means to edify and educate oneself? Or should we always be 
wary of the corruptions raised by travel? I argue that Swift’s satire draws upon the 
warnings of Locke on the subject of travelling from questionable educational/cultural 
backgrounds at the inappropriate time, and also Shaftesbury’s understanding of how 
interaction with others of varying quality can both polish or sully an individual in the 
context of a polite society. This culminates in the argument that Swift ultimately offers a 
sceptical conservative criticism of the notion that travel is inherently edifying, buttressing 
a natural law idea of organic hierarchical society in the process wherein those who are 
corrupted by less than ideal societies are likely the worst candidates for travel, and should 
not do so for their own sake. 
 
2.2. Locke on Travel 
In assessing the significance of travel writing on Locke’s work, the historian Anne Talbot 
has shown that Locke’s vast library of travel books was chosen carefully with the study 
of human social behaviour in mind (Talbot 2010: 9–14). Talbot believes that “Locke was 
using his travel books to explore some quite specific questions and that he was doing so 
as a natural philosopher working in the Baconian tradition” (Talbot 2020: 15). It is clear 
that Locke saw travel as a key activity through which to gain an understanding of 
humanity. He concludes his Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) with a 
discussion of the merits and pitfalls of travel. Notably, the philosopher describes travel as 
“the last part in education,” and is best used “to finish the work and complete the 
gentleman” (Locke 1996: 158). As the bulk of Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
offers advice on the education of children prior to engaging the issue of travel, it is to be 
considered but the final stage of a long process. As such, there is considerable work to be 
done in developing good character prior to one embarking upon a trip abroad. On the 
other hand, there is an implicit acknowledgment by Locke here that a gentleman’s 
education cannot be completed without seeing other countries and, by implication, that a 
full education requires travel. Whilst travel is not necessarily edifying outside of the 
context of considerable education attained prior to the fact, it is also the case that without 
it a gentleman’s education would be incomplete. In his retirement speech from Yale, 
Donald Kagan captured Locke’s general point here rather nicely when summarising 
attitudes to education and freedom in Ancient Rome: “servants were ignorant and 
parochial, so free men must be educated and cosmopolitan” (Kagan 2013: 2).  
The core difference, of course, is that Locke does not seem to acknowledge a 
necessary distinction between education and cosmopolitanism; in a sense to be educated 
is to be cosmopolitan. As the value of politeness took deeper root as a core component of 
how eighteenth-century Britain saw itself, this distinction between cosmopolitanism as a 
necessary characteristic of a polite and educated gentleman further established the 
necessity of worldliness achieved through experience of travel as vital to one’s education. 
Those who do not travel cannot be entirely cultivated as polite individuals who can both 
fulfil their own potential for moral development and participate in mutual improvement 
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through social interactions with other polite individuals. Indeed, as Jonathan Belcher, an 
influential politician in eighteenth-century America who served as Governor of both 
Massachusetts and New Jersey, reflected following travel from England to Germany as a 
young man: “A man without travelling is not unlike a rough diamond”, a raw specimen 
that is “unpolisht [sic] and without beauty” (quoted in Bullock 2017: 2). This view is 
typical of the general enlightenment ideal regarding the edifying effect that travel can—
and most likely will—have upon an individual. 
Locke clearly establishes that there are important conditions upon if, how, and 
when, travel is edifying rather than corrupting to the individual. Ultimately, then, it can 
be inferred that travel is necessary in the best cases but might be damaging in the average 
and certainly in the worst cases. Someone raised and educated toward vice, or at least far 
outside the realms of virtue, would thus not be a good candidate for travel. This 
individual is unlikely to benefit from the experience of travel and will likely not return 
home with the worldliness or cosmopolitanism desired of the polite gentleman.  
This is especially relevant in the context of imperial expansion. The historian Jack 
P. Greene has argued that as the English effort to establish a viable presence in the New 
World gathered steam, the contemporary discourse around colonial settlers centred on 
their lowly social origins and religious and social deviancy (Greene 2013: 50–55). The 
settlers were deemed to be of questionable stock and were popularly perceived to have 
left England to share far-flung wilderness territories with any number of savage peoples, 
terminally disconnected from the ordering cultural and religious amenities of English life. 
Whilst Locke was in fact friendly to the imperial project—notably drawing up the 
constitution of the Carolinas—under the terms of the Thoughts Concerning Education, if 
the popular perception of English settlers abroad was true, these were not souls likely to 
be edified by their endeavours. 
Indeed, Locke clearly acknowledges that travel in and of itself is by no means 
necessarily beneficial, with the age of the traveller being the primary caveat: “I confess 
travel into foreign countries has great advantages, but the time usually chosen to send 
young men abroad is, I think, of all other, that which renders them least capable of 
reaping those advantages” (Locke 1996: 158, emphasis in original). The typical tendency 
in late seventeenth-century England to send young gentlemen to the continent in their 
early teens, Locke argues, denies them the opportunity to truly benefit from what may be 
of value in the experience. Locke sees benefit in the traveller being of a younger age and 
accompanied by a linguistically and culturally adept guardian. However, he recommends 
that the more apt time for the perfecting of the educational process through travel is when 
the young man is old enough to go alone yet not entirely or unduly wedded to the 
conventions and customs of their home. This is so that they would recognise genuine 
value in other societies and use it in a process of self-edification that would return them 
home with an improvement in education and character. Thus, one should travel: 
 
When he is of age to govern himself and make observations of what he finds in other 
countries worthy of his notice and that might be of use to him after his return; and when 
too, being thoroughly acquainted with the laws and fashions, the natural and moral 
advantages and defects of his own country, he has something to exchange with those 
abroad from whose conversation he hoped to reap any knowledge (Locke 1996: 159). 
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Again, what we can take from this is that while travel is indeed recommended as part of a 
broader educational curriculum, it is not inherently of value unless certain preconditions 
are met. A core component of this education prior to travelling must be a thorough and 
frank adjudication of the vices and virtues of the moral, political, and religious status of 
the country of origin. It is worth noting that Locke scrupulously identifies that the 
traveller be aware of “the natural and moral advantages and defects of his own country” 
(emphasis my own). Without adequate perspective as to how one’s society ranks in 
comparison to others, one could fall afoul of either novelty bias—cheerily adopting all 
new customs one experiences—or prejudice against every new idea encountered abroad. 
Thus, neither ‘going native’ nor closed-minded jingoism are desirable for the traveller, as 
both would deny them the possible benefits of the enterprise. The potential to leave 
behind the vices of one’s homeland is not of much benefit if it results in simply swapping 
one vice for another. The character of Gulliver intermittently displays both problems of 
being too open and too closed to foreign cultures in demonstrating the issues that arise as 
a result of travel.  
Roger Caillois describes Montesquieu’s The Persian Letters (an early 
Enlightenment satire that shares notable themes with Gulliver’s Travels) as operating 
through a doubly relativistic optic—i.e. Montesquieu using an outside voice to satirically 
criticize his country of origin and the host nation in a bidirectional manner. Caillois 
interestingly identifies a necessary wider perceptual change for this literary approach to 
resonate with the reader: the existing bias of blindly preferring one’s own culture to all 
others needs to wither away. On this account, for the satire of both the Letters and 
Gulliver’s Travels to function on literary or political terms, it is required that the 
unconsciously resolute preference for the known be already broken down. In this regard, 
“those institutions, those habits, those moeurs, to which one has been accustomed since 
birth, and which are so powerful, so spontaneously respected that in most situations no 
alternative to them can be imagined” must be now be available for somewhat open 
competition with genuine alternatives, for both literary characters and readers alike 
(quoted in Richter 1990:15). Caillois is absolutely correct to identify this as a crucial 
facet of what makes both The Persian Letters and Gulliver’s Travels so compelling from 
a literary perspective. However, the breaking down of the unconscious preference for the 
known is problematic because it opens up the possibility for both edification and 
degeneration in engaging the unknown. From the perspective of a conservative skeptic 
such as Swift, one ought to expect the latter as the more likely outcome a great majority 
of the time. 
This kind of open competition is arguably undesirable and is a threat to those who 
travel, especially when it comes to adopting practices in a more permanent fashion and 
returning home with potentially deviant tendencies in tow. Locke is unequivocal in 
expressing the serious danger to those who would travel when overly open-minded and 
thus ill-prepared to engage what they encounter abroad: 
 
If they do bring home with them any knowledge of the places and people they have seen, 
it is often an admiration of the worst and vainest practices they met with abroad, retaining 
a relish and memory of those things wherein their liberty took its first swing rather than 
of what should make them better and wiser in their return (Locke 1996: 159). 
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The issue of the traveller indulging in vain and poor practices that are happily associated 
with the indulgence of a newly felt liberty applies primarily to travellers of a young age. 
However, the liberty that comes with breaking from the established practices, institutions, 
and hierarchies of the originating society might also have an intoxicating effect on many 
adult travellers, especially those who are not appropriately educated prior to setting sail. 
The principle that the traveller will not necessarily be able to ascertain distinctions 
between the wheat and the chaff in what they come across applies even more broadly. It 
is arguably the capacity to form appropriate judgment on such matters that forms the bulk 
of the educational process. Thus, opportunities for edification may well be passed up 
amidst a potentially well-intentioned but ultimately wide of the mark indulgence of some 
or all of the lower quality customs or habits found in the host country. In essence, the 
wrong traveller, travelling at the wrong time, can come home corrupted by practices they 
are insufficiently experienced and educated to understand as vicious. As a result, the right 
age and appropriate education are vital preconditions for any traveller. 
 Locke continues, warning that such a problematic traveller will not take 
the care to “examine the designs, observe the address, and consider the arts, tempers, and 
inclinations of men they meet with that so they may know how to comport themselves 
toward them” (Locke 1996: 160). The worry here is that a certain type of traveller will 
not show sufficient deference to the mores of the society in which they find themselves 
and will behave inappropriately as a result. In order to realise the potentially beneficial 
aspects of travel, a certain decorum or politeness (more on this later) is necessary. 
Interaction with people of the host culture is required and in order to facilitate this, a 
degree of adoption of local mores will be mandatory. It would thus be difficult for poorly 
educated travellers to navigate such cultural adoption and interactions without willingly 
or unwillingly adopting practices that are corrupting rather than edifying.  
The upshot of this, of course, is that negative or poor habits and characteristics 
adopted by the traveller when abroad will then be brought back to their home country. 
Richard Bourke has recently identified a similar fear of deviant behaviour in the colonies 
boomeranging back to the metropole in Edmund Burke’s condemnation of what he saw 
as the despotism of Warren Hasting’s running of the East India Company (Bourke 2015: 
524–5). Amidst these necessary interactions, Locke is clear in identifying the need for the 
traveller to maintain a wall against the possibility of their corruption. Although he must 
have “open eyes” (and, one presumes, some degree of an open mind), these open eyes are 
as much needed to “make him cautious and wary, and to […] keep himself free and safe 
in his conversation with strangers and all sorts of people without forefeiting [sic] their 
good opinion” (Locke 1996: 160). According to such thinking, it is required that the 
traveller combine a certain degree of humility and wariness of corruption with context-
appropriate behaviour that does not alienate those around him, thus denying opportunities 
to learn from the better practices of his surroundings. The difficulty of walking this 
tightrope for the well-educated gentleman—let alone a naïve young person or a boorish 
type—should be clear. 
Ultimately, Locke’s macro view of education is optimistic, starting from the 
premise of each child possessing a mind as a blank slate open to experience and 
necessarily capable of independent judgement and reasonable conduct so long as it is 
correctly cultivated. This vision proffers that a thorough and proper education can foster a 
truly self-governing individual guided by reason. This path to reason (or reasonableness) 
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is chiefly obstructed by the common moral failings of selfish self-interestedness (or 
narrow advantage), passion, and prejudice, identified by Locke (Grant & Tarcov 1996: 
xii). However, since humans are by nature moral and free beings, we have the capacity to 
overcome these obstructions to our full flourishing. Notably, as we shall see later in both 
the thinking of Shaftesbury and others, ignorance is deemed to be the primary driver of 
prejudice. Thus, if prejudice is one of the primary obstacles to one’s full development as 
a reasonable individual, ignorance must be conquered. Travel thus becomes essential in 
the execution of a conception of edification and education as the remedy to ignorance and 
by extension prejudice. 
Locke’s position, again, is essentially overwhelmingly optimistic in that the broad 
failings of morality and politics that one observes in society, caused as they are by 
prejudice, are largely failings of understanding rather than of character in any 
meaningful sense (Grant & Tarcov 1996: xii–xii). Improvements in education could thus 
substantially overcome the preponderance of ignorance that causes prejudice and most 
likely other related failings of humans to live up to our capacities as free and moral 
beings. However, travel as a necessary element of this vital project of mass edification 
through education is by no means something to be taken lightly, as his recommendations 
establish. Here I argue that Swift in Gulliver’s Travels acknowledges an understanding 
and appreciation of Locke’s position on this matter but seeks to nonetheless detract from 
the largely optimistic outlook that Locke presents. The chief point of divergence is the 
likelihood of extending the conditions under which individuals will be genuinely capable 
of meeting the standards required by travel to cover a significant number of individuals.  
Swift both adheres to and subverts Locke’s ideas regarding travel as part of an 
educational process through Gulliver’s actions across his four voyages. As Seamus Deane 
notes, unlike many readings of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as homo economicus, Gulliver 
is a “persona whose most conspicuous consumptions will be the customs and habits of 
others” (Deane 1985: 18). Gulliver takes Locke’s advice on being open and facilitating 
engagement, but he goes too far with it and runs into Locke’s warning on the other end of 
the spectrum. Gulliver sees the need to comport himself around his hosts in the required 
manner as part of his mission of anthropological documentation, somewhat discarding his 
critical filter in the process. This, of course, comes hand in hand with Gulliver’s overly 
enthusiastic and deluded praise of English society featured throughout all but the final 
voyage to the Land of the Houhynhnms. Indeed, Gulliver is guilty of several potential 
faults of the traveller identified by Locke, even in adopting some of his advice. Gulliver 
embodies the tensions that Locke’s recommendations for travel establish: he is at once 
deluded, prideful and arrogant about the supposed virtues of his originating society, yet 
also overly deferential and keen to imbibe all that pertains to the cultures he encounters. 
He is certainly a traveller beyond Locke’s endorsement, enacting much of precisely why 
Locke might counsel on the question of education to begin with. 
 
2.3. Shaftesbury on Politeness and Travel 
The notion of improving oneself through travel predates but also fed into the emergent 
sense of politeness as a core value of the Enlightenment. The idea of politeness became a 
central component of how eighteenth-century British men of influence saw themselves 
and their culture. By the midway point of century, the preface to Anglo-Irish writer 
Thomas Nugent’s The Grand Tour encapsulated the view of travel as a path to 
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completing a polite gentleman. Nugent writes that the “noble and ancient custom” of 
travelling can improve one’s manners, increase knowledge, and sharpen judgment 
(Thomas 2020: 73). The idea of politeness was largely (though not exclusively) 
popularised and made a cultural staple by Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, in his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711). A student 
of Locke, Shaftesbury argues that the natural sociability of man requires regular 
interactions with others (preferably in commercial society) aimed toward mutual 
improvement. As he wrote in “Sensus Commensus, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and 
Humour”: 
 
We polish one another and rub off our corners and rough sides by a sort of amicable 
collision. To restrain this is inevitably to bring rust upon men’s understandings. It is a 
destroying of civility, good breeding and even charity itself, under pretence of 
maintaining it (Shaftesbury 2000: 31). 
 
We need to take the edge off our natural harshness through regular interaction in order to 
improve both fellow citizens and ourselves. To deny this would be tantamount to 
retarding societal progress toward ever more civilised developments in line with our 
naturally benevolent character. Indeed, sociability, generosity, and a concern with the 
common good were all necessary in our quest to fulfil our moral potential as human 
beings. Together, these attributes—vital for our moral flourishing and capacity for mutual 
improvement—were called politeness and Britain should aim to define itself as a polite 
society. It is important to note that Gulliver’s Travels was published in a time and place 
where the barbarism and scandal contained in the text intentionally contrasts with this 
notion of England as among the “politer countries of Europe” (Book II, Ch. VII: 122). 
Steven C. Bullock, author of a recent work on the influence of the culture of 
politeness on the nascent American revolutionary generation in the early eighteenth 
century, argues that proponents of politeness “were not simply encouraging cultivated 
social interaction for its own sake” (Bullock 2017: 10). Manners were closely tied with 
political matters in the mind of right-thinking influential eighteenth-century minds: the 
self-discipline that politeness demands was a necessary corollary of the discipline of 
others established through just political power (Bullock 2017: 2.) Indeed, Locke’s 
approach to education, motivated as it was as a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer’s defence 
of patriarchal monarchy through divine right, sought to establish the proper role of 
parents as rendering children capable of becoming independent adults, rather than merely 
obedient to power (Grant & Tarcov 1996: xiii; (Bullock 2017: 207).  
As it is developed and expanded in significance, politeness forms an important 
societal agenda as it engages individual flourishing, meaningful social interactions 
directed toward mutual improvement, and a style of rule befitting a free people. Free men 
cannot be slavish or beholden to tyrants and their education must grant them the tools 
appropriate for a life of independence and self-reliance (Tarcov 1984: 5). Politeness and 
education go hand in hand, and it is clear that travel and the worldliness that it can 
establish in an individual play a vital part in both. The cultivation of polite individuals 
was designed to establish a base population who could polish one another and improve 
the nation in a general sense. The extension of politeness ought to be a social and national 
goal, not merely a means of improving the individual. As Klein summarizes: “Politeness 
was, after all an outcome of polishing, a process that enhanced persons but also 
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collectives. In this capacity, politeness helped to situate eighteenth-century Britain in 
time, as a ‘polite age’, and in place, as a ‘polite nation’” (Klein 2002: 875). 
Swift undoubtedly agreed with the central tenets of politeness, not least social 
refinement and the smoothing out of one’s basic manners. Indeed, decency, cleanliness, 
and restraint were all ideals that Swift valued highly.1 For Swift the goal of garnering 
widespread politeness was a noble one, and certainly desirable. However, in the words of 
Swift biographer David Nokes, “in a post-lapsarian world, the belief that such ideals 
might be realised was at best a paradoxical folly, at worst a criminal cheat” (Nokes 1985: 
328). Refinement is certainly an optimal goal for all, but the macro political facets of 
politeness—i.e. the cultivation of a genuinely polite society, perfected and sustained 
through mutual improvement through social interaction—is perhaps out of our reach, 
given what we know and observe about “that animal called man” (Swift to Pope, Sept. 
25th, 1725). One gets the sense from Gulliver’s Travels that the cumulative edifying 
effects of social interactions hoped for by Shaftesbury is by no means a given, 
considering the often wretched nature of those with whom we would be seeking to rub 
off our corners. In short: quality matters. Like Locke’s qualifications upon the potential 
edification derived from travel, Swift takes Shaftesbury’s ideal for polishing one another 
and suggests that we may be improved in such a manner when interacting with those of 
virtue, but we may also be soiled by engaging with the vicious.  
 Shaftesbury recognises more or less as much in his section on advice to authors in 
the Characteristics. Discussing the reading habits of the day, he decries the popularity of 
travel literature, particularly for its tendency to indulge the bizarre and unruly that one 
might find abroad in order to excite the reader. This may provide a shallow sense of 
worldliness in that readers will have their minds directed toward previously unknown 
parts of the world. However, it nonetheless does not offer any genuine improvement 
likely to resonate in the extension of politeness to individuals or collectives. Rather, it is 
mere titillation at best. As Locke before him, Shaftesbury displays an understanding that 
people affected by the cultural norms they engage. Locke worried for travellers, but in the 
“Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author”, Shaftesbury worries for those who read the 
outlandish travellers’ tales found in print: 
 
We care not how Gothic or barbarous our models are, what ill-designed or monstrous 
figures we view or what false proportions we trace or see described in history, romance, 
or fiction. And thus our eye and ear is lost. Our relish or taste must of necessity grow 
barbarous while barbarian customs, savage manners, Indian wars and wonders of the 
terra incognita employ our leisure hours and are the chief materials to furnish out a 
library (Shaftesbury 2000: 153). 
 
Gulliver’s Travels, of course, features both “monstrous figures” and “false proportions” 
in abundance. It is thus a threat to politeness on Shaftesbury’s terms. Seamus Deane 
identifies that Shaftesbury is further concerned by the tendency in travel literature to 
portray vice and corruption in foreign places as natural (Deane 1985: 10). Nature is 
invoked here in the modern sense of the word—i.e. outside of the deformations that 
society imposes upon individuals, as opposed to the classical sense of nature as the 
 
1 See Swift’s poem When I come to be Old ((1699): “Not to neglect decency, or cleanliness, for fear of all 
falling into nastiness” (Swift 1984: 23.) 
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perfected state of man (Berman 2009: 3–5). Nature on these terms establishes the basis 
for a cultural and moral relativism wherein politeness does not play into what 
Shaftesbury saw as the “universal benevolence” of man, but rather merely one practice of 
many cultures found around the world (Shaftesbury 2000: 153). Thus, for Shaftesbury, 
understanding foreign customs as “natural” denies the crucial moral distinction between 
virtue and vice that allows for the latter to be categorically condemned.  
 Travel is a necessary part of forming a polite society and was typically understood 
as “worldliness” by eighteenth-century thinkers (Klein 2002:876). In order to provide 
value in social interactions that are likely to generate bidirectional polishing, one must 
have a broad base of experience to draw upon and offer to one’s interlocutor. Expertise is 
desirable, but it also ran the risk of narrow bookishness, thus worldliness—achieved 
through travel and a general knowledge of the wider world—is necessary to combat this 
potential path to narrowness. When one considers the ever increasingly specialised 
disciplines, subjects, and types of expertise seen in the academy today, this has certainly 
borne itself out to be a highly valid concern. Notably, Lawrence Klein’s excellent survey 
of the range of semantic associations that politeness had for eighteenth century 
intellectuals establishes that this undesirable narrowness of thinking was also deemed 
incompatible with the cosmopolitan values of politeness and, crucially, the pursuit of a 
general culture (Klein 2002:876). This juxtaposition of a universalizable set of values 
amidst knowledge of a highly varied world (different mores in different places etc.) 
strikes at the heart of a core tension between cultural relativism and moral universalism 
arise in Gulliver’s Travels. I argue that Swift’s acknowledgment of the empirical fact of 
relativism across the globe in fact marked a stark argument in favour of clinging ever 
more tightly to the aspects of the defensibly general culture that we have thus far. 
Gulliver’s Travels engages this idea by highlighting the relativity of people, 
society and experience that can be found across the world—tiny people and giants; power 
hungry expansionists and absent minded scientific speculators; abominable animals and 
perfectly rational beings who live in harmony with nature—and yet the satire plays upon 
those who would see all this variance as equally natural and therefore relative. Rather, 
like Shaftesbury, Swift demands that the moral distinctions between these varying 
societies be maintained, refusing to allow the fact that different perspectives exist and 
that what one sees and understands of the world is relative to this perspective—i.e. things 
look different when you are a giant and when you are tiny—to affect moral judgments. 
Swift indulges relativity across the globe in outlandish terms in order to argue that the 
mere fact of relativity is not a justification for a relativist perspective. One can indeed be 
corrupted by deviant practices found abroad and, regardless of the vices found in one’s 
originating society, travel is by no means a guaranteed portal to edification through doing 
as the Romans do when in Rome. For Swift it is clear that an absolute standard of virtue 
and vice exists; the fact of variance across the world from the best to the worst of both is 
not a call toward value-free subjectivity, but rather an appeal to fall back upon the 
known. As such, the satire cations that one should be wary of travel, not in all 
circumstances, but perhaps in most. 
The complex intellectual history of the idea of nature ranges from classical ideals 
of human perfectibility to early-modern contractarian notions of the human outside of 
society and into Romantic ideals of nature as “the radiant presence of a transcendent 
moral order, of an absolute ready to guide humanity to illumination” (Herman 2013: 
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411). All feature to varying extents across Gulliver’s Travels, with each perspective 
coming in for severe criticism. In this case, Shaftesbury’s concern with the emergent 
romantic ideal is indeed echoed by Swift in his portrayal of the dangers of travel. This is 
reflected in the traveller (as travel writer) being inclined toward both a detached and 
objective portrayal of the habits and customs he encounters, but also a tendency to 
amplify the scandalous and fantastic elements of travel in order to hook wondrous readers 
excitedly seeking “materials to furnish out a library” (Shaftesbury 2000: 153). Gulliver, 
then, commits both errors of too little and too much in the way of cultural engagement in 
his role as traveller, yet his dutiful claims not to embellish the tale ring hollow in light of 
the fantastic character of the events described. 
 
2.4. Travel in Context: The Church of Ireland and the Tenuousness of Civilization 
It appears clear, then, that travel can be a portal to edification, corruption or degeneration.  
Following the Act of Union in 1707, travel of goods and people throughout England, 
Scotland, and Wales increased massively, as urban centres began to grow in the march 
toward the industrial revolution. Many of these new travellers were of course not tourists 
but economic migrants of a sort, shifted from isolated country areas by the allure of trade, 
work, and “new networks of economic self-interest, credit, and human contact” (Colley 
2005: 40). Whilst these are not necessarily the types of travellers most relevant or 
applicable to the broader political theory under discussion, these higher levels of 
interaction between peoples of all social levels highlighted the need for standards of 
politeness in the hopes of mass edification. Intellectual elites in Britain, however, did not 
see such encounters as necessarily likely to finish the education of young gentlemen. 
Typical foreign travellers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
include merchants and traders, explorers, scientists, diplomats, and tourists. The historian 
James Clifford describes the traveller as “someone who has the security and privilege to 
move about in relatively unconstrained ways” (Clifford 1997: 34). For the aristocratic 
class of eighteenth-century Britain to whom this could be thought to apply, the ‘Grand 
Tour’ of sites of antiquity in Europe (France and Italy in particular) was a prominent 
means for the finishing of the cultural education of noble gentlemen. This is of course the 
context in which Locke wrote his advice on the topic of travel and he had even worked as 
a tutor to young men on their Grand Tours, something also done by Thomas Hobbes, 
George Berkeley, and Adam Smith (Thomas 2020: 71). Incidentally, Swift himself never 
embarked on the Grand Tour. Swift biographer Victoria Glendinning wrote that the great 
writer “was not a traveller. Abroad was a closed book. He went from Ireland to England 
and back again, repeatedly. He never travelled widely even in his own island, apart from 
a solitary tour to the south and west after the death of Vanessa” (in the Summer of 1723) 
(Glendinning 1999:177). 
The Grand Tour was an exercise in education through worldliness and polishing 
through which the children of the nobility could realise “the glory of a perfect breeding 
and the perfection of that which we call civility.” Travel to Italy and France was seen as a 
means to “teach us fine and fair carriage of our body, good and discreet delivery of our 
mind, civil and modest behaviour to others”. The Grand Tour was as an essential 
component in the finishing of a gentleman’s education as one could learn “the best 
manners of every country” in carving personal mastery of the ideals of politeness and 
civility common to all proper elites of Western Europe (quoted in Thomas 2018: 33–34).  
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However, in an age of religious strife between Protestants and Catholics, some of 
stern Protestant stock would question or entirely deny the value of engaging the relics of 
the ancient world if they are in the custody of Catholic countries. Charles L. Batten notes 
the influence that Joseph Addison’s Remarks on Several Parts of Italy (1705) had as 
guide to several generations of Englishmen on the wonders of the Roman world to be 
found in Italy, describing the text as “a standard vade mecum for the Englishman on his 
Grand Tour (Batten 1978: 10). Notably, Addison embarked on his Grand Tour at the age 
of twenty-seven, and thus could optimise the educational possibilities of his experience, 
supporting Locke’s standards for the appropriate traveller (Batten 1978: 9). Again, the 
inherent value of travel in order to engage these wonders is presented as an almost 
indispensable dimension of an appropriate and complete cultural education. However, 
Addison himself cautions travellers against the corruptions inherent in visiting a country 
in which the Catholic Church, identified resolutely as the “Whore of Babylon,” is the 
dominant cultural influence. The potential positives for Englishmen traveling the 
continent, namely “to cultivate his historical consciousness and artistic tastes”, must be 
held in delicate balance with the dangers of engaging the corruptive context(s) in which 
much of this value is to be found (Buzard 2002: 40). For example, given that imitation is 
both natural and pleasurable to man (Aristotle The Poetics: 4.1), a Protestant 
encountering the treasures of the ancient world in the midst of the superstition and 
idolatry of Popery should give cause for concern to his fellow confessor.  
A popular London periodical called The Gentleman’s Magazine criticized the 
Grand Tour, not least that young men ought not to be “sent abroad before he has made 
any progress in learning, or knows the constitution of his own country” (Cave 2005: 13). 
In this regard, the journal certainly echoes Locke’s concerns for the traveller. It goes 
further, however, arguing that naïve and mentally weak travellers will wither in the face 
of immersion: 
 
in all manner of lewdness and debauchery, and their principles, both religious and 
political, are corrupted by the intrigue of Irish Romish Priests, and other emissaries, 
who swarm the Roman Catholic countries; and if they once pervert them from the 
religion of their education, will likewise beget in them an aversion to a Protestant 
prince, and the form of government in their own country (Cave 2005: 13). 
 
However, as Kenneth Churchill notes, the seriousness of this threat could depend on the 
relative health of the society in question. As the Eighteenth Century progressed and the 
horrors of religious conflict widespread in the Reformation and Civil War eras receded 
into further memory, British Protestant visitors to Italy thought it acceptable to reduce 
their suspicions of Papist corruption. Addison certainly delighted in linking the poverty 
he observed in Italy to the country’s control by “an avaricious Pope”, describing the 
desolation he encountered as “chiefly to be ascribed to the very genius of the Roman 
catholic religion” (Addison 1705: 6–7). In such conditions, English visitors could travel 
with a lowered guard, rather adopting a triumphalist position as they compared the 
grandeur of Britain to the relative decline of Rome and Italy, marking their country and 
culture out as the true inheritors of the Roman legacy (Churchill 1980: 1). In general, 
Britons who identified Protestantism as a cause of their nation’s wealth contrasted their 
fortunes with what they perceived to be the misguided slothful ways of Catholics. Lord 
Hervey, on tour in Italy in 1729, summarised as much in this poem: 
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Throughout all Italy beside, 
What does one find, but want and pride? 
Farces of superstitious folly, 
Decay, distress and melancholy: 
The havoc of despotic power, 
A country rich, its owners poor; 
Unpeopled towns, and lands untilled, 
Bodies unclothed, and mouths unfilled. 
(quoted in Colley 2005: 35). 
 
 Catholicism is invariably associated in early eighteenth-century British minds as 
intractably poor, wasteful, indolent and oppositional to liberty. Linda Colley summarises 
the extreme Protestant “superstructure of prejudice throughout eighteenth-century 
Britain” to be made up of a view of Catholics as “people who were so ignorant and 
credulous, so poor and so lacking in a sense of the real worth of things” (Colley 2005: 
36). Thus, it cannot be understated the level of religious sectarianism and partisanship 
that coloured the approach of early eighteenth-century British minds to instructions for 
travel to France or Italy, etc. However, a corrupt culture in decline may not produce the 
same risk to the traveller as a flourishing culture.  
Whilst Gulliver’s Travels notably lacks explicit discussion of such topical 
religious matters, as previously established Swift was typical of his era in viewing all 
questions of culture, custom, habit, value, virtue and vice as inextricably linked to one’s 
religious orientation (Montag 1994: 12). The religious facet of the perils of travel and 
cross-cultural encounter are implicit throughout the text, not least in Gulliver’s own 
background and extensive previous travels identifying him as a dissenting Protestant. 
And whilst Swift’s strong disagreements with Puritans and Latitudinarians within the 
Protestant landscape of Britain are very significant, the post-1688 world was nonetheless 
en route to a broad-based toleration for all sects of Protestantism. The worry associated 
with encounters with religious deviance, both Catholic and Dissenting, near and far, did 
not necessarily reduce in intensity with the passage of time in the context of the Church 
of Ireland as Churchill claims they might have in England. 
Swift never lost his resolute suspicion of what he perceived to be the terrible 
corruptions of both Popery and its antithesis, freethinking Protestant dissent (Carey 1997: 
89–99). As a self-identified Church of England man, Swift followed many orthodox 
positions of the established Church, in particular a political theology that fashioned a civil 
religion out of political loyalty and respect for social hierarchy (Montag 1994: 12–15). 
However, it is worth noting that Swift’s position as Dean of St. Patrick’s in Dublin made 
for a very different experience than that of a clergyman of the Established Church in 
England. As a minority (no more than one-tenth of the overall population of Ireland 
confessed Anglicanism in the early 1700s) (Eccleshall 1993:30), Irish Anglicans often 
professed in sermon and tract what can only be described as a siege mentality. They 
perceived themselves to be surrounded by both an indolent, superstitious, and ignorant 
Catholic population prone to sedition at any given moment upon Rome’s call, and also a 
small but fanatical batch of dissenting Presbyterians in the north of the island.2 From the 
 
2 For a good overview of the history of such divisions in the specific context of Irish history see Claude 
Rawson’s Swift’s Angers (2014: 41–3). 
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pulpit, Irish Anglicans preached of the profound danger of the imminent return to 
savagery of the surrounding native Irish. As Robert Eccleshall demonstrates in his survey 
of Anglican political thought in Eighteenth Century Ireland, the island is presented as a 
Kingdom on the tenuous precipice of relapsing into a state of natural barbarism should 
the resolve of those who hold the genius of English civilisation in their hands weaken 
(Eccleshall 1993: 36–39).  
Travel outside the pale of settlement, the small area of total British control centred 
around Dublin on the central east of the country was perceived as a dangerous gamble 
into a land of wild deviance, poverty, Papist superstition, and dissenting quackery. 3 
Despite some biographers arguing otherwise, Joseph McMinn has shown that in fact 
Swift travelled extensively throughout Ireland on horseback, even in ill health and 
advanced age (McMinn 1991: 102) and thus had significant first-hand experience of the 
horrifying living conditions of the rural poor. McMinn describes Swift’s vantage point in 
Ireland as on the frontier of the ongoing “war between barbarity and civilisation” (1994: 
82). Equally so, the demographic and economic growth of dissenting Protestants, 
including increasing Presbyterian immigration from Scotland into Ulster, made the 
embattled minority status of Irish Anglicans even more severe.  
Swift, then, was all too aware of what cross-cultural engagement and travels 
amongst those unfamiliar to oneself was like, and the perceived dangers associated with 
this resonate in Gulliver’s Travels where engaging deviant peoples and customs are not to 
be taken lightly. Swift’s “counter-enlightenment distrust of rationality, as much as his 
dim confidence in human nature” (Carey 1997: 89) led him to see Locke’s warning 
relating to travel as relevant to the wider context of human affairs. In fact, as both Stubbs 
and McBride have recently pointed out, the creeping extension of poverty to the point of 
subsistence living to Irish Protestant parishioners in the 1720s constituted an enormous 
shock to Swift’s generation (Stubbs 2016: 490–1; McBride 2009: 131–5). The worry of 
corruption and degeneration that may come from close encounters with those of lower 
stock and debased habits is summed up by Stubbs: “The picture was muddying; it was 
not always possible to say who the barbarians were any more” (Stubbs 2016: 491).  
Rawson argues that while this was a popular point of view for Protestants in 
Ireland in the 1700s, it does not necessarily stand up to historical scrutiny (2014: 42), 
although Stubbs pulls no punches in describing the misery and hardship of the poor in 
Ireland at this time (Stubbs 2016: 489). Either way, there is no doubt that the link 
between poverty and barbarism was clearly set in the minds of Swift’s Anglo-Irish class. 
Thus, it was perceptually true if not factually true. As a result, the progress of commercial 
society would likely not be the only casualty should Shaftesbury’s appeal to maintain the 
quality of those with whom you interact in the name of the general extension of 
politeness lapse. Indeed, Gulliver’s Travels presents an argument that individuals and 
perhaps even collectives are capable of lapsing back into the barbarism from whence they 
likely came, and that travel can instigate this process. Thus, the dangers associated with 
travel and the capacity for engagement with deviant peoples loomed large in Swift’s 
imagination. 
 
2.5. Gulliver the Traveller 
 
3 This is the origin of the popular phrase “beyond the pale.” 
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Gulliver’s Travels has long been correctly held to be a satire of travel writing (Vanek 
2015), drawing upon both the genre’s claim to represent the truth being stranger than 
fiction and its wider “dubious attempt to establish the veracity of improbable 
observations” (Carey 2013: 139). Indeed, as Carole Fabricant notes, “Gulliver’s Travels 
is in many ways the quintessential travel book, alternately reproducing and parodying the 
conventions of the genre, and forcefully demonstrating both its capabilities and 
limitations as an instrument for disseminating knowledge” (Fabricant 2005: 744). 
However, it is less common to assess the book’s commentary on the issue of travel itself 
rather than simply as a satire and parody of the literary genre of travel writing. Gulliver is 
not just a vehicle through which Swift could amuse himself by parodying travel writing; 
Gulliver himself is a traveller, and it is worth investigating how he and his experiences 
matches up to Locke and Shaftesbury’s advice for travellers examined in the previous 
section. 
I argue that Swift draws upon these, using the arrogance and delusion of Gulliver 
to demonstrate what he wants the reader to see as what can happen when the wrong 
traveller engages foreign cultures. However, in a typically Swiftian manner, Locke’s 
arguments are simultaneously invoked and subverted throughout the text and the Travels 
is always just shy of endorsing Locke (or any other overt political or philosophical 
platform or principle, for that matter.) The apparently studious objectivity of Gulliver as 
he engages each people and place on his travels, almost hyperbolic in its claims of 
anthropological documentation, recalls Locke’s steady advice for the traveller who might 
run afoul of those who host him. Indeed, as he first begins to describe Milendo, the 
metropolis of Lilliput Gulliver tells the reader that he is withholding a larger number of 
facts for inclusion in a soon to be published “greater work (…) containing a general 
description of this empire, from its first erection, through a long series of Princes, with a 
particular account of their wars and politics, laws, learning and religion; their plants and 
animals, their peculiar manners and customs, with other matters very curious useful” 
(Book I, Ch. IV: 41). But, as we shall see, this doesn’t necessarily serve Gulliver all that 
well, perhaps because he is a good example of Locke’s bad traveller, coming from a 
questionable background and with passion for the unknown as a chief impulse for his 
travels. 
The question of motivation for travel, especially in a context where political, 
cultural, and religious difference will be so significant as the fantastic variance in 
experience unleashed upon Gulliver across his four voyages is an interesting one. In A 
Sentimental Journey (1768), Swift’s fellow Anglo-Irish writer Lawrence Sterne recounts 
three reasons for travel: “infirmity of body, imbecility of mind or inevitable necessity.” 
Among the ten types of traveller listed by Sterne are the “idle”, “inquisitive”, “splenetic”, 
“sentimental”, and the “delinquent and felonious” (Sterne 2002: 9). Gulliver fits the 
category of naïve inquisition, describing his reason for travel as born of an “insatiable 
desire of seeing foreign countries” (Book I, Ch. VIII: 71). Also, when explaining why he 
opts to embark upon the seas once more after a mere two months at home following his 
adventures in Lilliput, Gulliver describes himself as “having been condemned by nature 
and fortune to an active and a restless life” (Book II, Ch. II: 75). It is interesting that he is 
doubly condemned by nature and fortune to both a restless and an active life, not least 
because both deny Gulliver agency (or create conditions where he denies his own 
agency). His need to traverse the world is beyond his own rational control, or at least he 
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presents it as such. This suggests that those who are most attracted to travel may well be 
those who for whom it is most dangerous. 
Later in the narrative, Gulliver intellectualises this previously non-rational desire 
as valid because travel is an invaluable source of education, as Locke had suggested. This 
desire, seemingly justified by Gulliver for its own sake, combined with a pathological 
understanding of himself as destined for travel does not align with Locke’s criteria for a 
suitable traveller. This is further demonstrated when Gulliver later arrogantly 
misrepresents Locke’s idea that travel can be edifying by claiming that all those who do 
not travel are ignorant and prejudiced (Book II, Ch.VI–VII). Again, it is clear here how 
the text functions as more than a stylistic satire of the genre of travel writing, but also a 
wider argument about how travel might contribute to an individual’s edification or 
corruption in the right or wrong cases. 
  An interesting (albeit anachronistic) comparison can be found in the first chapter 
of Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851), in which Ishmael explains that his own need to hit the 
high seas in the strange world of whalemen is caused by his torment at the hands of “an 
everlasting itch for things remote.” He continues, “I love to sail forbidden seas, and land 
on barbarous coasts” (Melville, 2009, 8). Both Gulliver and Ishmael are motivated by 
some deeper need that despite being understandable to them at level of passion or 
sentiment, is not presented as a rationalized attempt to gain knowledge or to edification—
at least at first. The lust for new and strange experiences expressed by both characters are 
entirely fulfilled as both books go on, with dreadful consequences for both. Travel, then, 
is not seen as the final component of a carefully curated education, but rather as 
something to satisfy one’s curiosity and appetite for wanderlust. Any edification that may 
come about is treated as a happy by-product of the endeavour but not the central 
originating goal. It seems to me that the innate attractiveness of travel discussed here is 
particularly applicable to the kind of self-interested, problem-solving and, crucially, 
proud individual such as Gulliver—the kind of person who can use their canny guile to 
overcome the hurdles of living outside of society or community.  
This type of individual possessing what Aristotle called “cleverness” 
(Nicomachean Ethics: 1144a22–29), or instrumental reason (the difference between 
practical wisdom and cleverness was a favourite target of Swift’s satire throughout his 
writings), seems drawn to travel partially as a means to assert their individuality and 
independence from society (Dahl 1984: 63). But, rather than be necessarily improved by 
the experiences of leaving the structures of society behind to exercise and develop one’s 
cleverness, Ishmael is subjected to physical harm and Gulliver is markedly corrupted 
mentally by his travels. The opportunity that travel provides to indulge this possible zeal 
for radical individual self-development is a risky proposition given the instability 
inherent in leaving one’s place in hierarchical organic society wherein society is not an 
artifice but rather exists by nature and prior to the individual. I am inclined to agree with 
Montag’s reading of Swift as primarily Aristotelian on this question (Montag 2001: 7). 
Fanaticism of all stripes is a persistence target of Swift’s ire throughout his corpus. Per 
Swift, one’s potential for excessive self-love—conceived in the Christian mould of Pride 
or as more worldly conceptions of vanity or narcissism—can be taken up with an 
enthusiasm akin to religious devotion. The argument that one’s conscience demands that 
one pursue travel likely struck Swift as pernicious in the same manner that religious 
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freethinkers demanded their endless permeations of Biblical interpretation and practices 
be indulged regardless of their consequences for the collective at large. 
Importantly, Gulliver has arguably already been shaped by travel by the time he 
embarks upon his first of the four voyages covered in the Travels. We learn in short order 
that he has never been meaningfully embedded in English society. The quick 
biographical information contained in the first two pages of Gulliver’s Travels briskly 
outlines that Gulliver is the third of five sons and is sent away to be educated at 
“Emanuel-College in Cambridge, at fourteen years old” (Book I; Ch. I: 15). Emanuel 
College is a noted college of Puritan character, thus marking Gulliver out as a solidly 
dissenting Protestant. Embarking on his young career as a surgeon at twenty one Gulliver 
travels to Leyden (Leiden) in the Netherlands, another university known as much for its 
stern Puritanism as its educational excellence. Beyond the Netherlands’ status as a 
resolutely Protestant country at the time, the city of “Leyden” also conjures the 
association of the notorious Anabaptist prophet and leader John of Leiden who 
contributed to the city of Münzter briefly becoming a bloody Puritan theocracy in the mid 
1530s. More generally, Rawson notes the similarity here of Gulliver’s origins and that of 
the eponymous hero of the dissenter Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, a text rich in 
Puritan moralization.4 Dolores J. Palomo also notes how seventeenth century Holland 
had a reputation as a safe haven for English dissenters, but also that the University of 
Leiden had a policy of religious toleration since 1575, something that would render it fit 
for Swift’s condemnation. While there Gulliver studies “Physick (…) knowing it would 
be useful in long Voyages” (Book I; Ch. I: 15), demonstrating both his supposedly 
deviant education but also his instrumental approach to education with an eye toward 
facilitating further travel.  
Later in Book III, Gulliver reminds the reader of his connection to the Dutch: “I 
had lived long in Holland, pursuing my studies in Leyden, and I spoke Dutch well” 
(Book III; Ch. XI: 203). Thus, we see that as a young man who has already travelled, 
Gulliver consciously seeks to develop the skillset he believes to be required for a career 
of even further travel. Additionally, whilst Locke would certainly not have seen it in such 
terms, the clear references to Gulliver’s Puritan background and education significantly 
summons Locke’s argument regarding the necessity of appropriate education for the 
traveller prior to travelling lest his experiences be less than edifying, and perhaps even 
corrupting. As Swift would write elsewhere, education forged in the fires of dissent 
generated dangerous enthusiasm and fanaticism that could not be relied upon to produce 
a morally upstanding character (Walsh 2003: 171–172). 5  The implication here is a 
warning that those who have a deviant or debased education will make for bad travellers, 
such as the Dutch merchants willing to trample on the crucifix in order to trade with 
Japan (Book III; Ch. XI: 203). 
Gulliver then takes up the position of surgeon on the ship ‘The Swallow’ on 
which he travels to the Levant “and some other Parts” over a three-year period. After 
settling in London long enough to marry, he is quickly compelled by his conscience and 
the failure of several of his contemporaries’ businesses to return to sea once more. He 
sets sail as a surgeon again on two separate ships, travelling for the subsequent six years. 
 
4 See James Egan’s “Crusoe’s Monarchy and the Puritan Concept of the Self” (1973) for more on this. 
5 Section VIII and the “Digression on Madness” in A Tale of A Tub contain Swift’s most scathing satirical 
presentations of this idea. 
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During this time, he travels to “the East and West Indies” where his leisure time “when I 
was ashore” was taken up “in observing the manners and dispositions of the people, as 
well as learning their language; wherein I had a great facility by the strength of my 
memory” (Book I; Ch. I: 15–6). Again, we see Swift have Gulliver skirt the line of the 
advice provided by Locke and Shaftesbury: while Gulliver does dutifully take time and 
effort to appreciate the cultures he meets, he may well be ill-equipped to properly 
understand how to distinguish the wheat from the chaff in these experiences, therefore 
consuming and engaging good and bad alike in both habit and personage. As his travels 
progresses, Gulliver’s behaviour certainly continues in this vein. 
Following this, Gulliver spends three years at home with his family before then 
leaving on the Antelope for the South Seas in what becomes his Voyage to Lilliput. Thus, 
in total Gulliver spends two years and seven months studying in Leiden, three years 
traveling aboard the Swallow, and six years aboard two other ships travelling in the East 
and the West-Indies before our tale commences proper. As such, prior to start of the first 
substantial voyage of the Travels, Gulliver has already spent extensive amounts of time at 
sea and engaging a range of foreign customs and languages. We are left to wonder how 
responsibly, on Locke and Shaftesbury’s terms, he may have done so. We might even 
wonder whether or not some of the flaws in character that emerge over the course of the 
text may have been set in place by his Puritan education and by the extensive travel he 
pursued at a young age amidst time spent around peoples and customs of potentially less 
than polite character. 
 
2.6. Escaping Vice or Engaging Corruption? 
The issue of travel and edification plays out most notably in Book II of the Travels. The 
second of Gulliver’s voyages features his interactions with the giants of Brobdingnag, a 
society resembling a more virtuous version of Britain. The twelvefold size differential 
between the Brobdingnagians and humans is equalled, seemingly, by the gulf in morality 
and virtue between the two peoples. Notably, Gulliver is not polished by his interactions 
with this morally upstanding people. Perhaps this is as a result an existing degeneration 
from all his time spent traveling up to this point.  
In chapters six and seven of Book II Gulliver recounts some important 
interactions with the King of Brobdingnag, informing him of the politics and culture of 
England. The broad outline for the character of the virtuous Brobdinagian King was 
seemingly inspired by Swift’s mentor, William Temple (Ehrenpreis 1952: 91–98). The 
King of Brobdingnag stands in firm contrast with expansionist and imperialistic Emperor 
of Lilliput who maintains a standing army and seeks to weaponize Gulliver’s massive 
size, demonstrating Swift’s distaste for the corruption inherent to arbitrary monarchical 
power divorced from the requirement of prudence. The King is well educated, “as learned 
a person as any in his dominions” and who knows better than his supposed “learned men” 
in court who pedantically speculate about what Gulliver is in empty jargon (Book II, Ch. 
III: 93; 94). Brobdingnag is arguably fortunate to be a secluded territory, cut off from the 
rest of the world, and can thus operate as a limited monarchy without the corrupting 
temptations of foreign adventure and luxuries exported from abroad (Lock: 1983: 170–
171). 
 Gulliver proudly proffers an account of what he believes to be the chief virtues of 
England, only to have the King recoil at what appear to him to plainly be vices rather 
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than virtues. The King’s arguments refer back to writings of Temple on similar topics 
(Ehrenpreis 1969: 96–97). The King projects the risks inherent to a licentious indulgence 
of individual conscience by asking if in England “advocates and orators had liberty to 
plead in causes manifestly known to be unjust, vexatious, or oppressive” (Book II, Ch. 
VI: 119). We have seen that Swift himself saw that deviant religious and political opinion 
were likely to be fuelled by dangerous enthusiasm that it was the remit of prudent 
religious, social, and political traditions to limit. The dangers of faction are made 
apparent by Gulliver’s breakdown of England’s population through counting the various 
religious and political sects. The vital distinction between public and private views in 
invoked by King’s saying that  
 
He knew no reason, why those who entertain opinions prejudicial to the public, should 
be obliged to change, or should not be obliged to conceal them. And, as it was tyranny 
in any government to require the first, so it was weakness not to enforce the second: for 
a man may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not to vend them about as 
cordials (Book II, Ch. VI: 120). 
 
Such a view affords a degree of sovereignty to individual conscience, but it prioritises 
objective public morality in name of protecting the individual and the collective alike 
from the obvious negative ramifications of encouraging unmitigated pluralism. It is 
certainly a hyperbolic metaphor to compare the spreading of dissenting opinion to the 
dissemination of poison, but Swift’s writings consistently press the highly illiberal 
assumption that bad ideas will lead to bad actions. The satire here impresses that while it 
is not possible to police the minds of free individuals, licentious encouragement of 
supposedly conscientious heterodoxy counter to the collective good is irresponsible and 
ultimately untenable as it will erode collective norms. Pluralism absent the toxicity of 
faction or extreme polarization is one of the great and admirable goals of liberal 
democracy, of course, but here we can read Swift as highly pessimistic of the long-term 
sustainability of such a proposition. 
The King also notably questions “what business we (England) had out of our own 
islands, unless upon the score of trade or treaty,” questioning the validity of travel in 
general terms (Book II, Ch. VI: 119). Of course, later he will express a hope that Gulliver 
individually may be bettered by his travels, but at a national level, he doubts that England 
has any business engaging other nations, especially in a context of imperial expansion. 
Earlier, in the voyage to Lilliput, the Emperor admitted to Gulliver that he might not have 
been granted his liberty from bondage had it not been for Lilliput labouring “under two 
mighty evils; a violent faction at home, and the danger of an invasion by a most potent 
enemy from abroad” (Book I, Ch. IV: 42). This links the problems of faction to overseas 
expansion and the opportunism of the Emperor’s weaponization of Gulliver’s enormous 
size. 
Following the summary of all he sees wrong in what Gulliver tells him about 
England, the Brobdingnagian King castigates the human race in one of the book’s most 
memorable lines: “I cannot but conclude the bulk of your natives, to be the most 
pernicious race of little odious vermin that nature ever suffered to crawl upon the surface 
of the earth (Book II, Ch. VI: 121). Scrambling to understand the depth of the King’s 




Great allowances should be given to a King who lives wholly secluded from the rest of 
the world, and must therefore altogether be unacquainted with the manners and customs 
that most prevail in other nations: The want of which knowledge will ever produce many 
prejudices, and a certain narrowness of thinking, from which we and the politer countries 
of Europe are so wholly exempted. And it would be hard indeed, if so remote a Prince’s 
notions of virtue and vice were to be offered as a standard for mankind (Book II, Ch. VII: 
122). 
 
There are multiple notable aspects to what Gulliver says here; for one, as noted earlier, he 
draws upon Shaftesbury in identifying England as among the “politer countries of 
Europe”, in doing so he also invokes the potential for a universal standard of virtue and 
vice for mankind 6 , despite seemingly also acknowledging a relativism of sorts by 
establishing that the conditions that King find himself in—i.e. being so remote—should 
insulate him from the kind of critical judgement that one would level at someone else 
who made the same points as the King. 
As the King has not travelled, Gulliver reasons, his education is necessarily 
incomplete and cannot thoroughly be held accountable for his deficiencies in knowledge 
and, as a consequence, virtue. Rawson reads this as Swift satirising the contemporary 
Whig position that ignorance was the sole cause of prejudice and that if one were to 
pursue travel, one would eradicate first ignorance and then prejudice as part of the same 
broad process. Swift sought to highlight an objective morality wherein many prejudices 
are inherently justified, rather than merely the consequence of ignorance (Rawson 2008: 
314.) The idea that prejudice is caused by ignorance would later find eloquent expression 
in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847): “Prejudices, it is well known, are most difficult 
to eradicate from the heart whose soil has never been loosened or fertilised by education: 
they grow there, firm as weeds among stones” (Bronte 2001: 290). As Locke has shown, 
a key dimension of the education that Brontë’s text assumes to be pivotal in eradicating 
prejudice is travel. Swift’s engagement with this idea is rather more conservative and 
sceptical. Swift also intimates in Gulliver’s Travels that the true fool is he who thinks that 
all prejudices will disappear when one has travelled and is therefore no longer ignorant.  
Here I read the text as imploring the reader to see that ignorance may be 
universally bad, but many prejudices are worthwhile, valid, and necessary. For Swift, the 
hard-won wisdom of communitarian custom may well provide a means to understand the 
distinctions between valid and invalid prejudices. Thinking that the achievement of 
worldly appreciation and understanding through travel will necessarily wash an 
individual clean of all prejudice only makes sense in a truly relativistic world where no 
hierarchy of moral, ethical, or political concerns exists. 7  Swift’s insight here is that 
utilizing travel as a means to rid oneself of harmful prejudices is only likely if one’s 
experiential education occurs in a context of genuine (rather than shallow or surface-
level) worldliness made possible by an orderly education. This understanding of the 
educational potential of travel is valuable even for those of us who oppose the more rigid 
and reactionary dimension of Swift’s misanthropic inclinations, as it points toward a 
 
6 As noted elsewhere in the paper, this identification and extension of a general culture was a stated goal of 
politeness, as part of its cosmopolitan outlook (Klein 2002: 876). 
7 And that society acts as a repository of the necessary prejudices that accompany knowledge of these 
political and moral hierarchies. 
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realistic evaluation of the circumstances under which meaningful edification is likely to 
actually occur through travel. 
Gulliver’s Travels satirically attacks claims that those who don’t travel are 
necessarily insular and prone to closed-minded prejudices that could not possibly be 
valid, and that those who do travel are necessarily better off than those who don’t. This is 
why Gulliver is quick to arrogantly shrug off the King’s strong refutations of his claims 
of the greatness of England; since the King hasn’t travelled he can’t possibly know what 
he’s talking about and, furthermore, Gulliver patronisingly adds that we shouldn’t hold 
these intellectual limitations against him because it’s not his fault. All the while, of 
course, the satirical implications are that for all his travels, Gulliver remains childishly 
proud of his country to his own detriment, and his assumptions regarding the edifying 
effects of travel render him unable to objectively assess criticism of his country and 
culture by someone wiser than he. As the King can rationally assess England based on 
Gulliver’s account despite not having travelled, his reasonableness is not withheld by this 
lack of worldliness—even if it may not be complete to Locke’s standard. Gulliver, on the 
other hand, has a shallow form of worldliness but it does not add to his reasonableness 
and most likely even detracts from it, since his education prior to travelling was deficient 
or incomplete.  
The satire is directed at both those who would think (or expect) that Gulliver’s 
prejudices should have melted away as a result of travel, but also at the idea that the 
prejudices one possesses in the first place are necessarily bad and require exorcism. In 
some ways, such a notion eradicates the possibility of any judgment at all, since 
discriminatory choice (prudent or otherwise) necessarily falls back on opting for one 
thing over another, often without genuine reason or experience to assist us in rendering 
the decision. Since we cannot possibly make all decisions in conditions of perfect 
knowledge, some degree of preconceived notions based on potentially rationally or 
empirically indefensible principles are a natural facet of life. If one is educated in an 
orderly manner, travel is probably an excellent way to assist in developing the capacity to 
identify morally beneficial prejudices and not to be beholden to the customs familiar to 
oneself exclusively. Beyond this, however, the aforementioned section of the text also 
engages Locke’s idea of the limitations of education when one doesn’t travel. Here, 
Gulliver’s inability to give credence to the wisdom of the King derives from his 
misguided application of the importance of travel to education and the attainment of 
virtue. In short, he distorts the relative importance of travel to education.  
Gulliver himself has travelled the world for much of his life and is nonetheless 
shown to be a fool in this interaction with the King. We might even wonder if the King’s 
lack of travel and his solid embedment in his own society is the source of his wisdom, 
rather than ignorance. One does not need to travel in order to be wise and in many cases 
one’s potential for wisdom could be upended by travelling. No doubt that Locke would 
recommend that given his existing education and wisdom, the King—“whose largeness 
of vision has the generosity of a Renaissance humanist” (Price 1964: 202) is an entirely 
appropriate candidate for travel. Perhaps so, but it is nonetheless apparent that Gulliver 
has plainly not been edified by his travels thus far, and in the face of just and virtuous 
criticisms of his homeland, he uses the King’s lack of travel as a basis to dismiss them. 
On the other hand, the text also suggests that lack of travel is no excuse for genuine lack 
of virtue or possession of ignorance. The character of Gulliver demonstrates in this 
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section that travel in and of itself is not an indicator of education or virtue, even though it 
can contribute to edification in the right circumstances. 
The key tension here resides in the idea that Gulliver, stemming from a society 
that the Brobdingnagian King expertly identifies as perfectly vicious—“the very worst 
Effects that Avarice, faction, Hypocrisy, Perfidiousness, Cruelty, Rage, madness, hatred, 
Envy, Lust, Malice, and Ambition could produce” (Book II, Ch. VII: 121)—might be 
improved by spending time away from it. Can one be improved from a state of vice 
derived from a corrupted background through travelling to other places and engaging 
other cultures? The King hopes that Gulliver’s travels will wash him clean of “the many 
vices of your country” (Book II, Ch. VII: 121) but the progression of the text shows a 
degeneration of Gulliver’s sanity to the point where he is delusional and mad at the 
conclusion of the narrative. I think that Swift wants to show that whilst the commentary 
on the follies of contemporary Britain espoused by the King is largely his own, simply 
leaving this society to gaily traverse the world is unlikely to provide the edification—or 
at least escape from corruption—that the King hopes for Gulliver.  
Simply trading the known vices of one’s homeland for unknown—and possibly 
even worse—vices found elsewhere demonstrates that travel is no guaranteed path to 
bettering oneself. This is especially the case for travellers ill-equipped or poorly educated 
to judge the value of their new surroundings and customs. In Lilliput, despite his 
mammoth size serving as a constant reminder of his inappropriate fit for the society, 
Gulliver embraces the Emperor to such a degree that he is willing “with the hazard of my 
[sic] life, to defend his person and the state against all invaders” (Book I, Ch. IV: 44). 
Such uncritical yet highly spirited adoption of local norms and loyalty ought to provide 
pause, not least when Gulliver uses his enormous size to destroy the Blefuscudian fleet, 
shouting “long live the most puissant Emperor of Lilliput!” (Book I, Ch. V: 47). Gulliver 
delights in the acclaim this brings upon him, including the title of Nardac, the highest title 
of honour among Lilliputians. Overall, given that the vices of home are understood in 
relation to the broader society, perhaps they are always better for the average potential 
traveller than what they might encounter when venturing abroad. We hope that well-
educated minds can distinguish worthy judgment from capricious prejudice when 
assessing virtue and vice in a well-understood context. Swift, however, is encouraging us 
to see the average traveller as unlikely to be able to do so in unfamiliar surroundings and 
will likely fall afoul of embracing or abandoning the wrong prejudices. 
Not only does Gulliver fail to escape the vices built into him by his country in 
general (and perhaps his Puritan background more specifically) but these vices—perhaps 
most notably his pride—are accentuated as his travels progress. Gulliver demonstrates the 
dangers that can befall those unsuitable to travel, inappropriately educated and with a 
mind both overly open to embrace new ideas in a relativistic manner yet pridefully 
deluded as to the merits of his own society. Swift establishes this tension between the 
relativism of experience found in the world and an objective universalist approach to 
virtue, vice, edification, and corruption. It seems, then, that uncritically swapping the 
habits of one bad society for another is not a path to redemption, as the Brobdingnagian 
King hopes will be the case for Gulliver. I would suggest that it is not insignificant that 
this is a hope rather than a belief or conviction on behalf of the King. As arguably the 
single wisest character in the text we can reasonably assume that the King is sceptical of 
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the likelihood of Gulliver escaping vice through travel, expressing this hope good-
naturedly rather than realistically expecting it to be realised. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
Locke suggests that education is a careful step-by-step process, and that travel is among 
the finishing stages of the endeavour. My analysis of Gulliver’s Travels shows that Swift 
believed there to be better and worse educations, and that even in an otherwise solid but 
unfinished education, travel is likely to detract from, rather than further, someone’s moral 
calibre. It’s also the case that the text summons the idea that the likelihood of a pure 
education completed by purely edifying travel are also unlikely. If that were possible, 
however, we are cautioned from believing that that traveller would emerge home entirely 
devoid of prejudice, nor would this be desirable in the first place. Given the likelihood 
that most individuals will be travelling with incomplete or imperfect education, Swift is 
clearly wary of the consequences of such disorderly licentiousness, as it is not probable 
that the results will be spontaneously positive rather than detrimental. 
The central divergence between Locke and Swift on this matter is that Locke 
seems to see treat the prospect of the autonomous, rational, and self-interested individual 
as if it is both universal and oriented toward the good prior to corruption potentially 
setting in. Therefore, whilst travel is the final part of a linear educational process, this 
process is nonetheless broadly available to everyone in the abstract. Given Locke’s 
direction of his educational advice exclusively toward children of the gentry, we might 
reasonably assume that he may not believe in the empirical realisation of these traits in 
the vast majority of the world’s population. Nonetheless, it is quite notable that the 
abstract orientation of his educational advice does cover all children and young people in 
that their innate human nature as moral and political beings renders them capable of 
education toward fulfilling their potential of a life of independence, self-reliance, and 
reasonable judgement. This is a presentation of the role of travel in education that is both 
realistic in facing the limited circumstances under which travel can operate as meaningful 
correction to ignorance and source of individual improvement yet can also function as 
part of a broader political philosophy conducive to an open and inclusive society. 
I argue that Swift, on the other hand, draws upon this insight but is more 
pessimistic and hence reactionary in his political impulses on the issue of travel. He 
doesn’t necessarily object entirely to the possibility of educational development entirely, 
but intimates that the a priori assumption of its availability to all desperately jars with 
everything we know and see regarding human behaviour. Swift thus draws on both the 
contextual or circumstantial limitations upon the likelihood of the broad extension 
educational development that Locke acknowledges, but also proffers a dim view of the 
innate capacity of many humans themselves. We are left to grapple with a grim 
projection that many people are thus seemingly naturally incapable of ever participating 
in polite society to the level truly desirable and the generation of conditions of improved 
understanding will not in fact surmount these limitations. In the broader political outlook 
being painted in Gulliver’s Travels, such limitations are best recognised and embraced by 
the firm commitment to the natural sociability inherent in organic hierarchical society 
rather than encouraging individuals to traverse the world in the misguided quest for self-
improvement only to further their corruption. Thus, we see an iteration of the classic 
liberal-conservative divide on the realm of possibility for education open to human 
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beings and the implications for questions of equality in the divergence Swift takes from 
his initial agreement and endorsement of Locke’s advice to the traveller. 
Swift’s infamously misanthropic view of human nature is most clearly elaborated 
in the portrait of the Yahoos and their relation to the Houyhnhmns in Book IV. The 
implications for travel and education of the beastly portrait of the Yahoos and Gulliver’s 










































3. The Teachable Brute? Questions of Human Nature, Education and Travel 
 
“It's a universal law—intolerance is the first sign of an inadequate education. An 
ill-educated person behaves with arrogant impatience, whereas truly profound 
education breeds humility.” 
—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, August 1914 
 
“Human history becomes more and more a race between education and 
catastrophe.”  
—H. G. Wells, The Outline of History 
 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
In Pleasurable Instruction, Charles L. Batten identifies travel writing as one of the 
characteristic literary and even artistic forms of the eighteenth century. Batten makes the 
case that the mimetic entertainment of imaginative voyaging through the reading of travel 
writing provided a form of what might today be called infotainment to a population 
“anxious to learn about the world in which it lived” (Batten 1978: 8). But we might ask 
ourselves just how educational reading about, or even pursuing, travel is in the first place. 
When considering questions of edification and improvement of oneself created by travel, 
it is worth assessing Swift’s portrayal of human nature in Book IV of Gulliver’s Travels 
and what this suggests about the possibility of education to edify beyond a lowly or even 
brutish condition. Just how teachable are humans, and is this capacity (if it exists) 
sufficient to mark us out from the beasts of this world? Need all education be 
hierarchically imposed or can individuals pursue self-improvement through autonomous 
experiential learning? Enlightenment thinkers such as those of the University of Leiden 
asserted that education is universally available as a remedy for ignorance and prejudice 
on the path to societal progress (Palomo 1977: 27–35). Conversely, Swift’s complex 
satire of emergent Enlightenment and Modernist ideas concerning human nature in 
Gulliver’s Voyage to the Land of the Houyhnhmns offers a challenge to both the extent 
to which human nature does contain such inherent teachability and brutishness, and to 
what end (or limitations) the former may be pursued.  
Here I engage Swift in order to question if the capacity to learn—i.e. the quality 
of “teachableness”, the term that Gulliver uses throughout Book IV—is universal to all 
humans and, if so, does that include those who are brutish in ways that might deny them 
the status of a fully moral being if they remain in this state? Furthermore, the question of 
travel as education raised in the previous chapter forms a core site of critical inquiry to 
this end as, if travel cures ignorance (of places, cultures, modes of being, etc.) and is thus 
a vital aspect of education, can travel cure the brutish of their lowly state? Can human 
beings be redeemed from ignorance through education and, if so, can travel provide a 
viable path to such an outcome? The ultimate issues here are whether or not the human 
capacity for education—“teachableness”, in Gulliver’s words—creates a moral 
imperative for travel so that humans may be improved through the benefits that can arise 
from expanding our horizons, and whether or not such an education ought to be 
structured in accordance with the values of an organically hierarchical society or not. A 
later chapter will then engage the question of Swift’s response to ideas of ordering travel 
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for the purposes of benefiting the scientific project. In this chapter I will argue that 
Gulliver’s Travels provides some hope for the human capacity to be educated, but 
perhaps significantly less so for our capacity for education through individualised 
experiential learning and thus Swift encourages us to view those in search of redemption 
are better off pursuing it at home rather than abroad. 
 
3.2. Locke and Enlightenment Ideals of Education 
By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, travel was viewed as an essential 
part of education because of the polishing effects it has on gentlemen seeking to curate a 
worldly consciousness and mastery of the universal ideals of civility. This reflected a 
broader emphasis in English elite thinking on the merits of experiential learning that 
coincided with “the gentry’s diminishing faith in the universities as schools of 
politeness.” The predilection of academics to remain cloistered in libraries with their 
heads buried in dusty books made it so that they could not be counted on to behave in 
worldly and urbane ways befitting the instruction of youth in the ways of polite society. 
Thus, it was necessary to send young gentlemen away from academics’ “pedantic way of 
disputing and wrangling, which makes them ungrateful to all well-bred company” 
(Thomas 2018: 34). University education was no guarantee of a completed gentleman; 
one must learn by doing and so the experiential learning of travel was an indispensable 
component of a completed gentleman. 
Given the argument of the previous chapter that Swift’s critique of travel develops 
an insight of Locke’s thinking on the matter, the philosopher’s position regarding human 
nature warrants some brief attention. We know from Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education that it was his position that “of all the men we meet with nine parts are what 
they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education (Locke 1996:10). This iteration of 
Locke’s conceptualisation of human nature as essentially nine-tenths malleable by 
nurture and environment to one-part fixed nature forms the basis of Locke’s empiricism 
and educational philosophy. Temperaments vary significantly within the remaining one 
tenth of human nature, but it is nonetheless broadly common to all people as the laws of 
nature apply to all equally. Interpreting Locke’s intention in this fashion assumes that he 
is referring to the division of nature and nurture as found within the individual.  
Another interpretation, however, would be that he is referring to one part in ten of 
the larger collective of people one encounters in life being as they are due to their 
education whilst the remaining nine-tenths of people encountered are pure products of 
their environments and learning. The latter interpretation is significantly less optimistic 
concerning the plasticity of human nature, seeing but one part in ten of the populace as 
capable of being educated above or beyond their social circumstances. The remaining 
majority, on the other hand, are prisoners of their social surroundings and mores. Whilst 
Locke’s meaning here was interpreted both in contemporary criticism and in subsequent 
canonical readings in the former fashion—i.e., a generous conceptualisation of education 
as available to all as a core facet of their one-tenth shared nature—the tension between 
the more optimistic individualist reading and the more pessimistic (and, perhaps, elitist) 
collective reading is exploited in Swift’s narrative treatment of the human capacity for 
education in Gulliver’s Travels. Whilst both readings are defensible and perhaps Locke 
was deliberately opaque in his phrasing so as to suggest this tension, I read Swift to be 
predominantly responding to the individualist conception of the argument, arguably in a 
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less than charitable manner in order to invoke the problems with prioritising individual 
over community.  
It is in Locke’s writings on education, as well as in the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) and On the Conduct of the Understanding (first published 
posthumously in 1706) in which the modern iteration of the idea of the mind as ‘tabula 
rasa’, or blank slate, emerges. Locke was the inheritor of an intellectual tradition of 
humanist educational philosophy that was prominent from the Renaissance onwards, but 
his influence in spreading such ideas was considerable, with his Thoughts Concerning 
Education going through twenty-five printings in England and Scotland before 1780 
(Spadafora 1990: 168). Locke saw travel as an important part of developing a theory of 
human understanding, interviewing returning travellers and corresponding with people 
abroad as part of his research (Thomas 2020: 55). The blank slate argument denies the 
existence of any innate moral ideas as the fundamental basis of human nature. Rather, 
humans are seen as primarily motivated and prompted by feelings of pleasure and pain 
and thus we alter our moral language to describe these experiences accordingly (Carey 
2002: 139–140). It seems that Swift sought to invoke Locke’s thinking but to also caution 
against the possibility of the ramifications of untethering the ideal of individualistic 
experiential learning from the kind of stout and orderly curriculum informed by Ancient 
and Renaissance Humanist values advocated by Locke. 
Arguing that there are no “innate principles”, Locke suggests that close 
observation of young children provides us with “little reason to think that they bring 
many ideas into the world with them” (Locke 1996:10). Humans are thus seen as 
malleable within a general set of preconditions natural to the species. Travel plays an 
important role in this conception of human understanding as our knowledge can only 
come from perceiving our direct experiences and reflecting upon them. As a result, we 
cannot know things we have not experienced, such as far off lands, peoples, cultures, 
animals and fauna Thomas (2020: 62). This presentation of the malleability of human 
nature suggests that through disciplining the mind from a young age, children can be 
moulded toward a disposition wherein their rational faculties may be enhanced and they 
can then be expected to live lives of responsible freedom (Porter 2000: 340–341). In 
Locke’s view, wickedness is thus not baked into the human soul intractably, as hardline 
Puritan and other reform theologians believe (Montag 1994, 103–104). This belief in “the 
pliability of man” provides a central plank of the progress of narrative so central to 
Enlightenment and Modernist thought (Spadafora 1990: 149). Proper rearing and 
discipline through “awe and respect” and “esteem and disgrace” could take the infant 
mind and raise it to be a rational and responsible Christian (Locke 1996: 32); (Porter 
2000: 340). 
As experiences (including habits and behaviour, as distinct from principles) 
accumulate throughout an individual’s development “by degrees afterward, ideas come 
into their minds” (Locke 1996:10). Thus, ideas, habits and behaviours are the result of 
experiential learning, whereas a capacity for morality, liberty, and virtue are innate (but 
by no means a guaranteed outcome in one or all cases). The most uncharitable 
interpretation of this position might accuse Locke of denying any innate moral content to 
human nature, resulting in an inevitable relativism ad infinitum. However, as Grant and 
Tarcov convincingly argue, Locke consistently tethers this empiricist perspective on 
human experience and understanding (best exemplified in the context of studying Swift 
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by travel and education, respectively) to that one tenth of humanity that is innate and 
within which our capacity for both independent judgment and reasonable action is 
contained (Grant and Tarcov 1996: xii). This capacity for judgment and reasonableness is 
what renders individuals capable of living both free and moral lives (Grant and Tarcov 
1996: xii). Consequently, all individuals are capable of fulfilling an inherent potential to a 
life of liberty through self-governance, guided by reason toward moral action. The key to 
unlocking this potential is one’s experiences: hence the vital importance of directing 
education so that experiential learning occurs in the order most suitable and likely to 
produce this most desirable outcome.  
In an overarching survey of the idea of progress in eighteenth-century Britain, 
David Spadafora notes that the immense success of Locke’s pedagogical ideas played 
into broader societal shifts concerning human psychology and the potential limits (or lack 
thereof) to societal change (Spadafora 1990: 168). Education was now a (if not the) key 
to unlock rational progress at both individual and collective levels. Indeed, if, as Locke 
suggests, humans are mostly the products of nurture and inherently pliable, society might 
be reordered entirely to reflect the most noble goals (Porter 2000: 342). A wide array of 
pedagogical writings emerged in the wake of Locke’s educational tract, many heavily 
influenced by the English philosopher in seeing failures of virtue and decay in society as 
failures of education (Spadafora 1990: 169). These problems, dire though they may be, 
are solvable through education. This assumption forms a cornerstone of Enlightenment 
thought, crystalizing in embryonic form throughout Swift’s lifetime that receives a firm 
counter-Enlightenment counter punch from the Irishman. I argue that this critique of the 
extension of Locke’s basic ideas on education as representative of a much broader belief 
in the possibility of individual self-directed experiential education is a key target for both 
satirical treatment and earnest political criticism in Gulliver’s Travels. 
Again, Locke’s is a broadly optimistic interpretation of human nature, arguing as 
it does that under achievable circumstances all people can be educated to bring forth the 
universally desirable characteristics of reasonableness and morality. The key here is that, 
per Locke, the raw material of humanity is generally (albeit not exclusively nor 
necessarily) favourable toward liberty and morality, and whilst circumstances may lead to 
negative outcomes, human nature is capable of achieving the former ends and can be led 
to the fulfilment of responsibly free lives through correct education. This stands in stark 
contrast to Augustinian and Puritan notions of the fallen soul, condemned to instinctual 
sin in all scenarios outside of intervention by God’s grace (Collinson 1991: 100–2; 
Gonsález 2010: 85–7). Augustine was indeed a profound believer in the enrichment 
education can provide, but his conception of education was entirely directed toward 
Biblical exegesis and questions of faith. For Augustine, studying the liberal arts was 
valuable only insofar as they could enhance one’s ability to understand God’s will and to 
stand up to tests of faith in a Fallen world (Herman 2013: 191). Education beyond or 
without reference to these goals will likely be corrupting to one’s already Fallen 
character. As perhaps the preeminent influence upon key theological reformers such as 
Luther, Calvin, and Knox, it is unsurprising that similar ideas regarding the value and 
role of education abound in Puritan and other dissenting Protestant thought.  
In this regard, the portrait of human nature provided by Locke’s educational 
philosophy deviates profoundly from the Christian political tradition (or at least the 
Augustinian and Reform variants thereof). Indeed, Locke seemingly adopts more of a 
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Classical approach to human perfectibility that energises individual experience in the 
name of self-betterment, thus assuming a telos or end purpose for human flourishing in 
this life, rather than salvation as survival of a wicked world en route to an eternal reward 
in heaven. Whilst not all individuals can necessarily achieve the optimal life of moral and 
virtuous flourishing, they can nonetheless play a role in fulfilling the collective telos of 
human flourishing in political society.  
For the purposes of this discussion, a Classical approach—in contrast to nascent 
modernist ideals and mores emerging in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries—refers to very general positions that were (and often still are) expressed as 
deriving broadly from the virtue ethics of the Socratic tradition in Plato and Aristotle’s 
political writings and their inheritors. Whilst this will necessarily caricature the 
complexity and diversity of Hellenic and Roman political thought, reductionism was the 
order of the day in an intellectual context where an ongoing debate between proponents 
and critics of so-called ancients and moderns. As Montag notes, Swift’s fiercely partisan 
attitudes to political matters followed him into philosophical questions, and in this regard 
he was typical of many late seventeenth century thinkers in seeing intellectual history as a 
“combat des livres” (Montag 1994:42). The perceived necessity of a rigid High Church 
Anglican political theology of this period, especially in the Irish context, was discussed in 
the previous chapter, but suffice to say again here that the innovation in economic and 
technological matters that sought to liberate individuals through the orderly progress of 
reason was met with stern scepticism at best and iron resistance at worst. Thus, a 
caricature of Classical or Ancient thought was necessary, operating as a widely 
understood shorthand among intellectual elites for the positions oppositional to nascent 
liberal and Enlightenment doctrines. This was the case in both the contemporary debate 
into which Swift intervened specifically with the Battle of the Books, but also formed part 
of a broader worldview in which the history of philosophy is presented as perpetual war 
(Montag 1994: 42–43). An important point here is that a primary implication of 
identifying Swift’s satire of travel is the broader critique of what he saw as the overlap in 
approach—characterised primarily by zealous enthusiasm and naïve optimism in the 
inevitability of progress—between dissenting Protestantism, Modernist scientific 
rationalism, and Enlightenment ideals regarding self-directed experiential education. 
 It is from this basis that Locke makes his recommendations concerning 
travel as the final part of a gentleman’s education. The character of Gulliver serves as a 
reminder that the prior education and experiences of a traveller are of serious concern, 
lest the traveller pursue a fateful combination of pig-headed pride regarding their home 
culture and adoption of the wrong lessons from newly encountered peoples. Thus, if 
Swift is, as I contend, working from Locke’s basic premises on travel but worried about 
some of the implications of a licentious approach to experiential education, it is thus also 
necessary to investigate the portrait of human nature in the text, especially as it concerns 
the issue of education as a means to progress the rational ordering of society (Spadafora 
1990: 168). If, per the individualist reading of Locke, nine tenths of the finished article of 
a person is made up through experience, what, then, does Gulliver’s Travels tell us about 
the remaining natural or innate characteristics of humanity and how does this play into 
the likelihood of travel composing a beneficial component of one’s education? Are there 
some for whom education is impossible? The opposing Enlightenment and Puritan 
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depictions of human nature and the consequent understanding of education both find 
expression in Gulliver’s Travels, with Swift satirizing the totalizing tendency of both.  
Ultimately, this has significant bearing on an emergent critique of the 
Enlightenment assumptions regarding the individual’s capacity for education and the 
prospect of this being achieved through an unrestricted freedom to traverse through life 
as they see fit, exemplified in particular by travel. Travel, then is a sort of litmus test for 
the kind of individual freedom that can be found advocated in embryonic (though heavily 
qualified) form in Locke’s political writings. Even more radically optimistic ideas in this 
guise later went on to become a hallmark value of Enlightenment thought in general and 
formed an important part of the liberal political philosophy that emerged in the fifty years 
after Swift’s death in 1745. In Gulliver’s Travels, I think it is important to amplify 
Swift’s highlighting of the qualifications to such ideas present in Locke’s discussion of 
travel. His is ultimately a far more pessimistic depiction of the freedom befitting humans, 
given what he presents as our real but limited capacity for education. 
 
3.3. Yahoos, Houyhnhmns, and Human Nature 
Debates concerning Book IV of the Travels are invariably coloured by the individual 
readings of how Swift characterised the Houyhnhnms and Yahoos. For several decades 
the central debate concerning interpretation of Book IV have coalesced around what 
James L. Clifford described as two predominant approaches: the “hard” and “soft” 
schools of criticism. The “hard” school sees the ultra-rational Houhynhmns as Swift’s 
ideal society and the crude and brutish Yahoo as mankind at its most deplorable. The 
“soft” school, in turn, see the Houyhnhmn as the true object of Swift’s satire, 
representing passionless and unattainable rationalism, with the Yahoo as a sub-rational 
beast whose distasteful nature is not necessarily to be held against him (Sullivan 1984: 
497–498). There is ample evidence in the text to support these and seemingly several 
other viewpoints on this issue. Such is the nature of a multidirectional satire that focuses 
on both contemporary and perennial targets. Indeed, Swift’s prose and narrative style 
crams in a veritable bonanza of intentional satirical references both timely and timeless 
(Ahrensdorf 1994: 114).  
 The most significant treatment of human nature in Gulliver’s Travel’s occurs in 
the book’s infamous fourth voyage to the Land of the Houyhhnhnms. Whilst the primary 
object of satiric intent in Book IV remains hotly contested, the depiction of human nature 
retains its biting character, regardless of one’s interpretation of its wider satirical 
significance. George Orwell described the voyage to the Houyhhnhnms as constituting an 
attack on humanity in three parts, speculating that Swift did so in order to vent “his 
private grievance against contemporary society” (Orwell 2000: 988). Sir Walter Scott, for 
his part, in the 1824 introduction to an edited volume of Swift, iterated what he 
considered to be the depravity of Book IV of the Travels in no uncertain terms:  
 
It holds mankind forth in a light too degrading for contemplation, and which, if 
admitted, would justify or palliate the worst vices, by exhibiting them as natural 
attributes, and rendering reformation from a state of such base depravity a task too 
desperate to be attempted. As no good could possibly be attained by the exhibition of so 
loathsome a picture of humanity, as it may even tend to great evil, by removing every 
motive for philanthropy, the publication has been justly considered as a stain upon the 
character of the ingenious author (Scott 2002: 312).  
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The portrait of human nature painted by Swift, as Orwell and Scott testify, is almost 
unanimously understood as grim. In Erin Mackie’s estimation, Swift’s evisceration of 
human nature amidst the corruptions of modernity leaves us with nowhere to turn but to 
call the great writer a nihilist (Mackie 2014: 109). Such an interpretation may say more 
about the interpreter’s prejudices than it does about Swift’s text. While some ideas and 
materials presented by the voyage to Houyhnhmnland are certainly troubling, my analysis 
is that Swift himself, insofar as we might extract meaningful authorial intent at all, is no 
nihilist. Daniel Carey offers the arguably more hopeful (although perhaps that is not 
saying much) interpretation that Swift’s picture of human nature leaves us “in a shadowy 
middle ground, uncertain of what, if anything, we should identify ourselves with (Carey 
2002: 156). For many years from the mid twentieth century onwards the two opposing 
schools of interpretation mentioned above dominated critical studies of Book IV. The 
hard and soft schools disagreed as to the primary focus of the satirical blade wielded in 
the portrait of human nature. The former takes the ugly portrait of human nature, English 
and European politics and morality more or less at face value; the latter reading a more 
reflexive satire against Gulliver himself, rather than humanity or European society, 
focusing instead on the deficiencies in Houyhnhmn society (such as, for example, the 
absence of humour and lying). 
In many ways the Yahoos are a challenge to then emergent assumptions 
underlining Enlightenment ideals concerning the transcendence of human reason. Swift’s 
text presents a profound challenge to the emerging ideal of the enlightened man, 
described by historian Roy Porter as educated, affluent, and independent (Porter 2000: 
339). A central ideal of what we can characterise as Enlightenment thought is that 
education forged the path to progress. The optimistic perspective extracted from Locke’s 
pedagogical philosophy infused thinkers with renewed hope for the prospect of 
fashioning the young into rational and responsible adults (Porter 2000: 553). In the guise 
of the “brute animal” Yahoo, Swift satirically confronts this optimism concerning human 
nature, most interestingly raising the complexity of the type of instrumental reason 
available to man amidst the wider idea of education as a path to edification.  
Gulliver’s Travels satirically juxtaposes two competing totalising 
conceptualisations of reason with the intent, I believe, of highlighting the limitations 
inherent in assuming reason as entirely transcendent or purely instrumental. The 
Houyhnhmns supposedly represent a society in total harmony with reason, living exactly 
as nature intended. Gulliver, on the other hand, represents the cynical problem-solving 
faculties of human society wherein instrumental reason is used to further nefarious 
ends—what the King of Brobdignag describes as “the very worst Effects that Avarice, 
faction, Hypocrisy, Perfidiousness, Cruelty, Rage, madness, hatred, Envy, Lust, Malice, 
and Ambition could produce” (Book II, Ch. VII: 121). In this regard, Swift’s presentation 
reflects his scepticism of seeing reason as either a Platonic sun that illuminates the world 
entirely or as a simple tool through which humans can solve problems in the pursuit of 
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Although their presuppositions and wider goals 
diverge widely, Swift’s understanding of instrumental reason in particular, is summarised 
neatly by the twentieth century Frankfurt school thinker Max Horkheimer. In 1974, 
Horkheimer wrote that the Enlightenment ideal of reason “meant the activity of 
understanding and assimilating the eternal ideas which were to function as goals for 
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men.” The contemporary conceptualisation of reason, emerging in Swift’s time through 
the new science and reductionist readings of Lockean autonomous individualism, is 
merely “to find means for the goals one adopts at any time (…) Reason is considered to 
come into its own when it rejects any status as absolute (…) and accepts itself simply as a 
tool” (Horkheimer 2012: vii). As referenced in the previous chapter, for Aristotle this is 
cleverness, rather than reason, whereby individuals possess the necessary skills required 
to achieve their ends, but the ends they seek may be of little to no value (Ethics: 
1144a23–28). References throughout this chapter to instrumental reason as a focus of 
Swift’s satire and criticism should be understood in this fashion. 
Brutishness is perhaps most significantly treated in Book VII of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. It is described as one of the three major character traits that are to 
be avoided by someone seriously seeking moral improvement (Ward 2016). Brutishness 
as defined by Aristotle is a serious deviation from virtue to the point of transcending even 
vice. To this end, he describes brutish people as “beyond the limits of vice” (1148b34–
1149a1). It is imperative to note that true viciousness is something people adopt or 
commit by choice, whereas brutishness, as Howard J. Curzer notes, “results from trauma, 
disease, birth defect, or socialization into a corrupt society” (1148b17–31) (Curzer 2012: 
44–45). Whilst Curzer links Aristotle’s depiction of brutishness here to what 
contemporary society identifies as mental illness8, the key for understanding how Swift 
uses the term is the brute as the product of a deadly combination of lowly nature and the 
corruption of socialisation in a wicked society. The examples of brutishness offered by 
Aristotle largely centre around cannibalism, invoking myths of the non-Hellenic, barbaric 
world. Essentially, some of the examples bring forward nightmarishly hyperbolic images 
of the terrifying depths of depravity that humanity might sink too if it were to indulge its 
animalistic side entirely.  
Conspicuously, Aristotle states in Chapter 6 that while vice is more evil than 
brutishness, we should be more alarmed at the latter (1150a1). As Curzer notes, this has 
significant ramifications for questions of voluntary and non-voluntary actions and the 
praise or blame that they warrant (Thorp 2003: 698). This is important because the idea 
of the brute throughout Western intellectual history largely continues from this premise: 
whilst brutes may be depraved and sub-rational it is not necessarily their fault and thus 
should not be held accountable as such. This is in contrast to the voluntarily vicious 
person who fails to reach the height of human rational (and thus moral) potential 
available to them. Lying—a most pernicious and widespread malady attributed to 
humanity in Gulliver’s Travels—generally falls under voluntary action, and it thus 
combines viciousness with brutishness to further darken the portrait of the human animal 
offered by Swift.  
This raises the question of whether or not the focus ought to be on the individual 
or the community, a key tension identified earlier in Locke’s phrasing “of all the men we 
meet with nine parts are what they are good or evil, useful or not, by their education” 
(Locke 1996: 10). Praise or blame might only be relevant for the individual if they are 
capable (in their nature) of overcoming corrupting education/socialisation—thus, those 
who could but do not live virtuous lives deserve blame. In the same fashion, those born 
into perfected societies raised accordingly may not deserve any praise, since they did not 
 
8  Aristotle does distinguish “diseased” people, or “madness” as distinct from bestial men, however 
(1148b25–36). 
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voluntarily do anything especially virtuous beyond follow through on the general 
habituations offered by their society. This is only the case, however, if the individual is 
the primary focus of politics. If one were to assess community as the focal point of 
political analysis, perhaps the significance of awarding praise and blame on matters such 
as the difference between involuntary brutishness and voluntary viciousness is 
misguided. This involves a significant reorientation away from political individualism (or 
even the idea that the individual soul is a useful mirror for the city/society at large) and 
toward a more resolutely communitarian ethos wherein individualism is discarded, even 
as a helpful or meaningful fiction. 
Swift’s use of brutishness is in line with the connotations recognised by John 
Thorp as “savage behaviour from semi-imaginary tribes” and “violent psychopathic 
behaviour.” In sum: “par excellence the irrational in human behaviour (Thorp 2003: 677). 
In this regard, the Yahoo’s allegorical power as a stand-in for humanity’s folly in 
conceiving itself to be rational is indeed a sharp satirical blade. Brutishness is seemingly 
beyond the pale in its depravity, perhaps irredeemable in ways that even the vicious could 
be salvaged. In the brutish, as opposed to the vicious, “it is not that the better part has 
been perverted […]—they have no better part” (1150a2–3) (Thorp 2003: 677). The 
possibility of redemption is seemingly hopeless in the brutish, characterised as the fullest 
flourishing of the irrational in humanity. Gulliver, then, as a seemingly teachable brute, 
capable of learning (or at least imitating learning) and displaying some glimmers of 
reason, manifests a fascinating puzzle as a stand-in for human nature. 
 Locke’s educational philosophy established that children were inherently 
malleable like wax paper and could be developed toward a life of rational, responsible 
freedom. Enlightenment thought heartily engaged and (crucially for the purposes of 
understanding Swift’s critique) extended this idea, as both projectors and cultural figures 
sowed the seeds for the later Romantic fantasy of childhood as a portrait of the unspoiled 
innocence of humanity at its most natural. The potential of a child’s mind to be improved 
spurred enlightened minds to see this model as applicable to other classes of people in 
need of reform and correction (Porter 2000: 353). Such groups included the downtrodden 
poor, beggars, and criminals, with a new focus on the circumstances that create such 
people rather than attributing blame to the individual themselves. Thus, benevolence and 
philanthropic guidance were the keys to deliverance and redemption, previously the 
exclusive domain of religious confession, devotion, or divine intervention (Bell 1991). 
Among these newly sympathetic groups were erstwhile “freaks” and “monsters,” 
previously shunned or denied any hope of redemption (Porter 2000: 353). The scientific 
need to explain and incorporate all new knowledge into a universal framework, typified 
by Bacon, combined with a newly unleashed optimism for human perfectibility to make 
such figures sympathetic as well as good fodder for both experimentation and voyeurism 
(Todd: 1995). As Roy Porter explains: “in enlightened thinking, erstwhile villains might 
be transformed into victims” (Porter 2000: 353). In this case, the brute, the freak, and the 
monster might have been considered villains against nature in the past but were now 
available for potential reform.  
In some ways the idea of progress so central to enlightenment thinking rests on 
this incorporation of the previously damned into the sphere of the redeemable. What were 
once monsters worthy of revulsion were now marvels worthy of wonder and, before too 
long, understanding. Such is the force of human reason and the projects and institutions 
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of its design that figures that were formerly shunned or cast aside could now be 
rehabilitated. Crucially, the extension of commercial society and freedom from censure in 
a robust print culture marked England out as an increasingly secular society as the 
eighteenth century progressed. As J.G.A. Pocock writes, “the Augustan journalists and 
critics were the first intellectuals on record to express an entirely secular awareness of 
social and economic changes going on in their society” (Pocock 1975: 451). Such a 
commitment to the universalization of the prospect of reform meets a heady challenge in 
the form of Gulliver, who mirrors many on the margins in possessing twin characteristics 
of both teachableness and brutishness. The capacity for the brutish (and other such 
figures on the margins) to be reformed or redeemed marked the ultimate challenge to the 
enlightenment project’s desire to understand and change humanity empirically through 
social projects and programs informed by reason.  
 
3.4. Educating Brutes and Beasts 
We might think of the brute as the sub- or non-human, a purely instinctual being devoid 
or deprived of that which makes humanity divine—reason. An instructive (albeit 
anachronistic) example of the religious connotation to the difference between human and 
brute is the memorable scene in Melville’s Moby-Dick when Starbuck chastises Ahab for 
his quest for revenge against the white whale: “Vengeance on a dumb brute!" cried 
Starbuck, "that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged with a 
dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (Melville 2009: 178). The blasphemy 
committed here is, as Isaac Rooks notes, that Ahab projects his own human agency upon 
the whale, rendering it an opponent capable of strategic thought and action, rather than a 
being that acts entirely on the basis of instinct (Rooks 2018). Ahab’s insistence on 
granting such qualities to Moby Dick is the fundamental tragic underpinning of the entire 
narrative. This tragedy is not just the ultimate futility of the dangerous and doomed hunt 
for the whale, but also that Ahab has lost his understanding of what it is to be human, 
rather than brute. This is somewhat like the pointlessness of conducting an argument with 
someone who is mad, but from a religious perspective it is even worse. The brute, in this 
instance the whale, cannot reason and to project the human quality of rationality onto it is 
to subvert and betray one’s own humanity. Gulliver is enraged with a dumb thing, in the 
form of the Yahoo, perhaps because he—and in many ways centuries of readership—
cannot come to terms with our (humanity’s) exact relationship to this particular dumb 
brute. Ahab’s folly is clear; whale and man are by no means alike. Gulliver’s inability to 
reconcile himself with the Yahoo speaks to a more troubling iteration of the fuzzy 
boundary between man and beast. 
Joep Leerssen describes this fundamental dichotomy “as the standard by which 
humans stand higher than animals in the great chain of being” (Leerssen 1995: 26). To 
this end Leerssen, a historian of ideas, explains that when one falls short of these 
standards it “means that either one must be educated and socialized (this is what is done 
to young children) or else segregated or outcast (witness the exclusion or confinement of 
madmen and criminals)” (Leerssen 1995: 26–27). Gulliver displays the teachableness that 
hints at a capacity of being educated or socialized, though the Houyhnhmns ultimately 
conclude that beings physically resembling Yahoos, teachable or otherwise, are unworthy 
of such a project of reform. Ultimately, Gulliver is forced to exile himself under the 
threat of execution. This steadfast dichotomy between animal and human, and between 
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those who might be redeemed and the irredeemable is certainly a point of satirical 
traction for Swift. Perhaps the author seeks to draw our critical attention here to the 
fallacy of a purely materialist worldview that ignores the age-old Platonic problem of 
differentiating between seeming and being. The Houyhnhmns cannot see (or are 
unwilling to engage the implications of) the distinction between Gulliver’s purely Yahoo 
body and a soul that contains the complex relationship to reason as both instrumental and 
transcendent. 
Those who may be educated or socialized out of their brutishness 9 are in an 
entirely other world to the pure brute summoned in the form of the Yahoo. Again, 
however, tensions between classical and modern conceptualisations of “nature” and its 
connotations for Swift abound. On this question, the ancient perspective (generally 
speaking) would understand de-naturing one’s behaviour in exactly the reverse fashion—
i.e. to de-nature would be to debase rather than to improve from a wild first principle. 
 As Weaver-Hightower reminds us, Gulliver repeatedly emphasises that the key 
character trait of the Yahoo beyond its animalistic appearance, is the sheer incorrigibility 
of its nature (Weaver-Hightower 2007: 147). This is a species that is, almost by 
definition, irredeemable. We are denied any meaningful window into Yahoo psychology, 
but Gulliver’s descriptions of their appearance and behaviour displays little beyond truly 
debased and animalistic instincts. As “the most unteachable of all brutes,” the typical 
path to redemption offered through education is not an option for Yahoos. The text 
suggests that the illumination of progress is not universally available, and it is the 
Yahoo’s very nature that denies them this possibility. 
If Locke is correct in saying that “of all the men we meet with nine parts are what 
they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education (Locke 1996: 10), then the Yahoo 
is indeed, as Gulliver declares, “cursed” and condemned by its very nature, for being 
brutish as well appearing so. It is important to reiterate that there is a tension at play here 
between modern and classical connotations of the word nature. The Yahoos are presented 
as a somewhat satiric iteration of the modern conception of pure nature understood as 
man without civilisation, outside of the deformations that society imposes upon 
individuals (Berman 2009: 3–5). On the other hand, the Houyhnhmns, whose very name 
means “the perfection nature” (Book IV, Ch. II: 220) invokes the classical sense of nature 
as the perfected state of man. The tension here rests on whether or not nature is 
something that we require saving from, or whether its perfection can save us from 
corrupting social conditions. At the heart of this is that Swift’s undoubted devotion to 
ancient over modern learning remained nested in a broader satirical ambivalence over the 
very nature of such quarrels. Even in taking a side in popular intellectual controversies 
such as that of the debate between the Ancients and Moderns into which his mentor Sir 
William Temple offered his essay Upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1690), Swift 
could not help but to lampoon both sides of the aisle. Swift’s offering in support of 
Temple, The Battle of the Books (1704) clearly reads as advocacy in favour of Ancient 
learning. However, it does so in a fashion, much like his Tale of A Tub (1704) that 
(amongst other things) promoted the Established Anglican Church over Catholicism and 
Dissenting Protestantism, whereby his understanding of the potentially farcical nature of 
the entire argument is rendered opaque by the sheer wit of the satire. 
 
9 Elsewhere Leerssen describes this idea as “de-naturing our behaviour” and links it to the very ideals of 
refinement and polishing that Shaftesbury would no doubt endorse (Leerssen 1995: 27. 
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3.5. Human Nature laid bare in Houyhnhmnland 
The challenging portrayal of human nature commences at the outset of Book IV, when 
Gulliver sets sail once more after a mere five months at home with his family following 
his previous travels to Laputa and elsewhere. It is noteworthy, given the previous 
chapter’s discussion of the reasons for travel and its causes, that this five-month spell is 
actually the longest gap Gulliver takes between voyages. Gulliver remarks that this time 
at home with his family was spent “in a very happy condition, if I could have learned the 
lesson of knowing when I was well” (Book IV, Ch. I: 207). Erin Mackie reads this 
sentiment as “retrospective regret at happiness lost before it was realised”, drawing a 
parallel with Defoe’s Crusoe echoing similar thoughts following his return to sea after a 
disastrous first voyage (Mackie 2014: 110). However, it is worth thinking here about 
Gulliver self-admission of a failure to learn his lesson that his travels have been 
dangerous, unpredictable, and his presence in faraway lands has not been a net positive 
for either the societies he visits or for himself. The capacity to learn and improve, later 
described throughout his experiences with the Houyhnhmns as the “teachableness” that 
marks him out as distinct from other Yahoos, notably fails Gulliver here and it is this that 
thrusts him into his most perilous voyage yet. Thus far, his travels have overwhelmingly 
not been to his benefit but he opts to leave a scene that he recognises as positive, at least 
after the fact, without even offering a reason.  
Gulliver blithely mentions that his “poor wife” was “big with child” before 
continuing to document his adventures without iterating any explicit reasoning to go back 
out to sea, beyond the extension of an “advantageous offer” to captain a new ship (Book 
IV, Ch. I: 207). It is as though Swift invokes, through this careful omission, the idea that 
travel is its own reward and does not need any justification in and of itself. Gulliver does 
mention the financial incentive to go to sea, but only in passing, and does not dwell on it. 
Regardless of the positive familial circumstances in which Gulliver finds himself nested, 
he falls back upon the assumption that more travel is always a good idea as it is always 
beneficial, especially in a society that values worldliness as a component of education 
and a key to progress. 
Thus, despite this claim to an enjoyable home life, Gulliver captains the ship—
aptly named the Adventure, as this is seemingly Gulliver’s calling, consequences be 
damned—and sets sail yet again. After several months at sea, a significant number of the 
crewmen perish as a result of tropical fevers and the vessel is forced to “get recruits out 
of Barbadoes, and the Leeward Islands” (Book IV, Ch. I: 207). In short order these new 
recruits reveal themselves to be “buccaneers” and they end up capturing the ship and 
imprisoning Gulliver in his quarters. Some months later, Gulliver is allowed to dress in 
his “best suit of clothes, which were as good as new, and a small bundle of linen,” and to 
bring his hanger, what money he had, and “some other little necessaries” before being 
taken by boat and dropped off at an unknown land (Book IV, Ch. I: 207–8). The mutiny 
of these buccaneers further suggests that those who opt to travel may not necessarily be 
of good stock to begin with, and they may degrade further through an intransigent life 
untethered to society in pursuit of plunder. 
 After stumbling through this newfound territory, noticing a trail with both human 
and horse tracks, Gulliver wanders into a field whereupon he spies some strange animals 
in trees and in the grass whose “singular” and “deformed” shape immediately strike him 
 65 
and leave him “discomposed” (Book IV, Ch. 209). Immediately upon their introduction, 
the Yahoos are depicted as resolutely bestial; a foul, monstrous, sub-savage being that 
lead Gulliver to conclude that he had never seen “so disagreeable an Animal, or one 
against which I naturally conceived so strong an antipathy” (Book IV, Ch. 209). The 
immediate revulsion with which Gulliver greets the Yahoo marks the species out as 
particularly rancorous. The “natural antipathy” Gulliver feels signals that his reaction is 
visceral, instinctive, and predicated on the Yahoo’s visual appearance. Gulliver’s 
understanding of himself as a rational being inherently possessed of moral judgment 
makes it so that we can read his guttural reaction to the sight of what he perceives to be 
natural brutishness not as a mere knee-jerk reaction, but indicative of a condemnation 
befitting the offense against nature that Yahoos represent. 
This instant and unmitigated negative recording that Gulliver makes of his first 
sighting of the Yahoo is worth noting, especially as it contrasts to his reaction to his first 
sighting of the Houyhnhmns. This near-farcically normative condemnation upon sight 
stands also in contrast with the more conspicuously measured and documentarian tone 
that Gulliver adopts, for the most part, throughout the voyages up to this point. While 
Gulliver never hides his disgust in scenes such as his close up view of Brobdignagian 
bodies in Book II, this is nonetheless a unilateral and unequivocal condemnation that 
overwhelms the staid narrative voice that the reader has come to expect from Gulliver. 
This is the first hint that the Voyage to the Houyhnhmns will stand aside from the 
previous voyages in both tone and content. Whilst there is some horror in Gulliver’s 
depiction and assessment of the immortal Struldbruggs’ endless aging and ailment in 
Book III, it is nonetheless laced with pity and sadness at their awful fate. No such 
sentiments are afforded the Yahoos. 
In short order having seen enough and “full of contempt and aversion,” he tries to 
exit away from the group. He bumps into a Yahoo on the trail and documents how this 
“ugly monster, when he saw me, distorted several ways every feature of his visage” 
(Book IV, Ch. I: 209). Does this particular Yahoo’s facial contortions suggest that despite 
Gulliver’s (perhaps wilful) ignorance of the similarities of himself and the Yahoo, the 
beast instinctively understands them to be of common stock? In response, Gulliver 
quickly draws his hanger and hits the Yahoo. Before long a loud roar summons a hoard 
of a further forty Yahoos who howl and make faces at Gulliver. This “cursed brood” then 
horribly live up to Gulliver’s initial gut reaction with aplomb by climbing the tree next to 
him and attempt to defecate atop his person while he narrowly avoids being hit by “the 
filth, which fell about me on every side” (Book IV, Ch. I: 209). Gulliver is rescued from 
this nasty scene by horses, soon identified as the Houyhnhmns whom, after an initial 
depiction as physically animal-like, shock and awe Gulliver by behaviour that was 
“orderly and rational, so acute and judicious” rendering him immediately taken with 
them. Again, the initial presentation of the Yahoo as the embodiment of a lowly life form 
is brought into further relief by their contrast with Gulliver’s presentation of the 
Houyhnhmns as a picture of perfect rationality, even in such a minor action.  
The language Gulliver uses regarding the Yahoos ironically fixates on the 
animalism of the species, labelling them as “beasts,” “monsters,” “animals,” before using 
descriptive terms far more befitting an animal to describe their bodies: “claws,” “fore 
feet,” “forepaws,” and “dugs” (Book IV, Ch. I: 210). Rebecca Weaver-Hightower aptly 
notes that the satiric function here is to reverse the literary trope of the animalistic 
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indigene/native as Gulliver scolds the human Yahoos and admires the literally animal 
horses, the Houyhnhmns, whom are cast as gentle, gracious, and rational (Weaver-
Hightower 2007: 146–47). Weaver-Hightower, in her book on island fiction of this 
period, points out that the character tropes of the genre such as pirates, cannibals, and 
savages often fell into one of two Manichaean characterisations; either wholly reformed 
or irredeemable; entirely noble or ignoble (Weaver-Hightower 2007: 146–47).  
I argue that Swift’s choice to outline the Yahoos as so utterly ignoble and 
irredeemable, playing upon humanity’s worst fears of its own capacity for debasement, 
savagery, and animalism, is significant when considering the possibility of a figure in this 
image being redeemed through education. Gulliver’s folly, to some degree, is to submit 
entirely to such a totalising understanding of brutality, allowing his gut reaction to these 
incontrovertibly foul beings to colour his entire understanding of both them and himself. 
The capacity for brutishness or a purely appetitive beastly life appears to be part of the 
ten per cent of innate human characteristics. Whilst there are some for whom redemption 
from such a state through education is possible, the reader is forced to grapple with the 
possibility that there are many others whose submission to their natural capacity for 
brutishness has simply gone too far for them to be salvaged. Education is indeed a 
possible path to redemption, but perhaps not for all, and Swift seems to think not even for 
most. 
We are initially presented with the Yahoo as the embodiment of a lowly life form, 
and this is brought into further relief by their contrast with the Houyhnhmns, which 
almost instantly upon Gulliver encountering them as his saviours are judged to be beings 
of an altogether higher wisdom and grace (Book IV, Ch. I: 211). His astonishment is 
derived as much (if not more) from encountering what he determines to be a perfectly 
rational being as it is from happening upon intelligent horses. The hyperbolically instant 
positive and negative reactions that Gulliver has to the Houyhnhmns and Yahoo 
respectively, is worth noting here. With minimal orientation in this latest bizarre world, 
Gulliver is already marking these new creatures out as polar opposites of savagery and 
civility. The disorientation of the reader contrasts with the immediacy and assuredness of 
Gulliver’s understanding of the Yahoos and Houyhnhmns as pillars of savagery and 
civility, respectively. The question is whether or not such a firm dichotomy is accurate, 
both in this case and more generally. It is clear, then, right upon their introduction, that 
both these species will be utilised for full allegorical value, with human nature as the 
broad satiric and political focus. 
 In his first discussion with the Houyhnhmns, wherein he presents himself as a 
hapless shipwrecked Englishman in need of help, Gulliver notes that the Houyhnhm 
response in their language demonstrated that it “expressed the passions very well” (Book 
IV, Ch. I: 212). Thus, within minutes of encountering and interacting with the 
Houyhnhmns, Gulliver has praised them for both their rationality and passion, signalling 
the totality of their nature. Thus, while the dominant portrait of Houyhnhmns, especially 
in contrast to the Yahoos, is that of cool—even austere—rationality, they are nonetheless 
not without passion. Critics of the soft school of interpretation view the austerity of 
Houyhnhmn nature and society to reflect Swift’s intention to satirise those who viewed 
pure reason alone as an acceptable basis of a truly humane society (Montag 1994). I am 
in agreement with Leo Damrosch, who argues that “it is not true, however, as is 
sometimes claimed, that they (the Houyhnhmns) have no emotions. They just don’t have 
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destructive ones” (Damrosch 2013: 970). These would include the general set of sins all 
too familiar to Swift such as jealously, avarice, vindictiveness, resentfulness, bitterness, 
etc. The contrary interpretation is proffered by Nokes who argues “the Houyhnhmns lack 
passions, but not virtues” (Nokes 1985: 324). 
Gulliver is taken to a gathering of several Houyhnhmns a few miles away from 
this initial encounter and is taken outside for comparison with a Yahoo. The scene that 
Gulliver encounters upon being taken to the Yahoos is painted vividly and with horror: 
 
Here we entered, and I saw three of those detestable creatures, which I first met after 
my landing, feeding upon roots, and the flesh of some animals, which I afterwards 
found to be that of asses and dogs, and now and then a cow dead by accident or disease. 
They were all tied by the neck with strong wyths, fastened to a beam: they held their 
food between the claws of their fore feet and tore it with their teeth (Book IV, Ch.II: 
214). 
 
This description further accentuates just how awful and disgusting the Yahoos are, again 
by highlighting their animalistic and beastly characteristics. The fact that the Yahoos are 
consuming the flesh of other animals hints at some degree of organic hierarchy within 
Houyhnhmnland in that, whilst the Yahoos are brutish beasts, they are nonetheless higher 
up the (literal) food chain than other animals. Later, Gulliver’s Master will tell him of 
some order even found amongst the Yahoos, wherein a particularly deformed and 
mischievous ruling Yahoo would have a “favourite” act as a lackey, ruling until the herd 
overturns him by discharging “their excrements upon him from head to foot” (Book IV, 
Ch. VII: 244). This again shows that organic hierarchy—even as vile and repugnant as 
that found amongst the Yahoos—is a universal condition that Gulliver has absconded 
from through his traversing the world via travel. In this scene, it is not just Gulliver’s 
narrative perception but also the Houyhnhmns’ treatment of the Yahoos as mere beasts 
that accentuates their animalistic qualities. We might speculate as to whether nature or 
nurture has rendered the Yahoos in their lowly position. It’s most likely that the 
miserable condition of the Yahoo is derived from a debased nature combined with such 
brutalising treatment at the hands of the Houyhnhmns. Without question, the portrayal 
here is designed to convey the harsh treatment of the Yahoos—“tied by the neck”—by 
the Houyhnhmns, as well as Gulliver’s revulsion at these brutes. Both of these serve to 
draw a negative response from the reader; there is little in this scene to suggest or to 
encourage sympathy, or the possibility for redemption for the Yahoos. Through 
Gulliver’s lens we are encouraged to see such punitive treatment as rational and befitting 
these loathsome beasts. This is a singularly debased creature that is designed to conjure 
our collective worst fears and insecurities concerning the potential beastliness of humans 
as a species.  
Crucially, the most repeated word by Gulliver concerning the Yahoo here is “brute”, 
as this summons the connotations of the animal in man: the depths of sub-rational 
depravity that humans fear in ourselves. The thrust of this scene is quickly accelerated 
further when Gulliver is compared to one of these beasts and is forced to recognise that 
what he had previously reacted to with instinctive horror was in fact one of his own kind: 
 
The beast and I were brought close together; and our countenances diligently compared, 
both by master and servant, who thereupon repeated several times the word Yahoo. My 
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horror and astonishment are not to be described, when I observed, in this abominable 
animal, a perfect human figure (Book IV, Ch.II: 214–15). 
 
We are thus confronted with the prospect that Gulliver, as the stand-in for all of 
humanity, is just as loathsome and detestable as the “filthy Yahoos” (Book IV, Ch.II: 
214–15). Gulliver goes on to clarify that there were some distinctions of features between 
the two, with the Yahoos possessing features more “common to all savage nations,” but 
the similarity between human and Yahoo is now clear. Gulliver’s pride and bloated sense 
of his own rationality hitherto denied him the willingness or ability to see that the Yahoos 
have been human all along. Dennis Todd, in an incisive book on tales of monsters and 
monstrosities in eighteenth-century England, argues that Swift presents Gulliver as 
subject to the same sense of disassociation with the objects before him as befell voyeurs 
at freak shows and readers titillated by stories of mothers birthing rabbits (Todd 1995). 
He has now been shaken from such a disassociation and must face the monster within. 
The key to this section of the text is that whilst Gulliver is confirmed as a Yahoo, 
the Houyhnhmns nonetheless identify him as markedly distinct from the local variant. 
Later, Gulliver will be described a Yahoo with a “tincture of reason”, a status to which he 
can never truly reconcile himself to. This is because Gulliver sees his endowment of 
reason in line with Enlightenment optimism concerning the prospect of reason as a 
singular and total, transcendent quality capable of reordering the world in its image. Here 
Swift’s satirical target is a degraded Lockeanism that is naively optimistic on the matter 
of humanity’s capacity for improvement through our access to reason and experiential 
education. Thus, he cannot comprehend being in possession of only a modicum of reason. 
The metaphor of the “tincture” is significant as while it openly refers to a small or trace 
amount of something, it can also refer to a medicine made by dissolving a drug in 
alcohol. It is notable that reason be tied to a medicinal metaphor, especially in the context 
of education as a panacea for the maladies of ignorance and prejudice. Prior to this, Swift 
invokes the material and practical trappings of civility as the initial identifiers of 
Gulliver’s supposed elevated status over the indigenous Yahoo population.  
The Houyhnhmns take scrupulous note of Gulliver’s clothes as these render him 
different from the Yahoos indigenous to the land. Indeed, he goes to great lengths to 
conceal the artificiality of his wearing of clothes from the Houyhnhmns, dressing and 
undressing only when assured of his secrecy. This is done in order to maintain the 
appearance of the essential character difference between the unclothed and clothed 
variants of what the Houyhnhmns see as the same species. Gulliver’s use of clothes to 
cover his body signifies his shame at sharing a brutish human nature with the Yahoos. 
Gulliver knows that every difference between he and “that cursed race of Yahoos” must 
be maintained and maximised, both for the sake of Houyhnhmn perception and, one feels, 
his own sense of self. No doubt this is a clear invocation of the well-worn paradigm of 
civility and savagery conjured by images of naked ‘natives’—be they noble or ignoble—
established in the European consciousness from Columbus onward. 
Swift is careful to establish that the dominant presentation of the Yahoo from 
Gulliver’s perspective is resolutely beastly yet worryingly human somehow but Gulliver 
possesses core characteristics that mark him out as different. The particular 
characteristics that do so, I argue, are notable, as this continues Swift’s satire—firmly 
established throughout the text as well in much of his other writing—on practical reason 
or cleverness masquerading as genuine reason. For example, his wearing of clothes offers 
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no necessarily meaningful testimony to his possession of reason, beyond establishing a 
desire to maintain modesty. This may be an important prerogative, but it is one typically 
divined through revelation in the Abrahamic tradition rather than reason. Gulliver 
performs the act of milking a cow to provide himself with some refreshment, rather than 
eating the rotten meat provided to him alongside the other Yahoos. Here he shows some 
discerning taste and proficiency in a mechanical operation of sorts. But this also serves to 
demonstrate Gulliver’s participation in an organic hierarchy wherein cows provide their 
milk as sustenance to those of higher value in the food chain. Later, when he takes up a 
Houyhnhmn who is positively disposed to him, Gulliver takes raw oats given to him to 
eat and refines them into a bread-like paste. Again, this is emblematic of Gulliver’s 
ingenuity and cleverness (Dahl 1984: 63), but it is nonetheless a demonstration of the 
instrumental reason of an interest-maximising problem-solver, rather than the 
illumination of pure reason. Instrumental reason, of course, is an indispensable resource 
for humanity’s survival in a harsh world, but it is but one facet of the broader holistic 
reason that marks humans out as distinct from other animals who can utilise craft and 
cunning to survive. The satirical focus is directed toward a broad caricature of proponents 
of experiential education whom, in Swift’s view, lack either the ability or willingness to 
discern between instrumental reason and practical wisdom. 
The crux of this depiction as it pertains to our purposes in this chapter, however, 
is to assess Gulliver’s capacity for reason beyond the “means for the goals one adopts at a 
given time” (Horkheimer 2012: vii) and, in particular, how/if he might be authentically 
educated to use it. In particular, the repeated use of the term “brute” and its derivatives 
warrant our attention, as we assess the extent to which Gulliver represents the teachable 
brute that I argue is the hallmark of Swift’s depiction of human nature in Book IV. 
 Gulliver’s “great facility in learning languages”—exhibited throughout his 
voyages but by now truly testing what could be believed even as preternatural—is put to 
use within his first discussion meeting with his new hosts. His ability to discern and 
repeat the word “Yahoo” garners surprise from the Houyhnhmns (Book IV, Ch.II: 212–
16). Gulliver’s linguistic and cultural capabilities flourish and within ten weeks Gulliver 
can understand the Houyhnhmn language and after three months can provide adequate 
answers to lines of questioning. This all occurs while Gulliver is under the wing of his 
Master, a kind Houyhnhmn who is fascinated by the potential Gulliver displays as a 
Yahoo outside the mould of those found in his land. In particular, the Master is captivated 
by Gulliver’s “Teachableness, Civility and Cleanliness […] qualities altogether so 
opposite” to what he has hitherto considered Yahoos (Book IV, Ch.II: 218). He is 
nonetheless convinced that Gulliver is a Yahoo. This linguistic proficiency is thus far the 
core characteristic that renders Gulliver teachable in the eyes of the Houyhnhmn Master. 
The capacity for teachableness and what this may tell us about the broader portrait 
of human nature being sketched here is what is most significant about this passage. There 
is of course an important relationship between language and reason (logos being the 
Greek word for both), but again the text cautions us to uncritically assume that the 
possession of language renders someone inherently rational. Language is the facilitator of 
both lies and truth. In particular, it’s significant that being identified as “teachable” is not 
the same as the capacity to imitate something. This distinction is central in distinguishing 
genuinely reasoning beings such as humans from animals who can perform actions upon 
command devoid of any meaningful understanding of the ideas or values behind these 
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performances. This distinction between genuine learning and imitation is important 
because while Gulliver can be taught the words and ideas of Houyhnhmnland (indeed, he 
learns them prodigiously and is recognised as such), his attempts to be virtuous and 
rational like the Houyhnhmns fall short of anything other than imitation and mimicry. 
This is especially pointed in Gulliver’s adoption of horse-like mannerisms upon his return 
to England. This episode is played for both comedic and tragic value, highlighting the 
difference between regionally distinct manners and universal rationality and morality. 
Alas, Gulliver can only summon the former in a cheap attempt at the latter. 
Whilst the Master and his servants all assist Gulliver in learning the language and 
culture of Houyhnhmnland, Houyhnhmn society at large is not keen to embrace the 
prospect of a mould-breaking Yahoo such as Gulliver, however. Gulliver’s Master is 
rebuked for allowing Gulliver to live with “his family more like a fellow Houyhnhmn 
than a brute animal.” Ann Cline Kelly makes the point that Gulliver is clearly more than 
a brute animal as his linguistic abilities and teachable nature demonstrate (Cline Kelly 
1976: 848). In Cline Kelly’s estimation, the Master is censured primarily because 
Gulliver’s presence “destroys the absoluteness of the categories that make up 
Houhynhnm reason because he forces them to re-evaluate their long-assumed clichés 
about Yahoos” (Cline Kelly 1976: 848). Whilst I agree that Swift is certainly seeking to 
problematize the monolithic categorisation of civility and savagery through placing 
Gulliver between these pure ideal types, the idea that Gulliver’s apparent possession of 
characteristics that render him above brutes warrant investigation. It would be a scholar’s 
folly, not unlike the Houyhnhmns to some degree, to assume that reason (or civility) and 
brutishness (or savagery) exist in an either/or equation. The Houyhnhmn society’s 
difficulty in understanding how a teachable Yahoo can exist and how they ought to relate 
to Gulliver seems to indicate that perfection of nature as they may be, Houyhnhmns 
themselves might not be teachable. The subtly of Swift’s engagement of human nature 
does nonetheless make it clear that, as Cline Kelly correctly points out, Gulliver’s 
teachableness is genuine, but that in and of itself does not absolve him of a broader nature 
that might well be corrupt. Indeed, instrumental reason—understood as problem-solving 
in the name of self-interest—is only as good or bad as the ends to which it is applied. 
This, ultimately, is what spurs the greatest fear of the Houyhnhnms concerning Gulliver’s 
presence in their land.  
When the Master tells the gathering of a Houyhnhnm general assembly of his 
pleasures in conversing with Gulliver, the response from the assembly asserted that “such 
a practice was not agreeable to reason or nature” (Book IV, Ch. X: 261). This is because 
whilst Gulliver’s teachabless and conversational skills cannot be denied, these “rudiments 
of reason, added to the natural depravity of those animals (…) was to be feared” (Book 
IV, Ch. X: 261). The worst fear of Houyhnhmns is that Gulliver might lead a Yahoo 
attack on the Houyhnhmn castle, plundering and destroying their society. Without a 
leader endowed with reason, the Yahoos, foul and despicable though they may be, could 
not constitute a threat of this sort. Gulliver possessed just enough reason, limited though 
it may be, to organise and command Yahoos so that their terrible nature might be 
enacted. This is a threat that cannot be tolerated.  
The Master keeps referring to Gulliver as a Yahoo, albeit a special one, and this 
irks Gulliver. Despite the key differences in ability and character that Gulliver possesses, 
he is nonetheless resoundingly identified as a Yahoo and is even asked “how I was taught 
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to imitate a rational creature” (Book IV, Ch.II: 219). That Gulliver’s apparent rationality 
(a mere “tincture” though it may be) is perceived of as mere imitation, rather than 
genuine apprehension, is important. It is even more interesting, however, that he might 
have been “taught to imitate.” The Yahoos of Houyhnhnmland are described as “the most 
unteachable of all brutes” so Gulliver represents a genuine puzzle for the dichotomy of 
civility and savagery—expressed consistently as brutishness or brutality—dominant 
amongst the Houyhnhnms (Book IV, Ch.II: 219–21). Gulliver is identified as a 
“prodigy”, but only insofar as it is incredible that “a brute animal should discover such 
marks of a rational creature” (Book IV, Ch. III: 219).  
It is notable here that rationality apparently has an edifice of sorts, in that Gulliver 
can display the outward tropes of possessing the holistic reason that allows humanity to 
transcend the moral character of other animals without it ever being so. It is very 
interesting to ponder whether Gulliver’s approximation or mimicry of reason and 
enlightened virtue means that there is an outward façade to reason that can be mimicked 
devoid of any substantial content, or if reason itself is more complex and multifaceted 
than even the Houyhnhmns can comprehend. It seems, at least, that Gulliver is possessed 
of more reason than he is credited with in that he can understand, explain, and defend to 
Houyhnhmn lines of questioning how he is how he is. This stands in contrast, say, to a 
parrot who can repeat phrases on command but certainly could not tell a Houyhnhmn 
who taught it the phrase it utters. Again, this breaks down and challenges the monolithic 
understanding of reason as a singularly illuminating force. Even as Gulliver’s Master 
commends him for having cured himself “of some bad habits and dispositions”, he cannot 
but lament the limitations of Gulliver’s nature and such endeavours could ultimately only 
result in imitation of genuine Houyhnhmn virtue (Book IV, Ch. X: 261).  
The challenge of distinguishing between seeming and being is raised by this 
presentation of reason. The Houyhnhmns can only comprehend reason as total, unified, 
and transcendent in its expression of a being’s higher nature. This is laudable, but it 
hinders their capacity to comprehend Gulliver, who represents the human capacity to 
outwardly display facets of reason that are sufficiently complex so as to be capable of 
self-understanding (or self-misunderstanding as the case seems to be) as such a higher 
form as reason when in fact it is but instrumental reason. Gulliver is rational enough to 
both know that the lofty form of reason represented by the Houyhnhmns exists, and he is 
even capable of assuming that he himself either can or does possess this, even though he 
does not actually understand this higher form of reason fully or appropriately. In this 
regard, there is a fundamental mismatch between the type of reason possessed by the 
Houyhnhmns and Gulliver because although humans aim toward the former, our reason 
is fragmented rather than unified, with many people only ever grasping problem-solving 
in the name of interest maximization and fleeting flashes of the façade of reason as a 
transcendent path toward Platonic truth. 
Visitors flock to see Gulliver as word spreads of a Yahoo who “seemed in his 
words and actions to discover some glimmerings of reason” (Book IV, Ch.II: 219). 
Noteworthy in this sentence is that Gulliver seems to possess some degree of reason, but 
appearances in this regard can be deceptive. That Gulliver has “discovered some 
glimmerings of reason” is also instructive as his reasoning is still clearly beneath the level 
or standard or expected from Houyhnhmns, who live in complete harmony with reason 
and nature. These “glimmerings” again suggest that the outward edifice of reason need 
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not be accompanied by reason itself. This further establishes Gulliver’s Travels’ 
decimation of the ideal of reason as a totalising characteristic. Swift satirises the 
arrogance of those who believe humans’ access to reason offers a guaranteed path to 
experiential edification, as early Enlightenment thinkers enthused by the possibilities 
opened up by Locke’s educational writings in particular, proffered. The local Yahoos, 
from the Houyhnhnm vantage point, offer little more than the “appearance of cunning, 
and the strongest disposition to mischief” (Book IV, Ch. III: 219), again highlighting that 
any calculation they may display (in this case cunning) is in appearance alone, and that 
there is nothing of substance deeper than a general predilection toward mischief. 
The Houyhnhnm worldview, perfectly in harmony with nature as it is, has no 
concept of “lying or false representation” and that, for them, being led to believe “a thing 
black when it is white, and short when it is long” leaves one “worse than in ignorance” 
(Book IV, Ch. IV, 223). This illustrates that the Houyhnhnms live in a world of certainty 
(or perhaps dogma) that is disrupted by Gulliver’s presence as a teachable Yahoo. The 
primary line of discussion and debate between the Master and other Houyhnhnms who 
encounter Gulliver is that his mental “capacity for speech and reason” are out of line with 
his physical appearance, even if Gulliver does “conceal what nature had given” by 
wearing clothes (Book III, Ch. 220; 221). A unilateral, objective, and universal notion of 
truth is in keeping with both the Classical and Enlightenment ideas of reason utilised by 
Swift in the presentation of Houyhnhnm society. The fact that lying and false 
representation is the avenue through which the Houyhnhnms explore Gulliver’s challenge 
to their certainty of category is particularly relevant to this point. It is especially so when 
considering that the Master claims that being lied to denies the purpose of speech, which 
he determines to be understanding one another, and thus in receiving incorrect 
information through a falsehood, one is left “worse than in ignorance” (Book IV, Ch. IV: 
223).  
Since Gulliver’s Master cannot comprehend falsehoods he’s also left baffled by 
related maladies such as war, money, and lawsuits that malign human nature as a result, 
not least because they stem from beings he has erstwhile known as mere brutes. This is 
because, as Leo Damrosch explains, for the Houyhnhmns “reason is a simple 
apprehension of reality, not the pretentious cleverness that humans call reason” 
(Damrosch 2013 966). This mental disconnect arises, Gulliver recalls, in “frequent 
discourses with my Master concerning the nature of manhood in other parts of the world” 
(Book IV, Ch. IV: 223). Thus, lying is firmly established as part of the universal human 
character, and in such a fashion where it has the capacity to entirely supplant the 
enlightenment equation that education is a remedy for ignorance. In this regard, lying is 
so corrupting that even someone seemingly educated out of ignorance can be rendered 
potentially even worse than where they started through the extension of falsehood(s). 
Swift’s insight here is that ignorance is lamentable, and it may be desirable to use 
education as a means to overcome it, but a broader culture of falsehood will surmount 
any gains made and, if the Master is correct it reverses the course entirely.  
Two caveats to this potential analysis are worth exploring here. Firstly, it might 
be significant that Gulliver describes lying as part of “the Nature of manhood in other 
parts of the world”10 (Book IV, Ch. IV: 223). Does this refer to humans outside of 
Houyhnhnmland, or humans outside of England—i.e. is the satire here still seeking to 
 
10 Italics my own. 
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lampoon Gulliver’s swollen pride for England in ways that cloud his understanding of the 
universality of human corruption? This, I argue, might have been the case earlier in the 
text, say in Gulliver’s interactions with the King of Brobdingnag in Chapters six and 
seven of Book II, given that Gulliver is reasonably close to admitting the vices and 
failures of England just a few chapters later, without any profound alterations in his 
character in the meantime. Secondly, given that the Houyhnhnms do lack a sense of 
humour and have no religion—both of which we know were of paramount concern for 
Swift the satirist and clergyman (Damrosch 2013: 970)—their societal lack of lying may 
not necessarily be a positive thing as such measures are apparently necessary given 
humanity’s corrupt nature.  
On this front, it seems to me that whilst lying is a necessary evil in a world of 
men, a society such as the Houyhnhnms may not have cause for such behaviour. Thus, on 
these questions, I read Swift as incriminating humanity for being sufficiently corrupt that 
lying is a universal condition of our nature, and even if such behaviour is a practical 
necessity given what we know about how people are, this renders the Houyhnhnms far 
superior morally to humanity as a collectivity. Houyhnhmn society (rather than as 
individuals) can be understood as praiseworthy for not needing lies whereas human 
society is perhaps beholden to lying precisely because of facets of our nature and culture 
such as humour and religion, held dear by Swift personally. 
A repeated instance of this confusion is the Master’s inability to comprehend 
Gulliver’s explanation of how he finds himself in this foreign land. In particular, the 
Houyhnhmns appear to have no conception of either “a country beyond the sea” nor “a 
wooden vessel whither they pleased upon water” incredulously managed by “a parcel of 
brutes” (Book IV, Ch. II: 219–220). Swift has Gulliver repeat this tale, accentuating the 
level of disbelief that the Houyhnhmns have regarding the fashioning of a ship and “how 
it was possible that the Houyhnhmns of my country would leave it to the management of 
brutes?” (Book IV, Ch. II: 219) This repetition is required because since Houyhnhmns 
have no concept of lying, the disbelief that Gulliver’s story fosters in his master is 
entirely unfamiliar to his kind. Interestingly, like the King of Brobdingnag, the 
Houyhnhmn Master is depicted as at best a wise and at worst a moderate and gentle 
individual, who has not travelled and, indeed, cannot even conceive of doing so. Neither 
the means (ship) nor the actuality of travel exist in the Master’s imagination and that 
brutes may be behind such a thing renders the thought(s) all the more incredulous.  
The depiction of human nature here, thus, does allow for the ingenuity and 
innovation of the human race, in contrast to the staid Houyhnhms, whose perfect 
harmony with nature implies a static existence (Book IV, Ch. II: 220). However, Swift 
conveys our innovation as often little more than the blending of the “cunning” and 
“disposition to mischief” identified in the Yahoos of Houyhnhnmland (Book IV, Ch. III, 
219). We can extrapolate from the text here that the human use of instrumental reason to 
creatively pursue such ends as global travel is by no means something to commend, and 
may even constitute part of the evidence for the prosecution, not least in Gulliver’s 
famous diatribe against the imperial project at the end of the book (Book IV, Ch. XII: 
275). Readers are asked to confront the possibility that brutishness is an intractable facet 
of the human condition, regardless of our appearance of outward facing aspects of reason 
and capacity for education. 
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3.6. “A Tincture of Reason” 
So, if the Yahoo is an irredeemable brute and Gulliver is a Yahoo, how, then, are we to 
understand Gulliver’s capacity to learn? This is not a question of Gulliver’s Master 
benevolently but misguidedly casting hopes of teachableness upon Gulliver like Ahab 
projects agency upon the whale. Gulliver’s faculty with language is demonstrated to the 
community at large and he proves himself capable of learning and understanding aspects 
of Houyhnhmn culture. Gulliver even undergoes a conversion of sorts, retracting the 
vain, narrow-minded and pompous avocation of English society offered to the King of 
Brobdingnag in Book II and repudiates “his previous allegiance with the vehemence of 
an apostate” (Nokes 1985: 327–328). Margaret Olofson Thickstun (1997) reads this 
conversion as a satirical attack on Puritanism. Certainly, the fervour of Puritan 
conversion is something that Swift offered as a problematic model of behaviour in all 
facets of life and this forms a central tenet of his critique of much of the modernist 
project in political and scientific affairs. 
Gulliver in Houyhnhmnland is a contradiction of sorts—the teachable brute. But 
this is only a contradiction in the world of the Houyhnhnms as the interrelationship 
between teachableness and brutishness is, for Swift, the central characteristic of human 
nature. Drawing upon the text, my analysis suggests that insofar as we can be free and 
moral beings, education is key, but the one tenth of human nature that makes the man 
prior to nurture contains a capacity for violence and malevolence that should worry us all 
in perpetuity. The totalising character of brutishness as inherently beyond redemption, 
and reason through education as the guaranteed and universal path to progress are both 
challenged here. In a meaningful sense this is an attack on what Swift saw as the thinning 
out of reason conducted by modernist movements in politics, religion, culture, 
philosophy, and, most importantly, the New Science so lampooned in the Voyage to 
Laputa in Book III. Instrumental reason, understood only as the capacity to decipher and 
carry out actions determined as means to one’s desired ends, cannot alone be harnessed to 
quell the brutishness within humanity. My reading is that Swift is seeking to undermine 
an emerging Enlightenment dichotomy between the innately brutish and self-
improvement predicated on the teachableness that accompanies the possession of reason. 
This reflects a concern for a degraded Lockeanism that is overly permissive and 
optimistic on the matter of experiential education. Gulliver is both teachable and capable 
of improvement (insofar as he is dynamic and can change through experience) and yet 
this does not necessarily generate proof that he is a fully rational being (in the moral 
sense) in practice. 
Interestingly, Gulliver’s Master, in seeking to explain how Gulliver is how he is, 
invokes the natural hierarchy of organic society, assuming that Gulliver must be of noble 
birth since he “far exceeded in shape, colour, and cleanliness, all the Yahoos of his 
nation” (Book IV, Ch. VI: 238). Such a hierarchy is reinforced by the Master’s 
explanation to Gulliver of the hierarchy of colour within Houyhnhmn society, wherein 
different coloured Houyhnhmns differ in regards to shape and “talents of mind, or the 
capacity to improve them” (Book IV, Ch. VI: 239). This establishes Swift’s firm 
presentation of hierarchy as intractable, natural, and befitting an organic society, where 
the lower castes do not aspire to “match out of their own race” as this “would be 
reckoned monstrous and unnatural” (Book IV, Ch. VI: 239).  
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Given that Houyhnhmnland is presented as a society entirely in harmony with 
nature through reason, this conveys Swift’s belief that capacity and reason are not 
unlimited, even for those who live perfectly rational lives. The conservative implication 
here is that human folly is in rejecting limitations, seeing rationality as total, and thus 
instrumentally extending what reason we have beyond the natural limitations proper to 
organic society. The modernist assumptions concerning human individuality that underlie 
the idea that travel is of universal benefit are dramatically challenged by Swift’s 
presentation of organic society here. The text cautions that individuals should be wary of 
breaking free from the ties that bind in organic community to traverse the globe in search 
of their subjective preferences and desires as this is a breach of the natural limitations 
befitting a political animal—i.e. a social being that ought to live solidly embedded within 
a community.  
To this end, Gulliver’s Master, when informed of the vanity, luxury, vice, and 
zeal of English politics and culture, tells Gulliver in disgust that he looks upon human 
beings as “a sort of animals to whose share, by what accident he could not conjecture, 
some small pittance of reason had fallen, whereof we made no other use than by its 
assistance to aggravate our natural corruptions, and to acquire new ones which nature had 
not given us” (Book IV, Ch. VII: 241). There is much at play in this short sentence. The 
use of the phrase “reason had fallen” ironically juxtaposes the hallmark enlightenment 
value of reason as the characteristically human quality with “fallen,” invoking our 
Biblical origins as fallen beings. This suggests that whatever reason we may possess is 
subordinate to our broader nature as children of the Fall. Gulliver himself, of course, will 
be ejected by the Houyhnhmns from their Eden. The irony of the Houyhnhmns as 
paragons of reason capable of living in total harmony with nature being situated within 
the Eden of revealed wisdom is Swift’s reminder to those who (wilfully or otherwise) 
seek to untether reason from its divine origins or to deny the value of revelation as a 
source of societal knowledge. While Olofson Thickstun reads Swift’s presentation of 
“Houyhnhmnland not as a Stoic or Enlightenment utopia, but as an Edenic place” 
(Olofson Thickstun 1997: 517), it is not an either/or dichotomy; Swift is seeking to 
demonstrate that all manifestations of an idealised place stem from our intractably 
Biblical roots. For him, even the transcendent value of reason to provide secular 
empirical answers to worldly questions of humanity (be they Stoic or enlightened in 
character) is nested within the wider context of a human nature that is inherently corrupt. 
The grim conclusion appears to be that neither reason nor education is a panacea for the 
human capacity for corruption; the problems of the human animal run deeper than what 
our limited rational capacity can solve. 
In fact, Book IV indicates that humanity’s faculty with reason is seemingly part of 
the problem, rather than the master key to unlock all solutions. Furthering his critique, the 
Master continues that in his estimation, English “institutions of government and law were 
plainly owing to our gross defects in reason, and by consequence in virtue, because 
reason alone is sufficient to govern a rational creature, which was therefore a character 
we had no pretence to challenge” (Book IV, Ch. VII: 241). Here Swift has the Master 
offer a somewhat Classical view of reason as inextricably linked to virtue and morality, 
rejecting individual liberty as an end in itself, rather than a mere enabling device for 
responsible freedom. Although it was emergent in Swift’s epoch, this viewpoint is more 
typical of later liberal thought, as influential liberals from Locke to Shaftesbury to Adam 
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Smith were all keenly aware that individual liberty and commercial society offered 
profound opportunities for vice as well as for human improvement. Like several other 
scholars, I agree with Ann Cline Kelly’s reading of Swift’s “uncanny prescience” in 
successfully anticipating how the germs of cultural moment in his time would later 
develop (Cline Kelly 2002: 181). Swift’s positive presentation of the Houyhnhmn Master 
articulates a political argument wherein the defects in human reason produce defects in 
virtue in a fashion that renders it entirely proper to acknowledge and embrace limitations 
upon the freedoms (license) permitted to individuals.  
The phrase “reason alone is sufficient to govern a rational creature” highlights 
how Swift identifies what he sees as humans’ problematic and incomplete relationship 
with reason. The implication being that we require societal boundaries and limitations to 
harness the aspects of reason that we do possess toward the common good. Gulliver’s 
teachableness does not necessarily render him entirely unbrutish, but rather makes him 
able to apply his instrumental reason or cunning to projects that are in line with his 
corrupt nature. The reader is left to wonder if societal norms dictated by tradition can 
potentially cultivate this teachableness, directing it toward positive outcomes. Swift’s 
valuable insight here is that the simple possession of the aspect of reason conducive to 
teachableness does not automatically render someone entirely in harmony with reason 
and therefore capable of free and self-directed experiential self-improvement. 
The general optimism (though not naively so) of the Lockean approach to 
education is severely challenged here by a more austere and pessimistic projection of 
human potential. In particular, we can assert that Swift is anticipating a more permissive 
and naïve iteration of Lockeanism that is far too bullish on the possibility of human 
reason to flourish through autonomous individual experience. Given Gulliver’s clear 
faculties with language and understanding, the Master cannot deny that humanity (or the 
Yahoo?) does indeed have some degree of reason. Yahoos must use it in accordance with 
their nature (natural corruption, that is) whereas humans do so against our nature, in that 
we seemingly creatively pursue new and unnatural forms of corruption through our 
reason. A crucial dimension to the satire is to highlight how instrumental reason is but 
one facet of human soul and to subvert all other aspects of our nature to this creative and 
innovative form of appetite fulfilment is ultimately unnatural for what is proper to 
humanity. Again, this is Swift’s critique of instrumental reason, the conception of which 
formed the backbone of the empiricist project that provided the scientific thrust that 
propelled the enlightenment project which would aggrandize reason as a far more 
transcendental force. For Swift, reason—thinly understood and utilised in a purely 
instrumental fashion—can be used as part of a corrupt nature in the name of transgressing 
nature. An example of this comes later when Gulliver uses Yahoo hides to fashion a 
canoe and sails to facilitate his escape from Houyhnhmnland, demonstrating how 
instrumental reason allowed Gulliver to dehumanise and desecrate the bodies of Yahoos 
in the name of creative problem-solving (Book IV, Ch. X: 263). Swift’s combination of 
classical and counter-Enlightenment instincts come to the fore here as the Master’s 
critique objects to both the narrow and thin conception of reason as little more than 
problem-solving in the name of interest maximisation and also reason as transcendent or 
divine quality that surmounts and overcomes all of the deficiencies in human character 
that we know to be both true and pervasive. 
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We might note that Gulliver’s base of information gathered throughout his travels 
is not achieved through experiential learning made possible by the individual exercise of 
reason. As Montag and others observe, Gulliver’s “teachable” nature extends primarily to 
“the customs, practices, morals and religions of the nations he encounters; in short, he is 
concerned with the reality of human society” (Montag 1994: 136–37). Gulliver’s capacity 
to educate himself is not predicated on inner harmony with his better nature, as classical 
virtue ethics would have it, but rather the uncritical consumption and adoption of local 
customs and language encountered on his travels (Bloom 1991). This is not the capacity 
for moral and rational development outlined by Locke in his considerations of the innate 
versus the experiential in human development much more satisfactorily exemplified by 
the character of Robinson Crusoe. Crusoe, unlike Gulliver, never learns any languages 
and forces others to communicate with him in English. Crusoe’s is a far more 
straightforwardly Lockean triumph of individual reason surmounting adversity through 
hard-won wisdom achieved by sense-experiential learning (Montag 1994: 137). Again 
this serves to convey Swift’s concerns for a degraded version of Locke’s ideas on 
education and experiential learning contributing to a wider confusion of what he sees as 
the marked distinction between instrumental reason and practical wisdom. 
This highlights the crucial difference between teachableness as education through 
individually directed self-improvement and teachableness as the capacity to learn from 
wise and informed (or vicious/deviant) instruction. The satire here seeks to target the 
empiricist fixation with purely experiential learning, showing that Gulliver’s individual 
experiential learning furthers rather than rectifies the natural corruption inherent to his 
person. This ties back to the argument of the previous chapter concerning the likelihood 
of travel to edify an individual. The overwhelming documentation of Gulliver’s sensory 
perception throughout his travels is undoubtedly reflective of Swift’s dislike of the 
modernist tendency, exemplified by the new science of the Royal Society, to reduce the 
complexities of life to materialist explanations (Damrosch 2013: 135). 
Gulliver oscillates in his ability to accept the ‘fact’ of his resemblance to the 
Yahoo. His greatest shame is in being identified as a Yahoo and so he takes a bizarre 
pride in the attribution of a modicum of rationality to him by his Master and graciously 
embraces their master-pupil relationship. Again, we see Gulliver’s eagerness to consume 
and digest culture and he demonstrates that he is not just an autodidact, but also a diligent 
student. He tells the Master that he wishes to improve as fast as he can (Book IV, Ch.III: 
219) and desires as deeply as possible to no longer resemble a Yahoo. As the Master 
grows closer to him, Gulliver pleads not to be called a Yahoo by him any more as he 
cannot stand being linked to a creature that he holds in absolute contempt (Book IV, 
Ch.III: 221). This represents an attempt to disavow the previously accepted undeniable 
physical similarities between himself and the Yahoo almost as though Gulliver commits 
an act of self-betrayal. Here Swift draws upon humanity’s innate knowledge of itself as at 
least partly animalistic—as well as the modernist tendency to rely on what is observable 
as the sole source of what is considered of importance—reminding us of the instinctual 
and appetitive aspects of our nature. In the words of John Stubbs, “Gulliver is fighting 
[…] (because) the idea that he has something of the Yahoo in his constitution is abhorrent 
to him” (Stubbs 2017: 633). This abhorrence is not Gulliver’s alone, however, as outside 
of the Master and those curious to see a “teachable brute,” Houyhnhmn society is not 
impressed with Gulliver.  
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The idea that the truly irredeemable brute must be banished from a right-thinking 
society is raised in chilling fashion at an assembly of the Houyhnhmns. As their society 
lives in perfect harmony with nature, the only question up for debate was the perennial 
conundrum as to “whether the Yahoos should be exterminated from the face of the Earth” 
(Book IV, Ch. 9: 253). Gulliver notes that the arguments in favour of exterminating the 
Yahoos primarily rest upon the generally odious and filthy character of the species, 
rendering their removal as both rational and in-line with nature. In particular, they are 
presented yet again as “the most filthy, noisome and deformed animal which nature has 
ever produced, so they were the most restive and inducible, mischievous and malicious” 
(Book IV, Ch. 9: 253). The debate recognises that there are other brutes, such as asses, 
who can perform menial physical labour yet do not fight back against authority, smell 
terrible and howl awfully as do the Yahoos. This interestingly establishes that there are 
good (or at least useful) brutes as well as the deplorable brute that the Yahoo represents. 
This summons dark ideas concerning the need for docile acceptance by subordinates of 
appropriate societal hierarchies that apply to racist and other discriminatory ideologies.  
It is unclear if Swift is necessarily endorsing such a loathsome worldview, but it is 
apparent that a preference for organic hierarchical society of some form permeates 
Gulliver’s Travels. The more charitable interpretation of Swift on this point is to 
highlight how an organic hierarchy could facilitate a communitarian social solidarity in 
which all members of society have a clear role to play in a context of mutual appreciation 
and certainty. However, the darker possibility of a stratified social order based on 
arbitrary group characteristics such as race lurks dangerously in Swift’s writing here. The 
initial Houyhnhmn contribution to the debate acknowledges nature as the author of the 
Yahoo, further locking in the idea that the brutishness of the species is incorrigible if it is 
built into them, perhaps even by design. Given their natural brutishness, there are no 
social or political policymaking tools available to Houyhnhm society to raise the Yahoo 
up from its lowly status, and indeed, given their disposition to mischief, levers of 
education might render them worse still. The possession of a tincture of reason, rendering 
a Yahoo such as Gulliver teachable, might make projects of mass education a real danger, 
as this instrumental reason could be put to malpractice once enhanced through education 
and combined with a natural tendency toward malice. This raises the question of whether 
the raw material of human nature can be changed, rather than simply corrupted or 
cultivated, as this presentation of the Yahoo assumes. 
One speaker raises the point of the Yahoos’ lack of indigenous status in 
Houyhnhmnland as grounds for their removal: 
 
He took notice of a general Tradition, that Yahoos had not been always in their Country: 
But, that many Ages ago, two of these Brutes appeared together upon a Mountain, whether 
produced by the Heat of the Sun upon corrupted Mud and Slime, or from the Ooze and 
froth of the Sea, was never known. That these Yahoos engendered, and their Brood, in a 
short time grew as numerous as to overrun and infest the whole nation (Book IV, Ch. 9: 
253). 
 
The Houyhnhmn tradition constitutes a means to assert their community’s specific 
legitimacy to the territory and a firm denial of any form of primordial relationship 
between the Yahoo and the land in question. By denying the Yahoos this legitimacy, their 
candidacy for extermination is rendered acceptable. Indeed, the tradition presents a logic 
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wherein a certain synergetic relationship with the land is required in order to be truly 
indigenous to a territory. The lack of such a relationship, again, presents a ground upon 
which removal from this territory was justified, and in accordance with natural law: 
 
Those creatures could not be Ylnhniamshy (or Aborigines of the land) because of the 
violent hatred the Houyhnhmns as well as other animals bore them; which although their 
evil disposition sufficiently deserved, could never have arrived at so high a degree if they 
had been Aborigines, or else they would have long since been rooted out (Book IV, Ch. 
9: 253–54). 
 
Swift characterises Gulliver as having lost his sense of internal legitimacy as a result of 
his own break from the tangible markers of his originating society and his inability to 
derive legitimacy in Houyhnhmnland from his position between the two groups there. 
The fact that other animals of the land display a hatred for the Yahoos again summons the 
idea of some form of hierarchy as both natural and proper to the land. Swift’s own 
nascent Anglo-Irish identity was developed on such a tenuous basis as he both reviled the 
native Irish and yet also defiantly and effectively pamphleteered on behalf of Irish 
rights—albeit within an Ireland dominated by the Anglo-Irish ruling class (Zach 2000: 
23). These two conflicting points converge, however, in the contribution of Gulliver’s 
Master to this debate at the general assembly. Gulliver’s Master approved of the 
Tradition and adds to the debate that the original Yahoos in Houyhnhmnland were not of 
such a debased nature but that the species degenerated over time: 
the two Yahoos said to be first seen among them, had to be driven thither over the sea; 
that coming to land, and being forsaken by their companions, they retired to the 
mountains, and degenerating by degrees, became in the process of time, much more 
savage than those of their species in the country from whence these two originals came 
(Book IV, Ch. 9: 254). 
It appears, then, if Gulliver’s Master is to be believed that the original Yahoo presence in 
Houyhnhmnland was not of an entirely brutish disposition but emerged as such over time. 
The parallels to Genesis here are clear, signalling that the Land of the Houyhnhmns is a 
prelapsarian place and that the Yahoos origin is separate from this divine realm: “like 
Adam and Eve kicked out of Eden, they descend into the innocent world, bringing evil 
with them” (Olofson Thickstun 1997: 528). Here Swift indulges in the nightmare of 
degeneration common across the imagination of European intellectual history. As 
established in the previous chapter, however, this notion had particularly potency in 
Ireland where the Anglican ruling minority saw the miserable poverty and lifestyle of the 
native Catholic population as a terrifying glimpse of the animal in man writ large. It is 
also notable that these original Yahoos had travelled across the sea and been forsaken by 
their companions, just as Gulliver had, further segmenting Gulliver’s role as a stand-in 
for humanity-as-Yahoo more generally. We are left, then, with a strong suspicion that the 
Yahoos are of European origin. It is interesting that Swift inserts a particularly colonialist 
tinge to the Houyhnhmn discourse here when it appears as though the Yahoos might be 
natural in and of themselves, yet unnatural to Houyhnhmnland after-all. This, of course, 
summons images of colonization and what could happen to colonists’ over time. 
Contemporary fears regarding the potential degradation of colonists is discussed in the 
previous chapter. Although Gulliver’s “teachableness” and “tincture of reason” render 
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him in a class above the Yahoos, he is nonetheless forced to recognise that he possesses 
several physical failings when compared to them. In conversation with his Master, 
Gulliver must humiliatingly accept these failings in comparison to the local Yahoos: 
 
I had neither the strength or agility of a common Yahoo; that I walked infirmly on my 
hinder feet; had found a contrivance to make my claws of no use or defence, and to 
remove the hair from my chin, which was intended as a shelter from the sun and the 
weather. Lastly, that I could neither run with speed, nor climb trees like my brethren (as 
he called them) the Yahoos in this country (Book IV, Ch. IV: 225). 
 
It is as though Gulliver is now somehow insufficiently animalistic, as though he would be 
better suited to life in Houyhnhmnland should he become even more brutish. The overlap 
in similarities between himself and the Yahoos are already painful to acknowledge but 
now Gulliver is taking stock of how in certain ways these brutish beasts are objectively 
better than he.  
This admission forces Gulliver to perform his differentiation to the Houyhnhmns 
through whatever means necessary. Gulliver does so by using body parts (skin, hair etc.) 
of Yahoos in the construction of his new shoes and clothes when his wear away, and also 
in the making of the raft that facilitates his escape from Houyhnhmnland. Gulliver stoops 
to such wretchedly dehumanizing measures to maintain his position above the indigenous 
Yahoos as a result of the cognitive dissonance created by his pained admission of his 
fraternity with them. It is necessary for him to display to the master race Houyhnhmn that 
facile physical similarities will not prevent him from treating Yahoos as they do. This 
might however, from an Enlightened point of view, render him even worse, as he is now 
willing to reduce his erstwhile fellow Yahoos to mere tools. 
On the other side of this relationship, Gulliver’s awe of the Houyhnhmns and his 
frank recognition of his (and his people’s) failure to meet their level of rationality results 
in a classic example of what the influential postcolonial thinker Albert Memmi called 
“colonial mimicry.” This mimicry is an admission and endorsement on behalf of the 
colonised of the coloniser’s superior strength and character (Memmi 1965: 119–124). 
Gulliver’s self-loathing in the face of Houyhnhmn perfection leads him to attempt the 
pyrrhic mimicry of their character: 
 
By conversing with the Houyhnhmns, and looking upon them with delight, I fell to 
imitate their gait and gesture, which is now grown into a habit; and my friends often tell 
me in a blunt way, that I trot like a horse; which however, I take for a great compliment: 
neither shall I disown, that in speaking I am apt to fall into the voice and manner of 
Houyhnhmns, and hear myself ridiculed on that account without the least mortification 
(Book IV, Ch. X: 260). 
 
Swift thus presents man’s hubris as encapsulated by Gulliver’s pathetic affection of the 
most trivial and surface-level facets of the rational Houyhnhnm. Just as his rationality 
could only manifest itself at surface level, his learning of Houyhnhnm ways is, 
ultimately, not only imitation rather than genuine learning, but pitiful in their signalling 
of Gulliver’s mental degeneration. Forced to attempt to escape extermination in 
Houyhnhmnland on a raft made of Yahoo hides, Gulliver sees Portuguese sailors and is 
horrified at the prospect at dealing with “European Yahoos.” When he is forced to deal 
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with the Portuguese, he introduces himself to seamen as “a poor Yahoo, banished from 
the Houyhnhmns” (Book IV, Ch. XIII: 267). Gulliver’s mindset has changed entirely 
now to see both himself and all Europeans as Yahoos.  
Once at home, he clings desperately to whatever sense of superiority he might 
derive from having glimpsed the rationality and natural harmony of the Houyhnhnms, but 
it is ultimately as a loathsome and pathetic caricature, talking to horses for four hours a 
day, sleeping in his stable and stricken with “shame, confusion, and horror” that he 
furthered the Yahoo race by having a family (Book IV, Ch. XI: 271). Gulliver’s time with 
Houyhnhnms provided an education to a state potentially less brutish and certainly less 
prideful than his starting point, but we are left to ponder if madness the cost of such a 
process? Ultimately, then, despite his teachableness, a deeper incorrigibility of character 
renders Gulliver—and, disturbingly, perhaps us all—irredeemable. It is highly possible 
that through the negative example outlined in Book IV Swift sought to instruct that 
humans ought to neither strive to a measure of reason beyond what he saw as our limited 
capacity nor to aggrandize what access to reason we do have, degrading ourselves like 
Yahoos in the process.  
 We can find interesting resonances of Swift’s concerns regarding education and 
human nature in some notes on the topic written by his fellow Irishman Edmund Burke in 
the 1750s. Writing on the topic of Philosophy and Education, Burke noted: “To study for 
its own end is fruitless labour; to learn only to be learned is moving in a strange circle. 
The end of learning is not knowledge but virtue; as the end of all speculation should be 
practice of one sort or another” (quoted in Weiner 2018: 53). We can extrapolate that 
Burke is suggesting that learning for learning’s sake is only worth the end goal of 
practicing a virtue that arises from said education. There are significant qualitative 
distinctions to be made between information, knowledge, and virtue. In this regard, 
Swift’s criticism of emergent Enlightenment assumptions of the inherent educational and 
beneficial properties of travel constitutes this type of “fruitless labour” in a great many 
cases. This is an insight that is valuable in a general humanist fashion, even if one finds 
the implications of Swift’s characterization of human nature abhorrent. Equally so, the 
presentation of reason in and of itself—deracinated from virtue—as likely to produce 
vice as it spirals out of control, enamoured with its own potential points toward a politics 
of profoundly illiberal and perhaps even authoritarian tendencies. The potentialities of 
reason are abstract—unbounded and intangible—as is what it means to be human. 
However, for Swift, rendering these concepts as tangible concrete practices necessarily 
involves virtue. Book IV of Gulliver’s Travels suggests that the human capacity for 
reason can be as much a threat to the fulfillment of this practice as it is a vital component 
for it to be possible in the first place. For Swift, the degradation of virtue by its 
subjugation to an abstract concept of reason is arguably most profoundly seen in the 
Modernist fetishization of experimental philosophy. This is the subject of Book III of 
Gulliver’s Travels wherein Swift satirically presents the disastrous outcomes of a society 
hell-bent on pursuing science above all else. Through this he furthers the critique of 
travel as necessarily educational, but also rejects the worldview that travel can—and 





4. Disciplining Travel for Scientific Purposes 
 
“The universal disposition of this age is bent upon a rational religion.” 
—Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (1667) 
quoted in Porter (2000: 96) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The Voyage to Laputa in Book III contains a pivotal facet of Swift’s attack on the 
emergent modernist project as he saw it: the New Science characterized by the 
experimental philosophy of the Royal Society of London and the University of Leiden. 
The aim of this chapter is to connect the underlining goals and ambitions of the New 
Science to other relevant tracts in the emergent Enlightenment thinking on societal 
progress featured in Swift’s counter-Enlightenment critique of travel. As the ideas of 
modernity crystallised in the early eighteenth century, the assumptions of modernity 
concerning travel again coalesced around a vital spoke of the emergent Enlightenment, 
that of the experimental science. 
Science, travel, and politics are conceptually linked by the idea of discovery and 
the frenzy for the new that often accompanies it. The scientific project sought to 
discipline travel for the purposes of its quest for endless discovery en route to a purported 
end goal of total knowledge of the natural world. Gulliver’s Travels offers a stern 
warning as to the risks that accompany free-form travel that assumes beneficial 
experiential edification in all circumstances. Science offers a form of order or discipline 
upon travel, but travel moulded to the demands of empirical observation for the purposes 
of scientific discovery is equally undesirable. This is because, as Swift shows in the 
Voyage to Laputa, the scientific worldview possesses the capacity to be inhuman in its 
singular obsession with speculation and abstraction, hubristically viewing all its exploits 
under the banner of the triumphant march of so-called progress. From the vantage point 
offered by Book III, this self-styled narrative of progress inoculates all scientific 
endeavours from criticism and is cast as inevitable, necessary, and inherently good. Swift 
presents a forceful critique that science carries an absolutist tendency which can easily 
bleed into politics, hastily rationalising a drastic overhaul of society in accordance with 
its aims. Like education, travel also forms a key fulcrum for the methods and goals of 
science as data collection from a myriad of travellers across the world fuel the discoveries 
of laboratories back home. 
Book III of Gulliver's Travels is largely the tale of Gulliver's two months spent in 
and around the Flying Island of Laputa and the territory it hovers over. The Laputans are 
a singular people, interested only in speculative knowledge, especially mathematics, 
music, and astronomy. Their king, who also rules tyrannically over Balnibarbi, the land 
below, is consumed by the abstractions of intellectual life. Gulliver visits Balnibarbi and 
is shown an Academy of Projectors in the city of Lagado, a topical allusion to the 
contemporary Royal Society in the age of Newton. Gulliver tells us that the Academy’s 
founders drew influence from a visit to Laputa decades prior and their degenerated 
attempts at scientific productivity are shown as a study in wastefulness and folly. Gulliver 
observes a host of bizarre, ludicrous, and even distasteful experiments during his tour of 
the Academy. All of this serves to critique the assumptions and arrogance of the 
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materialism and universal aspirations of the modernist project, broadly understood to 
contain the threads of rationalism, materialism, and individualism. 
Gulliver’s Travels certainly does not endorse travel as a pathway to autonomous 
experiential learning. As this dissertation has argued, the text rather serves as a warning 
through a dramatic worst-case scenario that travel is not of universal benefit and ought to 
be pursued in a rigorous fashion if it is to edify at all. The proponents of the New Science 
sought to pursue what Daniel Carey has called “the elusive goal of disciplining travel, 
making it useful and coherent in order to advance the cause of knowledge and the 
exploitation of nature” (Carey 2012: 26). Gulliver’s calamitous travels and his 
inauspicious end suggest that Swift agreed with the necessity of disciplining travel. 
However, I argue that Gulliver’s Travels cannot be read to endorse the type of disciplined 
requirements of impartial observation and documentation placed on travel advocated by 
the proponents and practitioners of the New Science. Indeed, the repurposing of travel as 
a means to support the ongoing push toward a unified rationalist and materialist 
worldview represented for Swift a turn toward foolishness, hubris, and even tyranny, all 
of which combine to exploit not just the natural world but perhaps even humanity itself, 
too. 
 
4.2. Reading Swift’s Critique of Science 
Secondary literature throughout the twentieth century frequently condemned Swift’s 
critique of science in Laputa for its apparent lack of foresight or apt judgment concerning 
soon-to-be-realized and immensely practical scientific progress. Characteristic of this is 
J.V. Crewe, who wrote in 1967 that “Swift’s prophetic powers partly deserted him” in the 
Voyage to Laputa as the great satirist “failed to foresee the advance of scientific 
technology that lay just ahead” (Crewe 1967: 61). In a similar vein, Herbert Davis wrote 
that “Swift did not realize that he was living in the bright dawn of the scientific era; he 
did not realize that some of his contemporaries were leading mankind across the 
threshold of the modern world (Davis 1964: 207). It is fair to say that Swift’s depiction of 
experimental science as wholly impractical and self-indulgent overstates the case. For 
example, the projectors’ ongoing attempt to make it so that “all the fruits of the Earth 
shall come to maturity at season we think to choose” is of course not the laughable folly 
today that it would have been to Swift’s contemporary readers (Book III, Ch. IV: 164). 
That is not to say, however, that Swift failed to realize the significance of the types of 
broad-based societal changes on the horizon as a result of innovations in the field of 
scientific understanding. On the contrary, he lucidly presents some of implications of a 
degraded version of science being granted a monopoly on universal truth. 
The simplistic retroactive view of Swift’s critique of science could easily be that 
as a pseudo-noble member of the emergent Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, he 
instinctually lurched to defend the entrenched privileges and power of a dominant 
aristocratic class. On this reading, Swift merely opposed change in general but perhaps in 
particular feared the democratic possibilities opened by the expansion of opportunities for 
individual liberty, commercial gain, and toleration that scientific progress broadly 
gestured toward. The celebrated conservative thinker Edmund Burke is a useful 
interlocutor with Swift on this issue. Burke—who like Swift is best described politically 
as an “Old Whig”—in his Letters on a Regicide Peace, identified the difference between 
caution as genuine prudence and “a false, reptile prudence” born of fear (quoted in 
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Weiner 2019: 2). It is not the case that Swift’s doubts as to the scientific project were 
rooted in purely survivalist instinctual fear of a threatened elite. His doubts were born of 
a prudent understanding of the relationship between the New Science and the wider 
project of modernism that necessarily sought to undermine and replace traditional 
hierarchies and communitarian norms.  
Swift’s caution is also closely linked to the moral character of humility that 
conservative counter-Enlightenment thinkers saw as desperately lacking in modernist 
projectors such as those in Lagado who refuse to accept their repeated failures as 
indictments of their endeavour. The New Science, on the other hand, seems to deny that 
prudence regarding the quest for and use of new knowledge is even a virtue at all. Swift’s 
presentation of the matter operates as a reminder that in a contingent world, we ought to 
restore “prudence as the political virtue par excellence” (Weiner 2019: 3). In its naïvely 
fanatical form, the scientific perspective, on the other hand, possessed with an 
unflappable faith in human reason, proffers that if something can be conceived it can—
and should—be achieved. Such attitudes deny the validity of any and all cautioning to 
hasten the progression of scientific projects of all stripes. Burke noted that a statesman 
must combine “a disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve” (Burke 2003: 113). 
Douglas Lane Patey has also acknowledged that Swift’s critique of modern science 
comes from the perspective that seeks to assert a distinction between the arts and sciences 
familiar in intellectual life since Aristotle:  
 
Swift’s science is still what centuries of thinkers would have recognised as the realm of 
certainty, whose instrument is logical demonstration; his arts are not the fine arts or 
humanities but the older arts of prudence—those fields in which, because of the 
limitations of the human mind, demonstrative certainty is not to be had (Lane Patey 
quoted in Shanahan 2009: 201).  
 
Swift’s critique of science notes that the projectorial mindset is incapable of 
acknowledging what ought to be best left alone, and that many changes offer not 
improvement but degeneration or destruction. Under such a worldview, the skill of 
prudence as a virtue of hard-won wisdom runs the risk of being cast aside as a relic or 
anachronism fit only for those who bitterly oppose progressive developments in science 
and politics out of fear for their own power. This is certainly a shallow and fallacious 
criticism directed at Burkean Conservatism by adherents of the narrative of progress. 
Book III of Gulliver’s Travels demonstrates the slanderous nature of this critique from 
proponents of a project incapable of acknowledging some of the dangerous implications 
for human society brought about by their ascendancy. The scientific method as a means 
to acquire information about the natural world is not necessarily under attack here, rather 
those who seek to utilize it as a master key to unlock a perpetual justification for their 
hold on power. 
John Spurr identifies Swift as part of a disparate group in early eighteenth-century 
English intellectual life, encompassing both Old Whigs and Tories, who spoke a political 
language of virtue rather than rights (Spurr 1998: 19–20). Unlike rights theorists who 
sought to emphasise the threats posed by intrusive governments encroaching on 
individual rights, Swift focused more on the virtuous responsibilities bestowed by custom 
and tradition upon landowners, MPs, Parliament, and the Crown to maintain the moral 
health of the polity. Spurr emphasises that the central premise of this deferential 
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conservative “Country” tradition, tied to the landed gentry, “was that civic virtue was 
constantly in danger of corruption” (Spurr 1998: 19). The degeneration of institutions 
over time is referenced throughout Gulliver’s Travels, most explicitly when Gulliver tells 
the reader that his account of Lilliputian laws covers “the original institutions, and not the 
most scandalous corruptions into which these people are fallen by the degenerate nature 
of man” (Book, Ch. VI: 53–54). This clearly presents an idea of human nature fated 
toward corruption by the Fall. Most institutions crafted by man are therefore intractably 
condemned to similar corruption. Institutions capable of reigning in and remaining 
vigilant in the face of the natural degenerative tendencies of human beings ought to be 
cherished and protected from speculative attempts at improvement.  
Brobdingnag offers an example of such a mixed state: a wise King, “a Prince of 
excellent understanding” (Book IV, Ch. VI: 116) and an educated nobility tempered by 
property under laws “expressed in the most plain and simple terms, wherein those people 
are not mercurial enough to discover above one interpretation” (Book IV, Ch. VII: 125). 
The Brobdingnagian King’s concerns for the lack of educational measures taken to 
ensure the continuing quality of the English nobility reflects Swift’s concerns for the 
degeneration of the aristocracy. This is further developed in the depiction of the fallen 
nature of the Laputan elite’s obsession with speculation over the practical matters of 
governance. That the nobility ought to “never be compliers with the times” also indicates 
the dangers inherent to the allure of slavishly following innovation and fashion, rather 
than respecting the custodial and protective role proper to an aristocracy (Book II, Ch. 
VI: 118). Again, the Laputan elite succumb to this failing, exemplified by their insistence 
on forcing Lord Munodi to move his perfectly operational mill to the side of a mountain 
in the misguided speculation that “the wind and air upon a height agitated the water, and 
thereby made it fitter for motion.” The project, of course, is a miserable failure (Book III, 
Ch. IV: 165). Brobdingnag’s insistence upon simple laws made up of no more than 
twenty-two words that are barred from interpretation signals the deception and confusion 
that can be unleashed by the written word as skilful writers and rhetoricians may spin 
deceptive webs of confusion, a theme pursued fully in Swift’s early career masterpiece A 
Tale of a Tub (Hammond 1983). One might easily finger Swift for hypocrisy on this 
point, given his tendency to vex readers old and new, but as a general point it chimes 
with the common feature of Utopian literature for ideal commonwealths to be made up of 
few or no laws with minimal barriers to comprehension.  
The satirical thrust of the projectors of Laputa’s submission to intense 
speculations demonstrates a characteristic counter-Enlightenment scepticism of the 
promises of Rationalism. This scepticism derives from a moral commitment to both the 
limits of human reason and also the natural limits proper to human capacity (Weiner 
2019: 2). J. Paul Hunter described Swift as having a “persistent distrust of human 
knowledge and judgment” and this provides the basis of his satiric deconstruction of what 
he saw as the hubris endemic to the scientific project (Hunter 2003: 229). This hubris is 
undoubtedly a central point of attack, but it is wedded to a genuine fear of the extension 
of technological capacity as a means to dehumanise us by allowing the overcoming of 
natural limits better left untested. Hunter is incorrect to claim that Swift “had little respect 
for intellectual ambition” (Hunter 2003: 230) as doubt and scepticism concerning the 
nature and depth of scientific projects is by no mean equivalent to disrespect of the 
intellect in general. Victoria Glendinning is more accurate in saying that Book III is 
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indicative of “Swift’s exasperated contempt for scientific research and experiment” 
(Glendinning 1999: 183). I will make the case here that the narrative of progress attached 
to such innovations in science were not, for Swift, limited to purely experimental matters 
and involved reforming the role and purpose of travel in ways Swift saw as dangerous to 
the nested traditions of organic society. 
For Swift, materialism, individualism, and the attempt to impose methodical 
rational explanation upon Christian mysteries threatened the uneasy peace hard won 
through an Anglican ecclesiastic order that had balanced reason and revealed religion to 
the appropriate degree (Carey 1997: 89–90). Swift’s politics flowed from his religious 
views and, for him, politics was not and should not be a secular matter. In fact, as recent 
Swift biographer Brean Hammond has argued, Swift “was particularly sensitive to the 
relationship between political and religious issues; indeed, he did not see them as 
separable” (Hammond 2010: 94). The imagery of the island flying and falling has clear 
connotations of the Fall, which evokes the theme of maintaining moral limits lest 
uncontrollable forces be unleashed to the detriment of all (Glendinning 1999: 184). The 
view that Swift’s critique of the New Science either missed the great accomplishments in 
science and technology to come or was purely derived from a reactionary distrust of an 
emergent middle class of traders and technocrats fails to acknowledge the over-arching 
argumentative thrust of Gulliver’s Travels. The critique of travel is a focal point for 
individualistic and licentious developments that formed of what Stephen Toulmin 
described as a general “politico-theological” agenda of reform that cannot be 
conceptually divorced from changes in approach to the understanding of Natural 
Philosophy (Toulmin 1990: 132). This included repurposing and disciplining travel in 
order to function as an orderly source of information for the data hungry projectors of the 
new paradigm. 
 
4.3. The New Science in Context 
Frank Boyle has argued that “(a)lthough Swift attacked modern thinking in politics, 
religion, social mores, poetry and art, he located the foundations of modernity in 
philosophy, and he identified its most formidable cultural representation as the New 
Science that began its move to the centre of Western thought in the seventeenth century” 
(Boyle 2000: xi–xii). Boyle correctly identifies Swift’s use of travel as an apt metaphor 
through which he could lance the myriad of cultural facets of Enlightenment and 
modernist values. However, as I have already argued, Swift’s use of travel as a metaphor 
is buttressed by a stern warning as to the role that the very real phenomenon of the 
growth and extension of travel plays in the harmful effects that he believes this project 
will have on society. The character of Gulliver represents the democratizing possibilities 
of travel as a means of gathering natural knowledge for the scientific project. As travel 
increased in frequency in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries amidst the desire for 
new data to fuel the scientific project, aristocrats became sidelined from the role of 
documenters-in-chief. In the words of Julia Schleck, “common tradesmen trafficked in 
truth alongside gentlemen” (Schleck 2012: 69). Thus, Swift is accusing the aristocracy of 
failing to fulfill its natural mandate to both control the progress and direction of 
innovation and societal change. The nobility ought to act to safeguard society from 
“unregulated witness testimony” (Schleck 2012: 69) by inappropriate travellers in order 
to control narratives concerning key issues in science, politics, economics, and social 
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affairs. The intersection between travel, knowledge gathering, and the modernist project 
of the New Science is clear. It is entirely appropriate that Swift insert a sustained and 
significant satire of contemporary experimental science in a book that cautions of the 
universal benefits of travel, especially when advocates of the New Science were seeking 
to order and discipline travel so it might better suit their needs. 
Boyle interestingly argues that “in the England of the New Philosophy, the 
accounts of travel informed the radical rethinking activity that explains the move from an 
‘Age of Discovery’ to an ‘Age of Reason’” (Boyle 2000: 54–55). However, the holistic 
critique offered by Swift’s multifaceted satirical and ironic narrative suggests that a 
simple transition from one age to another—from ‘discovery’ to ‘reason’—does not 
adequately explain the relevant phenomena. While Boyle astutely acknowledges the role 
the former plays in fashioning the latter, the critique proffered by Swift makes a 
convincing case that they were/are thoroughly enmeshed from the onset. Gregory Lynall 
is apt to acknowledge that across his corpus, “Swift was responding not to a single 
discipline of ‘science’, but to a range of social and cultural practices and epistemological 
practices” (Lynall 2012: 4). However, within the heterogeneity of this broad array of 
epistemological, social, cultural, and political innovations, a core set of common 
assumptions underlined discovery, rationality, and much in between. Travel and the 
assumption of an autonomous, rational, and self-interested traveller who is edified by 
new experiences provides the central enabling context through which the boarder project 
of modernity and the Enlightenment presuppositions and expectations contained therein 
flowed. 
In an overarching history of the phenomena, Stephen Toulmin identifies the 
modernist project as deriving from three dreams he attributes to the proponents and 
projectors of Rationalism in human affairs. These dreams of “a rational method, a unified 
science, and an exact language” unite, for him, into a single project “designed to purify 
the operations of human reason” (Toulmin 1990: 104). Toulmin refers to the sixteenth 
century Baconian roots of this project as borne out of a “Quest for Certainty” (Toulmin 
1990: 117). In many ways, the counter-Enlightenment can be characterized as a 
recognition of the folly and hubris of such a goal in and of itself, let alone any meaningful 
attempt to achieve it. The possibility of a universal reason as the pathway to certainty 
requires a rejection and renunciation of the moral foundations of religious and cultural 
traditions (Mitchell 2019). Swift’s critique of the scientific project features a prominent 
focus on the haplessly speculative and fruitless character of contemporary experiments, 
but also of the broader implications for society of a universal method of knowledge 
acquisition that is both delinked from and in denial of the moral character of tradition 
(Mitchell 2019: 94) as is shown by the pathetic figures of the Laputan aristocracy. 
The desire for a universal explanatory scientific mapping of knowledge generated 
a focus on fact-finding and data collection. The grounding of all inquiry in empirical 
observation fashioned a new and important function for travel. No longer could or should 
travel be pursued for religious or even personal reasons. The Royal Society set out to 
reorient the scientific nature of the role of the traveller in the early modern period “as a 
collector of data from remote parts” (Vanek 2015: 558). Instructions for travellers 
disseminated by the Royal Society in several tracts published in The Philosophical 
Transactions sought to standardize conventions of documentation found in travel writing, 
“calling for only simple, perceptible facts shorn of their experiential origin” as a means to 
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“safeguard against charges of romantic embellishment” (Pearl 2012: 71). Of course, one 
of the hallmarks of Gullliver’s narrative voice is the calm and detached tone with which 
he documents his extraordinary sights and experiences, frequently in a quantitative 
fashion. Dennis Todd’s Imagining Monsters argues that Gulliver’s fascination with 
monstrosity throughout his travels is a satirical dramatization of typical eighteenth 
century attempts to follow Bacon’s urge to collect documentation “of all monsters and 
prodigious births of nature,” because “he that knows [Nature’s] deviations will more 
accurately describe her ways” (quoted in Todd 1995: 154–155). In the political realm, the 
clergyman and man of letters Richard Hurd’s dialogue imagining a debate between Locke 
and Shaftesbury on the merits of the Grand Tour has Locke argue that human nature can 
only be understood in entirety by direct observation and experience of “all its disguises 
and distortions, arising from absurd governments and monstrous religions, in every 
distant region and quarter of the globe” (quoted in Bohls 2005: 18).  
Bacon’s awareness of the fanciful and false ways in which tales of monstrosities 
had been told in the past made him advise strict guidelines regarding such reportage, 
insisting on “grave and credible history and trustworthy reports” in order to render 
reports creditable as part of the scientific enterprise (Todd 1995: 155). Neutral 
observation and quantifiable measurement thus became of paramount importance. Bacon 
and his inheritors understood the power of travel to dictate narratives concerning newly 
discovered phenomena and hence demanded a rigorous and solidly empirical 
observational process that could facilitate and assist scientific progress. Julia Schleck 
points out that contemporary debates concerning what type(s) of statement ought to be 
considered “reliable assertions of experiential knowledge” linked travel and claims 
travellers made about foreign lands to order and structure scientific knowledge, but also 
impacted economic affairs and civil society more broadly (Schleck 2012: 68). Swift, too, 
worried for the wider societal effects of disorderly travel, but certainly did not agree with 
its subjugation to a wider project based on individualism, materialism, and rationalism. 
 Morgan Vanek’s survey of eighteenth-century travel writing makes a strong 
argument for the “changeability” of the traveller as a crucial theme in this genre of 
writing. This is especially important given the necessity of the traveller’s capacity to 
document all manner of experiences in the suitably detached, neutral, and quantifiable 
manner demanded by science. As previously established, Locke’s recognition of the 
traveller’s potential weakness in falling prey to external influences abroad serves as a 
stern warning that travel is no guarantee of personal edification. When allied to the 
mission of fact-finding and data collection, as mandated by the Royal Society and the 
project of the New Science more generally, the impartiality and consistency of the 
observer is vital if travel is to have positive implications for broader civic improvement 
(Vanek 2015: 555). Locke understood that people are almost invariably changed through 
their experiences of travel and I have argued that Swift saw the likelihood of this change 
being positive as rather slim. Thus, for Locke and Swift, the ideal scientific traveller can 
hardly be trusted to reflect information neutrally let alone consistently as the effects of 
their experiences take hold. 
Whilst the Royal Society of London certainly formed Swift’s chief topical 
satirical target in his presentation of the Academy of Lagado, the materialist science of 
the University of Leiden—where Gulliver tells us he attended at the start of the text 
(Book I, Ch. I: 15)—is also a focal point of the satire. Dolores J. Palomo convincingly 
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makes the case as such, demonstrating that across all of Europe it was in Leiden where 
modern scientific techniques found their earliest and most comprehensive incorporation 
into the traditional curriculum of higher learning. In the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, the curriculum at Leiden had already started to move away from 
traditional Aristotelianism and toward Cartesian and then Newtonian science (Palomo 
1977: 27–35). Leiden also profoundly represented, as noted earlier, both dissenting 
Protestantism and religious toleration. Swift no doubt sought to further establish the 
connection between the materialistic New Science and untethered dissent in the readers’ 
minds. Palomo summarises: “the institution at Leiden most completely represented the 
attitudes, both scientific and religious, which Swift considered misguided and dangerous 
(Palomo 1977: 28).  
The connection between travel and science is furthered here by the implication of 
dangerous ideas migrating from Leiden to England, both by the specific figure of 
Gulliver and the more general cross-cultural transmission that brings quintessentially 
Dutch (and therefore modern) ideas to a country that, in Swift’s view, ought—through its 
resolution of political and religious divisions in the settlement of 1688—to know better. 
And indeed, the mainstream New Whig regime in place in Britain at this time harboured 
a “tolerant and inclusive religious policy that tried to embrace as many Protestants as 
possible.” Swift saw the potential extension of state power to dissenting sects as likely to 
result in sedition and attempts to abuse their newfound authority for mass conversions 
(Hammond 2010: 94). Hence, the association of Holland with pathways best avoided. 
Gulliver’s role in Book III is less engaged than in the other three voyages, 
operating more as a social commentator than an immersed participant. This is explained 
narratively by the inability of the Laputans to engage in conversation to any great degree, 
with Gulliver lamenting that he can only really converse “with women, tradesmen, 
flappers, and court-pages” in his initial two months in Laputa (Book III, Ch. IV: 161). 
This is partially a sexist and classist joke but is also part of the broader critique of the 
abdication of an aristocratic class to partake in the appropriate discourses of polite 
society. However, much as Gulliver’s behaviour evokes some of Locke’s considerations 
regarding travel, the conspicuously documentarian tone that Gulliver adopts throughout 
the text is arguably even more pronounced in his recording of his time in Laputa. In this 
regard, his writing style is that of a diarist, as proposed for general use by Francis Bacon 
in his “Of Travel” (1625). Bacon’s program of experimental philosophy formed a core 
inspiration for the Royal Society and others who sought to follow what they conceived to 
be the Baconian project. In this regard, the wider satirical focus here is how travel 
instructively operates as a problematic test case for what Swift sees as the naïve optimism 
of overly permissive Lockeanism on the matter of experiential education and the singular 
faith in progress of the Baconians. 
Thomas Sprat, in his famous history of the Royal Society in 1667, praised Bacon 
for his “defense of experimental philosophy and the best, directions, that are needed, to 
promote it” (Sprat 1667: 35). Indeed, Sprat summarized the sentiment of the Society 
being an inherently Baconian institution when he described him as “one great man, who 
had the true imagination of the whole extent of this enterprise, as it is now set on foot” 
(Sprat 1667: 437). To this end, the Royal Society viewed travel very much through a 
Baconian lens and drafted its recommendations for travellers as such. However, the style 
of science pursued by the Laputans arguably betrays even Bacon’s own scientific project 
 90 
as the English philosopher’s iconoclastic attacks on bibliolatry and tradition were rooted 
in a far more rigorous empiricism than the absurdly abstract speculations of Laputan 
mathematicians. 
 Most significantly, the Royal society shared Bacon’s view that the methodical 
collection of knowledge ought to be the purpose of travel (Bruce 2008: xxviii). Thus, 
travel can be utilised for the greater gain of societal progress, rather than as part of a 
project of individualized edification. Bacon describes the educational character of travel 
to be a factor only “in the younger sort”, whereas “in the elder (it is) a part of experience” 
(Bacon 1996: 374). Interestingly, by the time Swift has Gulliver operating under a 
combination of Baconian and Lockean assumptions concerning travel, the distinction 
between the education of the young and the experience of the elder might not represent 
such a rigid dichotomy. As discussed elsewhere in this work, a central argument made 
here is that Swift’s critique of travel as a core facet of the Rationalist project revolves 
around scepticism of sense-experiential learning through travel as a guaranteed source of 
edification, rather than corruption.  
The belief that travel is of universal benefit is based on a narrative of progressive 
betterment through experience, especially educational experience as a panacea for 
ignorance and prejudice. The doctrine of progress, in which human history is the story of 
continuous improvement over time, also formed a central narrative pillar of the New 
Science, allied with theories of materialistic explanations for rational phenomena. The 
doctrine of progress, of course, also formed a key facet of what would later be called the 
Whig interpretation of history wherein England, in particular, moves continuously toward 
increased freedom along a historical arc bent singularly toward justice (Burrow, Collini, 
and Winch 1983). Such optimism concerning the fate of individual travellers, large-scale 
scientific endeavour, and even entire nations is, for Swift, tragically misplaced. 
It might also be the case that whatever positive effects of travel there may be, 
dependent on the prior education of the traveller as they are, enforcing the methods 
appropriate to science on travellers’ experiences and writings is likely to eliminate any 
net benefits. Given that the speculators of Laputa are so entirely dedicated to abstract 
speculation, leading even to their inability to see or recognise others, the application of 
such a mindset to travel would strip away the possibility of experiencing and recognising 
the otherness encountered abroad. This might be desirable if a traveller was visiting a 
land of utmost vice but in, say, the Grand Tour, would ultimately result in the traveller 
losing out on the actual human experiences necessary for the treasures of the ancient 
world to positively affect them in an educational manner.  
Whilst the likes of Shaftesbury have noted the importance in disciplining how 
travel writing conveys information to a public “anxious to learn about the world in which 
it lived” (Batten 1978: 7), it is clear that reducing all coverage of foreign countries to 
purely scientific facts devoid of sentiment or pleasure would deny both the traveller and 
readers alike of any potential benefit. Indeed, in an age prior to the rigorous delineation 
and separation of disciplines, the aspiration toward universal education meant that travel 
and pleasant, artistic, and informative travel writing were all seen as necessary 
components of the completed gentleman. The methods appropriate to science, be they 
overly abstract, speculative, or rigorous in nature, may very well constitute threats to any 
edifying possibilities of travel. Thus, although science proposes to discipline travel, 
which I argue Gulliver’s Travels certainly makes a case for, this would nonetheless be 
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undesirable for the purposes of individual education as it would deny even those capable 
of reaping the benefits of their travels their due edification. 
 
4.4. An Aristocracy Degraded 
Gulliver’s time in Laputa amongst the rule of science and technology highlights the 
dangers of the ascent of intellectualism for its own sake, firmly connecting contemporary 
movements in science to politics. The necessity of polite interaction as a means to polish 
and improve one another through mutually beneficial contact is disregarded in a 
community obsessed with supposedly intellectual concerns. As Shaftesbury argued, 
removing this is treacherous to individual and collective virtue and civility (Shaftesbury 
2000: 31). This is precisely the scenario Gulliver encounters, as he is socially neglected 
by those whom he meets in Laputa since he cannot meet their standards of discourse on 
their sole topics of interest—mathematics and music—and is thus treated “not without 
some degree of contempt” (Book III, Ch. IV: 161). The Laputans are not just socially 
ignorant due to their submission to “intense speculation” but they are also impolite to 
such a degree that the mutual improvement of interaction with others is rendered 
impossible by the severely limited range of acceptable discourse.  
This singular focus on abstract matters of speculative science runs counter to 
natural human sociability, as represented by Gulliver who, despite all his faults, is a 
curious and engaged gentleman. As such, he is moved to describe the people of Laputa as 
“so abstracted and involved in speculation, that I never met with such disagreeable 
companions” (Book III, Ch. IV: 161). Gulliver declares himself to be “not unversed” nor 
unappreciative of matters scientific, but the Laputan dedication to abstract speculation 
renders them essentially impossible to communicate with. This highlights the dangers 
that a self-indulgent intellectualism poses to polite sociability. It also conveys Swift’s 
concerns of the scientific project’s disinterest in grappling with methods or approaches 
other than its own and that this inevitably leads to a problematic incorporation of 
phenomena properly left outside the remit of experimental science. This includes both 
travel and political power. 
 The contemporary scientific projectors of the Royal Society and its ilk are 
satirised by Swift through the presentation of the Academy of Lagado. They are shown to 
be crackpot experimenters whose harebrained schemes fashion a counter-intuitive anti-
Utopia of inventors that achieves nothing but economic and ecological ruin, technological 
tyranny, and social disengagement. The process and means of modern knowledge 
acquisition are shown to warp human intellect into a fetishization of abstractions such as 
mathematics and music to the detriment of the nation’s prosperity and even the most 
basic human functioning such as communication, ruining the possibility for human 
alertness and polite interaction. It would be facile to think that Swift’s quarrel here is with 
all scientific projection or the extension of human knowledge through any and all 
modernist means. It is more so the case that the particular biases and tendencies that the 
modernist project prioritises—innovation in all matters at all costs, denial of the validity 
of traditional knowledge or customs, unyielding faith in the narrative of progress, etc.—
are universalised and applied to all facets of life in ways that strip the aristocracy of its 
sober tempering influence upon society as they are swept up in the bonanza of change. 
Science has its uses but when its use becomes an end onto itself that is deemed 
universally praiseworthy it comes at the expense of human intellect, properly understood. 
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 Throughout Gulliver’s time in Laputa there are consistent references to there 
being both groups of the vulgar and persons of higher or “prime quality”, whom Gulliver 
can clearly and easily distinguish from one another. This further affirms the organic 
hierarchy that Swift seems to offer as a universal standard of sociability proper to man, 
yet again demonstrating that despite all the fantastic images conjured up by Swift, 
Gulliver never encounters a society with an egalitarian form (Montag 1994: 138). The 
supposed intellectual elites, who are “so taken up with intense speculations, that they 
neither can speak, nor attend to the discourses of others, without being roused by some 
external taction upon the organs of speech and hearing” are pathetically absent-minded 
figures (Book III: Ch. II: 146). It is worth noting that Gulliver immediately identifies 
those who are afflicted by this powerful distraction to “be of better quality” and that their 
heads are hit by a bladder full of pebbles or dried peas by flappers comprised of “the 
vulgar, whose thoughts and minds were more disengaged” (Book III, Ch. II: 146–147). 
The inversion of expectation whereby the vulgar are capable of attentiveness and those of 
quality are practically catatonic highlights how the luxury of supposedly indulging one’s 
intellect does not always produce results befitting an erstwhile noble class. In Laputa, the 
supposed life of the mind brings about both economic and societal disaster on a macro 
scale and the people of quality in Laputa “have been rendered unfit to care for themselves 
or others” as they are dependent on the vulgar flappers to keep them even slightly alert. 
Ultimately, they have degenerated into “a nobility that has abdicated its natural place in 
the world” (Montag 1994: 139). 
The connection between travel, science, and Swift’s view of the role proper to 
aristocracy in an organic hierarchical society is important here. It is notable that Gulliver 
makes particular effort to describe the Laputan elites as “altogether unmoved by the sight 
of my foreign habit and countenance” (Book III: Ch. II: 146). At one level this is a simple 
comedic image of the absurd extent to which the “intense speculations” remove the 
elites’ capacity to even notice their surroundings. However, it also points to the potential 
significance of not being able to identify or recognise someone whose habits manners, or 
customs are different from one’s own, and how this is both unnatural and perhaps even 
dangerous. The implication is that absolute submission to purely speculative thought 
degrades one’s capacity to engage, understand, or in this extreme case even notice culture 
and cultural differences.  
For Swift, who held clear and profound political and religious prejudices 
(Damrosch 2013), such a mindset was clearly a path to relativist toleration ad infinitum, if 
not outright societal ruin. On the other hand, it could also point to how such an utterly 
narrow elitism predicated entirely on one’s speculative abilities renders the Laputans 
incapable of even comprehending the humanity of a supposed inferior such as Gulliver. 
This, too, points toward societal ruin as a singular fetishization of merely one facet of 
human existence to the detriment of all others is sure to distort society beyond repair. The 
second reading of Swift’s critique of scientific reasoning and his implied fear that such a 
form of thinking will necessarily corrupt politics arguably finds it most profound 
expression in Burke’s rejection of Jacobin abstract reasoning. Unlike abstraction, practice 
draws upon social knowledge embedded in custom and tradition. In this regard, Swift 
foreshadows what Francis Canavan has described as Edmund’s Burke’s Political Reason 
as a force against the dogmatism of abstract, speculative theory that is divorced from 
political practice (Canavan 1960). Much as disciplining travel for the purposes of science 
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is undesirable, the reduction of politics to subservience to the scientific project is also 
disastrous. Both of these possible interpretations of the disconnected nature of the 
Laputans point toward Swift’s ire at the fanatical submission to a singular type of 
knowledge and how a degraded aristocracy may be particularly vulnerable to such 
temptations as an economy of prestige emerges surrounding scientific and/or speculative 
knowledge. 
When Gulliver is in Laputa long enough to master the language to the point of 
being able to converse with the King, the line of questioning pursued is dedicated solely 
to the state of mathematics. Gulliver is shocked that the King has “not the least curiosity 
to inquire into the laws, government, history, religion, or manners of countries where I 
had been” (Book III, Ch. II: 153). Of course, this is precisely what the reader has 
witnessed Gulliver do throughout his travels thus far as he seeks to be a good 
documentarian and to be edified through experiential learning. Such incuriosity is surely 
a sign of a weak intellect, but it also signals that the Laputans have strayed from the 
information gathering and documentation proper to the scientific project. As a 
demonstration of the dulling effects of the purely speculative life, the King’s responses to 
Gulliver are largely characterised by “contempt and indifference, though often roused by 
his flapper on each side” and thus barely able to mount any natural interest in his guest 
(Book III, Ch. II: 153). The character of the King is characteristic of how the New 
Science is presented as a naval-gazing, antisocial subversion of the intellect rather than its 
champion, ultimately serving to threaten organic social hierarchy and order.  
Aristocracies of the intellect and of genuine nobility are not one and the same, 
Swift implies, and Laputa and Balnibarbi serve to show that the former leads to ludicrous 
and even disastrous results. That scientific thinking appears to degrade norms of polite 
society is particularly ironic considering the important role that the Royal Society saw for 
“the importation of codes of gentlemanly conduct into scientific debate” if knowledge 
generated by the methods of the New Science were to be secured as general knowledge in 
a peaceful fashion (Schleck 2012: 54). We might extrapolate, then, that if scientific 
progress were to be pursued to profitable and moral ends, it surely ought to be stewarded 
by the aristocracy so that it may work toward the good of the community and avoid any 
destructive pitfalls. The text encourages us to see that a strong aristocracy that promotes 
the ideals of politeness and gentlemanly conduct is required if science is to be fruitfully 
pursued. Travel and travel writing could easily have been seen as lacking in sufficiently 
gentlemanly stock as several influential writers of the era, including the “famously 
bourgeois journalist, novelist, entrepreneur, and sometime spy Daniel Defoe” held sway 
in communicating popular images and ideas of travel to the public (Bohls 2005: xv). This 
demonstrates that the potentially democratising currents in science and travel could 
combine to undermine the aristocracy. 
What Swift shows us in Book III is the degradation of both the intellect and the 
aristocracy who ought to stay above the petty fashions of innovation, especially those that 
claim universal scope and the prospect of certainty, as these will run roughshod over 
tradition. The radical levelling effect of the democratic possibilities opened up by the 
scientific project risks fashioning a priesthood of all believers that erodes the social and 
political custodial responsibilities of the aristocracy. The universal priesthood advocated 
by Luther was, for Swift, a dangerous idea, as demonstrated in the centuries since the 
Reformation by radical dissenters’ obsession with an individualistic religion. As James 
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Simpson has recently argued, the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, although 
born of profoundly illiberal origin, generated an argument concerning human equality 
that allowed for a gradual and inevitable extension of individual rights from religious 
toleration to private judgment on a wide array of matters, all of which we now take as 
hallmarks of political liberalism (Simpson 2019). This, from Swift’s perspective, is 
clearly an unacceptable usurpation of the aristocracy. Permitting a rational religion in the 
form of experimental science to flatten social hierarchy would be no better, but 
Tocqueville shows us that even in societies governed by an egalitarian ethos, hierarchy 
seemingly inevitably reasserts itself (a fact demonstrated by Swift’s depiction of 
exclusively hierarchical societies across the four books of Gulliver’s Travels). In such a 
reordering of society, the scientists become firsts among equals, emerging as a pseudo-
aristocratic elite that bears no genuine aristocratic characteristics nor fulfilling the 
custodial duties proper to the position. 
The critique of the scientific project in Laputa further contributes to Swift’s over-
arching counter-Enlightenment thesis, with a repurposed travel as the fulcrum of the 
absolutist aspirations of the New Science. Tradition was no longer sacrosanct and those 
who could undermine old ways soared in a new economy of prestige under emergent 
modernist norms. Baconian science shared the anti-idolatry of reformed Christianity, 
seeking instead to control the illusions or distortions to human sense perception through 
“a controlled ascent from fact to theory, then moving on to the acid test of practice, in the 
generation of discoveries and inventions beneficial to mankind” (Porter 2000: 57). Swift, 
however, worriedly identified the emergence of the idol worship of science itself—what 
would later come to be called scientism.11 He then sought to attack this as vehemently as 
the Protestant iconoclasts he hated so much might ransack a statue-laden church (Hunter 
2003: 229). Indeed, just as the scientific project sought to constantly update and improve 
itself through further experimentation, James Simpson has argued that radical 
Protestantism is “an anti-tradition tradition of permanent revolution” (Simpson 2019: xi). 
Across the text, the radical enthusiasm and simplistic optimism of dissenting 
Protestantism, Lockean empiricism, and Baconian science are juxtaposed in such a 
fashion as to encourage the reader to see all three as inflicted by the same core maladies.  
The front-facing satire of Gulliver’s voyage to Laputa is a refutation of the claims 
by the early fellows of the Royal Society that it was not merely curiosity but also a 
concern for real-world application that motivated their experimentations (Pearl 2012: 72). 
The projectors and inventors of the Academy of Lagado are shown to conduct wasteful, 
pointless, and patently absurd projects. This satirical thrust is not divorced from the 
generalized context and critique of travel found in Gulliver’s Travels as a whole. Indeed, 
it is significant that the projectors of Lagado and other academies throughout Balnibarbi 
originate from a trip to Laputa some forty years previous, returning “with a very little 
smattering in mathematics, but full of volatile spirits acquired in that airy region” (Book 
 
11  See, for example von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1980. The Counter Revolution of Science: Studies on the 
Abuse of Reason, Carmel: Liberty Fund; von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1942. “Scientism and the Study of 
Society. Part I”, Economica 9: no. 35 (August): 267–29; Popper, Karl. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An 




III, Ch. IV: 164). This is another example of the theme of degeneration over time raised 
elsewhere in Gulliver’s Travels most notably in Book IV’s myth concerning the origins 
of the Yahoo’s brutish demeanour and the Gulliver’s declaration in Book I of the 
“corruptions into which these people are fallen by the degenerate nature of man.” Most 
worryingly, the degeneration of Laputa through misguided scientific hubris is 
dogmatically approved and applauded. Despite miserable failures to bring their “projects 
to perfection”, the projectors continue nonetheless, “fifty times more violently bent upon 
prosecuting their schemes, driven equally on by hope and despair” (Book III, Ch. IV: 
165). This demonstrates not only the degeneration of Balnibarbi over time, described by 
Gulliver as lying “miserably waste, the houses in ruins, and the people without food or 
clothes” (Book III, Ch. IV: 165), but also that there is little hope of rectifying this tragic 
scenario anytime soon. As true believers, the projectors may well deem themselves as 
simply falsifying hypotheses en route to a profitable and successful conclusion of the 
project at hand. Swift shows us, however, that this can operate as an excuse for the 
continuance of disastrous schemes aimed far more at confirmation of admiration of one’s 
own intellectualism, rather than any improvement of the country. 
 
4.5. The follies of Modernism 
When Gulliver plots his return home from Japan at the end of Book III he pretends to be 
a Dutchman in order to find passage on a Dutch ship. He must request to be excused from 
“performing the ceremony imposed on my countrymen, of trampling upon the 
crucifix.”12 The King of Japan notes that Gulliver would be “the first of my countryman 
who ever made any scruple in this point; and that he began to doubt whether I was a real 
Hollander or no; but rather suspected I must be a Christian” (Book III, Ch. XI: 202). The 
oppositional dichotomy that the Japanese King suggests between being Dutch and 
Christian represents Swift’s ire toward dissenting Protestantism and toleration as 
hallmarks of contemporary Holland’s degeneration from genuine Christianity to a 
mercenary shadow of the faith (Canfield 1973: 17). More generally, however, it also 
establishes the ruinous effects that pursuing travel for the purposes of commercial 
expansion has in eroding traditional morality and norms concerning sacred religious 
practices. The implication is that this Faustian bargain degrades moral and religious 
sensibilities and is clearly conveyed when, on the Dutch ship, “a malicious skipper” 
identifies Gulliver as not yet having trampled on the crucifix. The skipper has internalised 
and now even craves the desecration of the crucifix, rather than it being a barely palatable 
means to an end. This yet again establishes that the narrative of supposed progress 
peddled by the projectors of science, technology, and trade ought to be seen as false and 
that materialist modernism leads to degeneration and degradation. 
Swift had earlier made the connection between Reform Christianity and New 
Science in both A Tale of a Tub and, especially The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit 
(1704) by inverting the literal and figurative facets of spirit in a rebuke to the materialism 
of the rationalists. For the proponents of each, the projects of liberal politics and 
economics, dissenting Protestantism, and the New Science all sought to counter traditions 
they perceived as antiquated, stifling, and unjust. These various modernist movements 
 
12 This practice, called Yefumi, was a religious ceremony designed to detect Christians, who were forbidden 
in Japan. Dutch traders consented to the practice as a means to pursue commercial relations in Japan, the 
sole Europeans to do so. 
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were decentralised and encouraged a certain degree of freethinking and autonomy in 
ways that Swift saw as pernicious, licentious, and damaging to revealed religion and 
organic hierarchy as the basis of tradition (Carey 1997: 89). Palomo highlights how 
Holland represented for Swift a dangerous beacon of “materialism and the progressive 
spirit” (Palomo 1977: 35) applied to the realms of politics, trade, and science, and he 
feared the worst as a New Whig-dominated England moved in a similar direction. The 
scientific projectors of Book III are presented as not only laughable and misguided but 
also profoundly dangerous. The quintessentially modern tendencies exemplified by the 
Netherlands, including prioritising commercial gain over religion and the erosion of all 
but materialist explanatory schemes, represented a dangerous break from the stability of 
tradition and order.  
Gulliver’s role in Book III is far less engaged than in the other three voyages and 
his commentary on Laputa is arguably the most clear-eyed and sober of anything he 
offers throughout the entire text. Insofar as he has anything approximate to the typical arc 
of a novelistic protagonist, at this point the character of Gulliver has yet to fully turn on 
the rotten nature of English politics and culture as he does to full effect in Book IV, but 
the satire of currents in European science and philosophy continues apace in Laputa. For 
example, Gulliver makes the link between the degradation of politics at the hands of 
scientific hubris in Europe in general, but not necessarily England in particular, as his 
pride in his home country has not yet fully waned. The critique is widened when he 
expresses his doubts as to the validity of the link between science and politics. For him, 
the desire of those with expertise in the former to claim authority over the latter as 
derived from “a very common infirmity of human nature, inclining us to be more curious 
and conceited in matters where we have least concern, and for which we are least adapted 
either by study or nature” (Book III, Ch. II: 151). This represents a clear objection to the 
modernist project of unlocking the universal method and unified language through which 
a rational world can be fully comprehended and mastered (Mitchell 2019: 94). It also 
establishes Swift’s critique of the natural limits proper to man that science seeks to 
overcome. Science presents itself as having rightful dominion over all facets of life, as 
the Projectors of Lagado and elsewhere throughout Balnibarbi “contrive new rules and 
methods of agriculture and building, and new instruments and tools for all trades and 
manufacture (Book III, Ch. IV: 164). And the domain of science is seen as justly 
extended beyond the purely empirical world.  
The connection between the New Science and Swift’s characterization of the 
modern science of politics is most clearly expressed when Gulliver notes that the people 
of Laputa have a strong disposition toward “news and politics, perpetually enquiring into 
public affairs, giving their judgments in matters of state; and passionately disputing every 
inch of a party opinion” (Book III, Ch. II: 150). This comes immediately following a 
description of how every facet of Laputan life is shaped by and around the conventions of 
mathematics and music, resulting in the effective curtailing of the practical reason (as 
opposed to speculative reason and instrumental reason), imagination, fancy, and 
invention: “The whole compass of their thoughts and mind, being shut up within the two 
forementioned sciences” (Book III, Ch. II: 150). Thus, in a typical satirical flourish, 
Gulliver moves from describing the impossibility of any meaningful Laputan culture of 
political contemplation as it ought to be intractably characterised to immediately 
observing a generalised obsession with political intrigue, news, and opinion. Gulliver 
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claims to have seen a similarly damning tendency amongst the mathematicians of 
Europe. This is a strong criticism of the emergence of something approximating a 
technocratic elite or the conflation of knowledge of matters scientific and the broader 
science of politics properly understood.  
In Book II, Gulliver’s discussions with the King of Brobdingnag satirised the 
supposed ignorance of the Brobdingnagians for “not having hitherto reduced politics into 
a science, as the more acute wits of Europe have done (Book II, Ch. VII: 124). The 
choice of the word “wit” here to describe those who claim to have elevated (or, rather, 
reduced) politics to a science is no doubt an intentional swipe in the direction of those 
who were lauded in contemporary British and Irish intellectual circles (Deane 1985). 
Thus, we see a clear over-arching theme of the foolishness of either the outright 
conflation of science and politics—i.e. the denial that science and politics are two distinct 
phenomena—or the attempt to convert politics into the metrics and methods of science—
i.e. to render politics comprehensible via scientific means. This eventually would form 
the dogmatic approach of scientism, in which all facets of life ought to be reduced to 
measurable and quantifiable indicators suitable for insertion into the pre-set methodology 
of science, regardless of the appropriateness of the fit. This degradation of science is 
emblematic of Swift’s wider concern across the text of how decent or good ideas (such as 
Locke’s advice concerning travel) get diluted, misinterpreted, and overextended, often to 
disastrous effect. Most importantly, Gulliver’s recognition that we are badly fitted to 
approach problems of politics “either by study or nature” recognises the limitations that 
apply to humanity as a consequence of both inherent human nature, and how our 
capacities are blunted by the fallacious universal equivalences of the scientific project. 
Equally troubling developments were to be found in the so-called Anglican 
Rationalism of the Latitudinarian faction who “chose to graft Christian understanding 
onto the mechanical but serviceable Newtonian worldview and to accommodate the 
needs and desires of a burgeoning market-society while enlightening its self-interest in 
order to preserve and promote the Church” (Atkins 2013: 16). Politics deferring to 
science is troubling enough, but the moulding revealed religion around the scientific 
worldview was, for thinkers such as Swift, essentially a terrible abdication of 
responsibility from political and religious elites. This Latitudinarian deference to science 
would render it morally equivalent to deism and freethinking in its willingness to break 
with custom and a mercenary acceptance of the inevitability of triumphs of science, 
commerce, and liberal individualism. Margaret C. Jacobs notes that the Latitudinarian 
adopted the new science “and promoted it from their pulpits because it served their 
interests” as they sought to reorient Church power around cohabitation around a 
Newtonian “model for a stable and prosperous polity, rued by the self-interest of men” 
(Jacobs 1976: 17–18). 
 
4.6. Scientific Universalism and Political Absolutism 
Robert P. Fitzgerald astutely points out that, for Swift, the certainty and universalism 
claimed by science found its parallel in the political realm in absolutism; the doctrine that 
“political sovereignty was indivisible, was not to be restrained by law, and was to be 
accepted without question” (Fitzgerald 1988: 214). The liberal tradition has also viewed 
absolutism as inherently arbitrary and corrupt through the usurpation of rule of law by 
personal prerogative (Tapsell 2007: 8). Such absolutist claims to power could (and 
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frequently did, historically) manifest devoid of any specifically scientific character. The 
modern tradition of absolutism advanced by the likes of Filmer and Hobbes was not 
defended on the basis of mastery of science. However, as has been previously 
established, Gulliver’s Travels satirically evokes the conflation of scientific and political 
knowledge, especially the idea that the former ought to bestow its beholder with the 
latter.  
Bacon’s utopian travel narrative, the New Atlantis, makes this link clear when the 
purpose of Salomon’s House is identified as “the knowledge of causes, and secret 
motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of 
all things possible” (Bacon 2008: 177). By empire here, Bacon can be interpreted as 
referring to the common cause of all humanity across the broad range of possible 
endeavours. Investigation in the natural sciences is valuable because it contributes to this 
common cause and as such, as Susan Bruce argues, for Bacon “scientific knowledge is 
indivisible from political power” (Bruce 2008: xxxv). The absolutism inherent in the 
desire for “a rational method, a unified science, and an exact language” (Toulmin 1990) 
and the quest to eliminate uncertainty and ambiguity reflected for Swift a misguided 
conflation of the capacity for material and technological manipulation with the art of rule 
responsibly embedded in the traditions that maintain order and make structured freedom 
possible.  
Patrick J. Deneen, a contemporary philosopher whose heavy criticisms of 
liberalism can be read to echo several of Swift’s concerns in Gulliver’s Travels, has 
recently argued along similar lines, making the case that the infiltration and even 
supplanting of politics, properly understood, by technology is “a tradition-destroying and 
custom-undermining dynamic that replaces practices, memory, and beliefs” (Deneen 
2018: 96). The Laputans’ inability to even maintain basic conversation and norms of 
politeness is indicative of the point made by Deneen here that the radical presentism of 
scientific and technological speculation squeezes out the long-term and historically 
conscious perspective that custodial politicians ought to preserve. In a more literal sense 
Gulliver’s potential in Lilliput to act as an instrument of destruction summons the 
Emperor’s dream of using this power to achieve world domination. The natural 
destructive capacity of Gulliver the giant the Emperor suggests, could be harnessed to 
achieve the goal of becoming the “sole monarch of the whole world” (Book I, Ch. V: 47). 
This shows the destructive possibility of technology (in this case a weaponized giant) 
allied to the expansionist designs of a corrupt leader. 
Swift’s opposition to political absolutism, featured prominently across Gulliver’s 
Travels as well as throughout his other writings, broadly followed the conventions of 
what will later be understood as “Old Whig” Lockean liberalism. Fitzgerald argues that 
Swift’s criticisms of commercial society, individualism, religious toleration, and other 
aspects of what are commonly understood as cornerstones of Locke’s thought were 
nonetheless nested in the crucial Whig bedrocks of natural rights to life, liberty, and 
property, government by consent, and the fragmentation of political power. On the core 
issues of political philosophy, Fitzgerald claims, “the only significant difference between 
Swift and Locke was one of degree” (Fitzgerald 1988: 214). This interpretation is 
intuitively in line with my reading of Swift’s evocation of Locke’s writing on the 
edifying possibilities of travel. Gulliver’s Travels presents what can happen, however, 
when such potentially positive facets of liberal thinking are taken as abstract conceptual 
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truths rather than facets of a more holistic human nature that must reside fully within 
nested traditions. Swift carried the distaste typical of all brands of Whig toward 
absolutism and of arbitrary power. The Emperor of Lilliput backed by a standing army is 
an example of European-style despotism, whereas the King of Luggnag reflects the 
oriental despot, and both use their arbitrary power to extend their realm of control and 
enslave those who come under their control. Both are contrasted with the gracious and 
wise King of Brobdingnag who wields considerable power within a “general 
composition” between royal prerogative, the nobility, and the people so as to maintain 
order and stability (Lock 1983: 173).  
The order of Brobdingnag is possible due to the lack of faction, malevolent 
political competition and religious nonconformity. This is made clear by the King’s 
incredulousness at England’s licentious allowance of people to freely speak plain 
falsehoods and his conception of justice as informed by religious and political conformity 
and knowledge of local customs (Book II, Ch.VI: 119). Thus, Swift’s anti-absolutism is 
absolutist in its strong requirements of public conformity. Swift’s conception of anti-
absolutism does not fashion an equally absolutist vision of liberty in contrast to 
authoritarian coercion, making a state such as Brobdingnag, distasteful though it is to 
modern liberal democratic values, a site of responsible liberty as life under a King 
“possessed of every quality which procures veneration, love and esteem; of strong parts, 
great wisdom and profound learning; endued with admirable talents for government, and 
almost adored by his subjects” (Book II, Ch. VII: 124) provides a rich existence. Indeed, 
for Swift the King ought to be thought of as a servant of the nation and cannot be 
permitted to breach the reciprocal relations between subject and ruler, mediated through a 
representative parliament (Ehrenpreis 1935: 135). This applies to both the tyranny of 
arbitrary political rule, but also to the possibility of an abstract conceptualisation of truth, 
liberty, reason, or any other singular ideal that could supplant the concrete practice of 
political community in an absolutist fashion. All this to say that Swift’s critique of the 
universal aspirations of science intersects with his firmly held principle of anti-
absolutism, and that he saw the combination of the two as apparent and inevitable, but 
this does not mean that he conceives a free society to be defined in terms of state-
guaranteed individual negative liberty.  
For the projectors of modernism, the sectarian violence and political upheaval that 
befell seventeenth-century Europe, and England in particular, was caused by uncertainty 
and interpretive anarchy. As Stephen Toulmin states, “the time had come to discover 
some rational method for demonstrating the essential correctness or incorrectness of 
philosophical, scientific, or theological doctrines” (Toulmin 1990: 55). Scientific 
Rationalism emerges, then, as the criterion of conformity under a regime of tolerant 
pluralism. Swift’s anti-absolutism finds the absolutism of science to be a pathway to 
tyranny whereas life under a benevolent, dignified and prudent king, power might be 
wielded in authoritarian forms but would never be arbitrary in nature. 
 The blending of scientific acumen and absolute political power culminate in the 
figure of the King of Laputa. Under the total control of the King the island of Laputa 
hovers menacingly over its subordinate territory, Balnibarbi. Through its advanced 
astrology and a load-stone located in its centre, the island can be manipulated to move 
about, rise and fall. Gulliver reports that the monarch can use the Laputans’ technological 
know-how to raise the island so high that “he can prevent the falling of dews and rains 
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whenever he pleases” (Book III, Ch. III: 154). One might well fear this capability 
inherently as a terrifying subversion of nature, characteristic of modernism’s 
disinclination to acknowledge boundaries moral or natural. Worse still, this manoeuvre is 
used in a targeted fashion to quash those in Balnibarbi who “engage in rebellion or 
mutiny, fall into violent factions, or refuse to pay the usual tribute” (Book III, Ch. III: 
158). By hovering the island over a particular town or community in Balinbarbi, the King 
is able to “deprive them of the benefit of the sun and the rain, and consequently afflict the 
inhabitants with dearth and diseases” (Book III, Ch. III: 158). This illustrates the dangers 
of technological and scientific mastery, especially when wielded by those whose 
intellects have been warped in inhuman ways. Worse still, the King can use the island of 
Laputa itself to crush areas beneath “by letting the island drop directly upon their heads, 
which makes a universal destruction both of houses and men” (Book III, Ch. III: 158). 
The implication here is clear: the aspiration of science to a universal method and/or 
language comes with the potential for universal destruction. This highlights a profound 
tension between moral accounts for why science ought to be pursued and the moral 
consequences of its practical application. The abstract ethics of expanding the horizon of 
humanity’s knowledge takes on a substantially different character when considering the 
types of uses we can expect from the technological proficiencies gained as a result. 
Universal power in science and politics generates the capacity for total destruction, both 
of humanity itself and the fruit of its labour and a key identifier of those of quality in the 
form of property. 
 
4.7. The Stabilising Effects of Property 
There are, however, two important remits to this technologically fuelled tyranny. One is 
natural, in that the bottom of the island, and even the crucial Load-stone can be damaged 
by the impact of the island crashing down upon Balnibarbi. The second is the fact that the 
nobles of Laputa hold property on Balnibarbi they do not wish to be damaged by 
plummeting the island onto insurrections below. Here Swift highlights the argument in 
favour of the sobering effects a propertied aristocratic class has upon a monarch. Property 
provides an anchoring effect that stabilises and checks the excesses of even an aristocracy 
corrupted by a degraded and misguided intellectualism of intense speculation. This 
further weakens the case for travel for those whose positive instincts are buttressed by 
their duties to protect their property.  
Burke is again an instructive interlocutor here, given his advocacy of the Roman 
law of prescription under which long term possession provided the right to property 
ownership. Burke disagreed with the Lockean conception of property rights generated via 
the improvement of land erstwhile held in common ownership, arguing that this was 
insufficiently stable to provide the required basis for a landed aristocracy. In Greg 
Weiner’s analysis: “in rejecting Locke, who sought to impose an abstract theory on 
property, Burke chose slow evolution over speculative politics” (Weiner 2019: 132–133). 
The dovetailing of speculation as a threat to politics and as a hallmark of the modernist 
project of scientific experimentation is not coincidental as both are purposefully 
destabilising forces in ways that both Swift and Burke identify. In the Reflections, Burke 
wrote that without prescription “no species of property is secure, when it once becomes 
an object large enough to tempt the cupidity of indigent power” (Burke 2003: 128). The 
security of property makes stability and thus prudence possible for the landed aristocracy 
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tied to the land. In Gulliver’s Travels, Swift implicitly outlines an ideal political order as 
hierarchical, informed by the stability that property confers upon a hereditary nobility 
(Lock 1983: 1983). 
Gulliver informs the reader that the King’s failure to recruit a “ministry to join 
with him” is the only thing preventing the establishment of “the most absolute Prince in 
the universe” thereby mitigating the totality of the technological tyranny offered by the 
island’s literally crushing power (Book III, Ch. III: 158). Another potentially positive 
facet of the nobility here is that Gulliver tells us that they are aware that “the office of a 
favourite hath a very uncertain tenure” and that they “would never consent to enslaving 
their own country” (Book III, Ch. III: 158). This shows that the elite are at least 
sufficiently engaged to avoid being lured by short-term petty advantage, recognising the 
favour of an absolutist leader to be fleeting at best and that any further acquiescence to an 
absolutist regime would represent an unconscionable enslavement of their country and 
people (Book III, Ch. III: 158). Thus, while Swift certainly wants us to see the “people of 
better quality” in Laputa to be victims of the degradation of the intellect that comes with 
a life of “intense speculations”, they nonetheless maintain some ingrained sense of 
responsibility concerning the protection of property and the long-term health of the 
country proper to their position. The cabinet of ministers in Lilliput, also represent the 
dangers of a degraded aristocratic class, who acquire “great employments by dancing on 
the ropes, or badges of favour and distinction by leaping over sticks, and creeping under 
them,” without a parliament (despite the rampant nature of party-based factionalism) in 
place to restrain their malign ascendancy (Book I, Ch. VI: 54). Yet, some of the wiser 
among the Lilliputian Ministry agree with Gulliver’s protestation against the Emperor’s 
desire to use him to “reduce the whole Empire of Belfuscu into a province” as part of a 
wider plan to make himself the “sole monarch of the whole world” (Book I, Ch. V: 47) 
showing the positive influence of a proper nobility, shrinking though it may be. 
A century on from Swift’s identification and possible anticipation of its effects, 
Alexis de Tocqueville articulated the special quality that land ownership has, binding it to 
political power, even beyond that produced by movable wealth. Summarizing 
Tocqueville’s views on the stabilizing effects of property, Harvey Mansfield writes “in 
aristocracy, individuals are fixed in a hierarchy between those on whom they depend and 
those who depend on them” (Mansfield 2010: 21), and this co-dependence is predicated 
on land ownership by elites. Although writing well after liberalism had developed in 
ways Swift could not have anticipated, Tocqueville nonetheless asserts this position in 
terms I believe Swift would endorse:  
 
Great territorial properties localize, if we may so speak, the influence of wealth; and 
forcing it to exert itself always in the same place and over the same persons, give it by 
that means a more intense and a more permanent character (quoted in Spring 1980: 122–
123). 
  
Secure property ownership creates stability, and even an aristocracy in severe decline 
such as that of the Laputans have a tempering effect upon the disastrous tendencies of the 
scientifically obsessed society. This further establishes the organic hierarchy led by a 
landed gentry that Gulliver’s Travels repeatedly demonstrates to be natural to human 
sociability, rather than what it presents as the “excessive freedom and individualism” 
characteristic of modernist innovations in politics and science (Paulson 2007: 8). This is 
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an aristocracy run amok on misguided intellectualism, no doubt, but Swift does not want 
to abandon us to abject dejection at the possibility of correcting course against the 
vainglorious errors of the modern project and if this is to be successfully pursued, the 
nobility must return to their time-honoured duties. The implication being that a properly 
functioning nobility ought to confer the benefits of a rich education and superior cultural 
awareness. Thus, elites ought to be more hardened against intellectual decay, protected 
by their heightened historical consciousness and the example of noble ancestors they 
should be seeking to emulate. Furthermore, property is a source of political virtue as it 
provides something to defend and cultivate as well as providing a baseline of wealth as a 
bulwark against bribery and further corruptions (Lock 1983: 175). The criticisms of the 
Laputan elites that Swift does include in Book III are laments for a degenerated ideal, 
rather than an attack on the idea of hereditary aristocracy. 
In this vein, Gulliver is hosted in Lagado by Lord Munodi, an affable and 
comparatively grounded figure, described by the critic F.P. Lock as “a paradigm of the 
benevolent, conservative, country gentleman of Swift’s Tory mythology” (Lock 1980: 
121). Gulliver is afforded a letter of introduction to Munodi by a “great Lord” that he 
meets in Laputa who is decried as among “the most ignorant and stupid people” due to 
his lack of skill in mathematics (Book III, Ch. IV: 163). As he is guided around by Lord 
Munodi, Gulliver laments the uncultivated fields, decrepit homes, and a misery-laden, 
deprived people he sees round him despite “so many busy heads, hands, and faces, both 
in the streets and the fields” (Book III, Ch. IV: 163). Not all work is worthwhile, it seems, 
and the modernist fixation with so-called improvement is undoubtedly a target of the 
satire here. The reader is left to grapple with the idea that the modern scientific project, 
taken to its extreme in the form of abstract speculation and crackpot experimentation to 
the exclusion of all else, renders the land and its people sorely deprived of both the means 
of general prosperity and the communication and sociability that makes human life worth 
living.  
Munodi’s more reasoned perspective allows him to see the failures of the Laputan 
fixation on scientific abstractions and duly informs Gulliver of the disastrous effects that 
the work of the Academy has wrought upon a once prosperous land. Munodi, “a person 
of the first rank” and former Governor of Lagado, now finds himself out of the King’s 
favour because of his failure to adopt the expected scientific innovations. Gulliver 
admires Munodi, commending him for his “prudence, quality and fortune” and 
exemption “from those defects which folly and beggary had produced in others” (Book 
III, Ch. IV: 163). Munodi represents a conservative traditionalist figure, indicated by his 
deference to the “rules of ancient architecture” and his being “content to go on in the old 
forms; to live in the houses his ancestors built” (Book III, Ch. IV: 164–165). In this 
regard, he is the quintessential pastoral gentleman, observant of the required norms and 
standards befitting his elevated position in the social hierarchy and resistant to the 
degeneration around him. However, given the devotion to projection, speculation and 
experimentation in Laputa and Balnibarbi, Munodi is under intense pressure from the 
King and other Lords to destroy his perfectly functional homes and fields, as well of 
those who live on his land, in order to conform to the projecting ways of his neighbours. 
Munodi, “being not of an enterprising spirit”, and happy to act “in every part of life 
without innovation”, clearly represents Swift’s idea of the country gentleman punished by 
the relentless—and in this case feckless—march of so-called progress. However, yielding 
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to the pressure to adopt the untethered and damaging scientific projects would prevent 
him from fulfilling his rightful duty of acting as a steward of the land and custodian of 
culture. As a noble, properly understood, Munodi is attempting to look beyond the fickle 
fashions of innovation and protect the long-term health of his property first and foremost. 
 
4.8. The Doomed Projects of Modernity  
Only scientific projects are seen by the Laputan regime as contributing to “the general 
improvement of their country”, and the benevolent paternalism of a pastoral Lord such as 
Munodi is treated as mere preference of one’s own “ease and sloth” (Book III, Ch. IV: 
165). Enterprise, innovation, and improvement under this regime all amount to 
buffoonery and ruin, showing that the positive connotations the words enjoy under 
modernism are by no means earned by anything other than blind faith in the narrative of 
progress. This uses the characteristic satirical strategy of inversion, where the attributes 
of Munodi’s rightful but denied role as a compassionate aristocrat atop a traditional 
communitarian hierarchy are condemned as vice by the misguided wits of Laputa, rather 
than the virtues properly understood. Indeed, Munodi’s failure to adopt “modern usage” 
of his land has left his reputation in tatters and the King believes that he must be 
beholden to “pride, singularity, affectation, ignorance, and caprice” if he will not manage 
his affairs in the modern style (Book III, Ch. IV: 164). This illustrates the intolerance of 
progress in the face of those who simply do not wish to be accelerated by its supposed 
blessings.  
Under such a worldview, change is seen to be a net positive regardless of its 
character and contour. Swift is harshly presenting the march of progress as relentless, 
blind to its own failures, and demanding absolute uptake. Not only is Munodi slandered, 
but his career as a Governor was ended by “a cabal of ministers” who had him 
“discharged for insufficiency” on the grounds that he was not forward-thinking in his 
adoption of new technologies and projects (Book III, Ch. IV: 163). This is clearly a 
reference to the poisonous nature of faction in general—a theme thoroughly discussed in 
Gulliver’s Voyage to Lilliput—but specifically refers to the dangers of using science as a 
measurement for political virtue or competency. The pressure exerted on Munodi takes 
its toll and he sees his conformity as inevitable in the near future. He is forlorn at the 
prospect as he tells Gulliver of a mill close by that although it was an efficiently 
providing for the area, was destroyed and replaced by a disastrous technological project 
that was abandoned after several years of miserable failure (Book III, Ch. IV: 165). 
Gulliver breaks with Munodi as he moves along to the Academy of Lagado, the 
site of the most ludicrous of scientific experimentation in Book III. Munodi cannot 
continue to act as Gulliver’s guide because he is held in low regard by the Academy but 
he passes along a representation of Gulliver “as a great admirer of projects, and a person 
of much curiosity and easy belief” (Book III, Ch. IV: 166) which is sufficient to grant 
Gulliver access to the Academy. Swift adds in a potential personal mea culpa here by 
having Gulliver admit that he had fallen prey to the temptation toward projection earlier 
in life (Book III, Ch. IV: 166). As Gulliver visits the various schemes and projects, each 
more absurd and outrageous than the last, Swift is clear to impress upon the reader the 
projectors’ attitude to the persistent failures. The first man Gulliver encounters is haggard 
after eight years of failed attempt to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. Notably, he asks 
Gulliver for some financial assistance “as an encouragement to ingenuity” (Book III, Ch. 
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V: 167). The clever phrasing here reminds one of the centrality of ingenuity and 
innovation to the core narrative of progress that underlines the scientific project and yet 
threatens the stability made possible by tradition (Mitchell 2019).  
Such behaviour is not uncommon, Gulliver tells us, as the projectors of Lagado 
are well known for begging from anyone who visits them. Victoria Glendinning 
cunningly describes this as simply a man “looking, as is the way of academics, for a 
further research grant” (Glendinning 1999: 183). The episode also highlights that the 
erstwhile quality of perseverance is not necessarily valuable in all cases. Rather, Gulliver 
instead sees the stubbornness of misplaced optimism characteristic of experimental 
philosophy, convinced by its own grandiosity that the great breakthrough is right around 
the corner even as destitution abounds. Another project to use pigs to plough fields has 
also yielded precious few positive results but “it is not doubted that this invention may be 
capable of great improvement” (Book III, Ch. V: 168). Again, this conveys Swift’s ire at 
the lack of humility and misguided faith that “the advancers of speculative learning” have 
in themselves and their project (Book III, Ch. V: 168–169). This level of arrogance is 
further demonstrated by Gulliver’s meeting with a professor at the academy who, in 
describing his latest project, states that “a more noble exalted thought never sprang in any 
other man’s head” (Book III, Ch. V: 171). For a society obsessed with speculation, the 
certainty with which it continues to pursue disastrous schemes is a damning indictment of 
arrogance and hypocrisy.  
Perhaps most indicative of Swift’s perception of the damage that scientific 
research does to the human intellect is the description of a large wooden proto-computer 
designed to save time and study, making it possible for “the most ignorant person […] 
(to) write books in philosophy, poetry, politics, law, mathematics and theology, without 
the least assistance from genius or study” (Book III, Ch. V: 171). This illustrates Swift’s 
exasperation with science’s fixation with information at the expense of knowledge, 
wisdom, and prudence, and on this front, he appears to have been entirely prescient. This 
particular fixation with codifying complex human experience into deracinated 
information is also the impetus behind the disciplining of travel for scientific purposes. 
Most tragicomically, Gulliver’s greatest lament is for the misguided souls in the 
school of political projectors who have the best of intentions to redirect rulers away from 
the petty favouritism and cronyism of typical European court politics and toward 
rewarding ministers and officials by the genuine merit of prudence. Gulliver here is 
clearly a direct satirical mouthpiece for Swift’s perception of the failures of the ruling 
class and also for his impatience for the projectors who waste time dreaming up 
theoretically perfect but unfeasible solutions, declaring these to be “wild impossible 
chimaeras, that never entered before into the heart of man to conceive” (Book III, Ch. XI: 
175). I argue that the greatest irony of all is that even the right-thinking aspects of the 
political projectors’ agenda is ultimately misguided because their entire approach is 
predicated upon a misreading or misunderstanding of human nature as entirely tethered to 
the scientific method. More significantly still, perhaps, they are doomed because the 
entire endeavour of projecting is hopeless in and of itself. Here we see the tendency of 
Swift to fall into a hopelessness of sorts which is often characterised as misanthropy but 
is probably more aptly viewed as disappointment. The doctrine of progress and the 
endless scientific, political, and economic scheming that it engenders is simply a terrible 
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Travel must be pursued in an orderly fashion if it is to be of benefit. Laputa and 
Balnibarbi show that, in Swift’s estimation, the scientific project is in no position to offer 
itself as a trustworthy ideological apparatus fit to discipline negative potentialities of 
travel. The use of travel for the over-arching set of concerns integral to modernism—
commercial expansion and resource exploitation, scientific mastery over the natural 
world, political democracy, colonisation, and the emancipation of the individual from the 
shackles of an irrationally hierarchy—all coalesce together as a clear marker toward the 
Enlightenment ideals that would take dramatic shape in the later eighteenth century. This 
chapter has largely agreed with recent secondary literature’s analysis of early counter-
Enlightenment criticisms of experimental science, adding Swift’s primary insights to this 
existing historiographic contribution. I have, however, sought to push back against 
interpretations that see Book III as either an episodic digression from the more important 
material found in Gulliver’s other three voyages. It certainly is the case that for the 
purposes of this dissertation the more nuanced interpretation and argumentation 
concerning travel and education is predicated on my reading of Books II and IV, but there 
is much noteworthy evidence to support the argument made in the chapters covering 
Gulliver’s time in Brobdingnag and Houyhnhmnland in Book III. The conceptual linking 
of travel and science through the idea of discovery makes the two processes inextricably 
linked, especially if the goals of the latter are to be achieved. The common theme of 
zealous enthusiasm and naïve faith in the ideal of progress overlaps prominently between 
permissive Lockean ideals of experiential education and Baconian scientific 
experimentation, also. 
The Voyage to Laputa suggests that disciplining travel to serve the needs of the 
materialist and rational project of the New Science weakens the aristocracy, either by 
sweeping them up into its naval-gazing speculations, or by rewarding them with 
technocratic powers that may produce or enhance tyrannical absolutist rule or supplanting 
them with those who would wield those powers if they refuse to do so. This may result in 
a science-obsessed society where scientists assume the authoritative mantle vacated by 
priests and/or nobles, or it might fashion a radically decentralised flattened society where 
all pursue and contribute to the pursuit of knowledge acquisition through experimental 
science. In either case, Swift’s critique of science as a project that is necessarily 
destructive of tradition conveys the fact that the universal aspirations of science toward a 
unified method to reduce the entire world to rational explanations of cause and effect 
relationships ought to stoke prudential caution from those whom he hopes should (or at 
least can) know better. 
The disciplined ordering of travel is vital for the scientific project to spread its 
authority. Gulliver’s Travels demonstrates that disorderly travel can have ruinous effects, 
but its acquiescence to the disciplining of travel for the exclusive purposes of science is 
also highly undesirable. The empiricism that underlines both experiential learning 
through travel proves to be a significant keystone of the modernist project in politics, 
education, and science. Swift’s insight on these matters all coalesce around a satirical 
presentation of a quintessential traveller in Gulliver whose journeys show the folly of 
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assuming that a detached documentarian approach to travel insulates one from potentially 
deviant ideas and events one encounters. Thus, Gulliver stands as evidence that the 
scientific disciplining of travel is but facile stylistic indulgence, appropriate perhaps for 
travel writing (although not necessarily so) but not for the traveller him/herself, 
especially considering that it ultimately renders them subservient to the goals of an 
endeavour that can itself be led dramatically astray by a predilection toward zealous 
belief in its own teleology.  
As Karen Armstrong has noted, the “emergence of reason as the sole criterion of 
truth in the West coincided with the eruption of religious irrationality” (Armstrong 2001: 
75). The initial rise to prominence of the scientific worldview necessarily subdued the 
mysticism and mythology that governed much of humanity’s dealings with a complex 
and multifaceted world. Custom and tradition, denied validity by the cult of rationality, 
frothed outward in deviant forms such as witch crazes (Armstrong 2001: 75). Reason is 
not without its role in the proper functioning of society, but it must be counterbalanced by 
the prudence that comes in its most readily available form via tradition and religion. 
Swift’s criticism of science reflects a worldview that is respectful to tradition and custom, 
sceptical of grandiose claims of inevitable progress, and seeks to maintain what is solid 
and reliable over promises of improvement. The dangerous zealotry of Puritanism shows 
what happens when reason is sacrificed to supposed revelation, but the hare-brained 
schemes of Balnibarbi show what happens when a facile singular reason runs amok 










































5. Travel, Travel Writing, and Magnificent Lies 
 
A traveller’s chief aim should be to make men wiser and better, and to improve 
their minds by the bad, as well as good example of what they deliver concerning 
foreign places. 
—Gulliver’s Travels, Book IV, Ch. XII: 272. 
 
Swift has sailed into his rest; 
Savage indignation there 
Cannot lacerate his Breast. 
Imitate him if you dare, 
World-Besotted Traveller; he 
Served human liberty. 
—W.B. Yeats, Swift’s Epitaph13 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In an overview of the relationship between travel, disease, and medicine, Jonathan H. 
Cossar identified the importance of understanding “how the consequences of man’s 
travels have shaped history” (Cossar 1994: 36). It is my contention here that Swift’s 
critique of travel reveals that the assumption of individual experiential edification lies at 
the heart of tensions within what he saw as Modernity. Most crucially, the aspiration that 
travel is a portal to individual education undermines the centrality of community to 
political life and the necessity of a shared set of values upon which this rests. The 
traveller’s untethering from society, overconfident in his or her own capacity for 
boundless self-edification serves as the apt allegory for a hubristic narrative of progress 
unable or unwilling to comprehend what Swift saw as the necessity for the prudent limits 
and natural sociability of organic society. Understanding the political implications of the 
presentation of travel in Gulliver’s Travels allows for a reframing of a text as satirising 
moral and intellectual improvement outside of tightly constrained and orderly practices. 
 
13 Yeats, W.B. 2011. “Swift’s Epitaph.” In The Winding Stair and Other Poems. London. Scribner. 
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 The blurb on the inside dust jacket of the recently published The Meaning of 
Travel by Emily Thomas of Durham University claims that the work is the “first-ever 
philosophical study of travel” (Thomas 2020). Although generally written with a popular 
audience in mind, Thomas does include some solid insights into the important roles 
played by Montaigne, Bacon and Locke in the place travel has in modernist thought. She 
astutely recognises that for early modern minds, the urge to travel was borne of a deep 
desire to understand the world. As such, travel and philosophy are intertwined both then 
and now. Thomas is correct to lament that the “philosophy of travel is not a recognised 
field of enquiry. There are no books on the philosophy, no university lecture courses, no 
conferences” (Thomas 2020: 2). If such things existed, I contend that Gulliver’s Travels 
ought to feature prominently. Thomas only references Swift’s satirical masterpiece in 
passing but does cover More’s Utopia and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe to some degree, 
both of which form important inspirations for Gulliver’s Travels. Thomas grants space 
for deeper consideration of Swift by recognising that being a work of fiction does not 
preclude a text from constituting a valuable piece of travel writing. In fact, it may well 
heighten the philosophical import and impact of the work. In Thomas’ words:  
 
a novel imitating a real travel report gains credibility and depth. This makes it attractive 
to philosophers. If you want to build a complex thought experiment, how better than to 
write a fictional travel book? (Thomas 2020: 92) 
 
Gulliver’s Travels, then, as I have already argued should be understood as a philosophical 
meditation on travel as well as a proto-novel and satirical work lampooning the 
contemporary appetite for travel writing and the conventions of the genre. 
 Published six years before Thomas’ book, one recent long form meditation of the 
significance of travel to political theory that reflects some of the insights amplified by 
this dissertation is Susan McWilliams’ Travelling Back (2014). In particular, McWilliams 
offers a sweeping overview of the ways in which travel has facilitated “an intellectual 
process that involved both comparing particular cultures and identifying patterns and 
possibilities across those cultures” (McWilliams 2014: 10). In this regard, McWilliams 
stakes out not just a vital role for travel within the toolkit of theorization, but also 
demonstrates that within the kinds of thoughts summoned by travel we find the 
antecedents of modern comparative social science. Travelling Back lucidly delineates the 
competing interests of travel as developed throughout this dissertation; new insights 
acquired during travel are fundamentally ambiguous and often clash with the settled ways 
of the originating society. McWilliams traces currents of thought that both warn against 
the detachment of the traveller from his or her home and of the potential destabilising 
knowledge and powers that could be accrued over the course of global travel. Again, in 
line with the central argument of the present work she concludes that travel is “neither 
necessary nor sufficient on its own for the development of wisdom” (McWilliams 2014: 
121). Gulliver’s Travels outlines exactly as much in its contrasting presentation of the 
King of Brobdingnag and Gulliver. Following Locke’s advice to travellers, McWilliams 
is also broadly in line with the argumentative thread expressed here when arguing that 
“there are some travellers who are better than others” due to their possession of “practices 
and habits of mind that separate them from the travelling mass” (McWilliams 2014: 47). 
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5.2. Travel and Otherness 
The Meaning of Travel seeks to comprehend the drive and significance of the human urge 
to see and visit foreign lands for its own sake. This is important as it precludes discussion 
of travel solely for the purposes of trade or conquest. Ultimately, Thomas seeks to 
organize our understanding of virtues available to those who travel: increased knowledge, 
humility in the face of a diverse and enormous world, and an affectionate wonder at the 
gravitas of nature (Thomas 2020). Gulliver gains information, to be sure, but it is highly 
suspect that he is improved by his travels. From Lilliput to Laputa, his pride in the 
institutions and culture of England remain unflinching in the face of considerable 
comparative experiences that ought to highlight their deviant nature, until he becomes 
entirely misanthropic in his rejection of Europe and attempted emulation of Houyhnhnm 
reason. In this regard, his self-interestedness and cultural chauvinism serve to indicate the 
problems inherent to allowing such an ill-suited individual to travel. This is represented 
starkly by the enduring image of Gulliver enormous presence in Lilliput, big enough to 
pose a literal existential threat to the entire population and requiring mountains of food 
just to be satiated. Gulliver’s experiences of nature come in the forms of storms, the 
miserable pain of old age, urination, defecation and other unseemly natural acts, and 
interactions with scientific projectors seeking to defy and tame nature. 
Thomas correctly notes that the experience of travel as a means toward an 
expansion of understanding has been a perennial concern of philosophy. However, her 
relatively uncritical engagement with assumption that immersion in unfamiliar contexts, 
cultures, and places is invariably rewarding seems remarkably naïve, not least in light of 
Gulliver’s experiences fantastical though they may be. Had Thomas considered 
Gulliver’s Travels in additional detail perhaps her enthusiasm for the universally edifying 
effects of travel would be moderated or complicated. 
Bacon’s assertion that travel and science “are not yoked together in any trivial 
way” signals the higher purpose of experiential learning as the focal point of the 
empiricist goal to overturn the sacred cows of conventional wisdom. Bacon continues: 
“distant voyages and travels have brought to light many things in nature, which may 
throw fresh light on human philosophy and science and correct by experience the 
opinions and conjectures of the ancients” (Bacon 1964: 131). The empiricist faith in the 
possibility of correcting by experience is the key idea here, as this would become 
prominently intertwined with later liberal notions of individual improvement and the 
wider narrative of human progress. Gulliver’s Travels demonstrates, however, that it is 
highly possible for travellers to be corrupted rather than corrected by their experiences as 
voyagers and that progress is not inevitable, if it is even desirable in the first place.  
Writing in 1606, Sir Thomas Palmer recognised as much, arguing in his Essay of 
the Meanes how to make our Travailes into Forraine Countries the more Profitable and 
Honourable that travel could be useful in training citizens to be good and loyal citizens 
but that travel ought to be pursued differently by nobles and commoners (Hadfield 2007: 
4). Palmer’s advice to travelling nobles features three key points: “1. To make diligent 
observation of all common and accidental things. 2. To be aswel [sic] expert as learned. 
3. To be careful to transplant what may profit their country” (Palmer 1606: 31–34 quoted 
in Carey 2012: 39). Common folk could not be trusted to follow such advice and their 
observation and transplantation of that of value that they encounter abroad would be 
highly suspect given their lack of preparatory education prior to embarking on their 
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travels. In this regard, Palmer is representative of the early empiricist movement, but does 
not believe that the capacity for experiential learning applies to all equally, noting the 
importance of social hierarchy in the usefulness of travel.  
As Andrew Hadfield notes, it was, in fact, quite difficult to travel prior to the 
beginning of the seventeenth century as travel was tightly restricted and controlled only 
to European travelers that could obtain a license (Hadfield 2007: 4). This was partially to 
avoid the possibility of espionage but also demonstrated contemporary tensions derived 
from the misinterpretation and confusion that could ensue when uncharted waters and 
experiences were recounted through travel writing. Many travellers, it seems, could not 
be trusted to be sober in their assessment and “the radical conclusions which some 
travellers drew from their experiences were vigorously opposed by other writers” 
(Hadfield 2007: 4). For example, Palmer wrote in retort to works such as Thomas 
Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller (1594), which attacks the purpose of travel and travel 
writing, using the misadventures of the Englishman Jack Wilton in Europe to highlight 
the twin evils of Puritanism and Popery, an agenda highly agreeable to Swift, no doubt. 
Thus, while the connection between travel and the expansion of human knowledge is not 
trivial, it is highly contingent upon who the traveller is and whether or not they are 
capable of reaping the benefits of their experiences. 
 Thomas helpfully identifies the difference between everyday journeys and travel 
as not merely a matter of distance, but rather “in how much otherness the traveller 
experiences. Everyday journeys involve just a little, whereas travel journeys involve a 
lot” (Thomas 2020: 5). This differs, for example, from the definition of travel offered by 
Paul Fussell, editor of The Norton Book of Travel. For Fussell, for real travel “movement 
from one place to another should manifest some impulse of non-utilitarian pleasure” 
(Fussell 1987: 21). Thomas draws upon the sixteenth-century French philosopher Michel 
de Montaigne’s Essays of 1580 to generate her definition as travel determined by contact 
with otherness. Indeed, Montaigne emphasises that genuine travel provides opportunities 
to see and engage with the diversity and variety found across the world, allowing 
observation and experience of “new and unknown things” (Montaigne 1993: 171; 278). 
Overall, Montaigne argues that travel is positive as encountering otherness expands our 
horizon of thought and we should aspire to pursue “the characteristics and customs of the 
different nations, and of rubbing and polishing our wits on those of others” (Montaigne 
1993: 56). Montaigne possessed sufficient confidence in the merits of travels such that 
he: 
 
should like to see a boy to be sent abroad very young; and first, in order to kill two birds 
with one stone, to those neighbouring countries whose languages differ most from our 
own, and to which the tongue cannot adapt itself if it is not trained early (Montaigne 
1993: 56). 
 
Montaigne is more generally optimistic and positive concerning the benefits of travel 
than either Locke or Swift, seeing early youth as a suitable time for contact with the 
unfamiliar to expand one’s mind. Locke, of course, sees travel as beneficial as the final 
component of an orderly gentlemanly education. I have already indicated that Gulliver’s 
Travels forms a meaningful dialogue with Locke, but we can also say with some degree 
of certainty that Swift was also referring to Montaigne on travel. Claude Rawson writes 
that “Montaigne was a natural part of the reading of any educated person of Swift’s time 
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and cultural disposition.” Irvin Ehrenpreis also acknowledges the influence of the French 
philosopher on the composition and thought of Swift (Rawson 1992: 335). Rawson notes 
that Swift read Montaigne from as early as 1704 and definitely owned a copy of the 
Essays in French from at least 1715 to the end of his life. It is not unreasonable, then, to 
infer that Swift provokes Montaigne’s positive depiction of travel as well as his 
qualification that genuine travel as that which engages with otherness, as Thomas 
identifies (Thomas 2020: 6–7).  
Without ever embracing overt relativism, Montaigne repeatedly asserts that 
otherness is a matter of convention and familiarity and therefore the exoticization of one 
group or practice from the narrow vantage point of one’s colloquial perspective ought to 
be avoided (Thomas 2020: 6). Across four voyages to sea, initially as surgeon then as 
captain, Gulliver encounters a fantastical array of otherness: miniature people, massive 
giants, deranged scientific projectors manning a flying island, and hyper-rational horses 
who dominate a brutish race of humanoids. Suffice to say that Gulliver’s Travels is 
designed to hyperbolically meet (and exceed!) precisely such a definition of travel. In the 
process, Gulliver treats his family with appalling negligence, preferring instead to travel 
as he is “condemned by nature and fortune to an active and restless life” (Book I, Ch. I: 
15), possessed by “an insatiable desire of seeing foreign countries” (Book II, Ch. VIII: 
71). Gulliver represents the dark side of travel and the stubbornness associated with 
unflappable faith in experiential edification even as he suffers through storms, 
shipwrecks, encounters with fearsome pirates, and mutiny on the high seas. 
At the outset of the Voyage to Laputa, Gulliver declares himself unable to reject 
the prospect of returning to sea, finding his thirst for “seeing the world, notwithstanding 
my past misfortunes, continuing as violent as ever” (Book III, Ch. I: 141). After a mere 
ten days at home, Gulliver’s limited capacity for better judgment is overwhelmed by the 
individual appetite for the novel experiences that only travel can provide. Captain 
William Robinson lures Gulliver back to sea with a combination of flattery, double his 
usual salary, and a promise “to follow my advice, as much as if I had share in the 
command” (Book III, Ch. I: 141). Thus, contrary to the expectations of Montaigne and of 
broader ideas concerning experiential education through travel, Gulliver’s perspective 
remains mired in individual fallibility and desire for novel experience. He secures the 
consent of his wife only by persuading her through “the prospect of advantage she 
proposed to her children” (Book III, Ch. I: 141). We can take this to mean that Gulliver 
has to essentially sign away the vast majority of the financial windfall from this voyage 
to his wife and children and is content to return to sea out of wanderlust rather than a 
direct concern for his individual economic self-interest. It also appears that he is 
sufficiently disconnected from his family for his self-interest to be divergent from that of 
the family unit. 
 
5.3. Splendide Mendax 
Jonathan Lamb’s Preserving the Self in the South Seas argues that voyaging was 
attractive to prospective sailors particularly because of the opportunities it provides to 
dislocate from the social contract and pursue private pleasures outside the realms of 
common sense. Lamb’s work summons thoughts of the kind of person likely to thrive 
under such circumstances, be they swashbuckling pirates, rugged frontiersmen, or any 
other number of individuals better off outside of society and away from family. The 
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geographical and psychological distance of travel brings a sort of liberation from the 
limitations of societal structures. Crucially, however, Lamb details how malnourishment, 
vitamin deficiencies, rampant scurvy outbreaks, and hallucinations all led to sailors 
severely doubting their own capacity to act as credible witnesses of their own experiences 
(Lamb 2001: 116). Under such pressures, Lamb chronicles how navigators in the South 
Seas in the eighteenth century carried themselves not with the precision and confidence 
of the scientific method but rather toiled in the dark, spreading “ignorance before they 
spread trade routes and disease” (Lamb 2001: 4; 5). This highlights the disparities 
between the promises and realities of travel. Lamb also notes that in documenting their 
trips, travellers to the South Seas tended to fall back upon tropes of romantic narratives 
designed to titillate and evoke sentimental reactions from their readership rather than 
advance the cause of science (Lamb 2001: 116).  
The attempt of science to discipline and utilise travel for its ends was thus 
frequently unsuccessful. The gulf between theory and practice seemingly extended 
commensurate to the variance in geographical and psychological distance experienced by 
the traveller. As a result, the desire of experimental science in Bacon’s words to “lay the 
foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but human utility and power” to fulfil the goal to 
“conquer nature in action” is heavily compromised by the fallibility of those who voyage 
and observe in its name (Bacon 1989: 16; 21). This is not to say that cartography, botany, 
and a great number of other fields of human understanding were not enlarged as a result 
of data collected by travellers, but rather to push back against the assumption that all 
travel invariably can and will be a valuable part of this over-arching endeavour.  
Gulliver goes to great pains at the conclusion of his narrative to ensure that the 
reader trusts his veracity: “I could perhaps have astonished thee with strange improbable 
tales; but I rather chose to relate plain matter of fact in the simplest manner and style; 
because my principle design was inform, and not to amuse thee” (Book IV, Ch. XII: 
273). As noted earlier, Swift uses Gulliver’s adoption of this scrupulously matter-of-fact 
tone to both establish the purported verisimilitude of his travelogue, but also to satirize 
the expectation that travellers can be trusted at all. Leo Damrosch is not wrong to point 
out that “the miraculous balance between fantasy and realism” (Damrosch 2013: 360) 
struck by Swift contributes a great deal to what has rendered the satire compelling to 
readers over the centuries. However, this balance also serves to underline that travel is 
rather bad at living up to the expected outcomes that various projectors seek from it, be 
they educational, scientific, or general enthusiasts of human improvement.  
It is no coincidence that Swift has Gulliver start the final chapter of the work with 
an appeal for travel to be used toward the end of making “men wiser and better, and to 
improve their minds by the bad, as well as good example of what they deliver concerning 
foreign places” (Book IV, Ch. XII: 272). It is also notable that this comes alongside an 
ironic call for sanction against those who mislead the public in their travel writing: 
 
I could heartily wish a law was enacted, that every traveller before he were permitted to 
publish his voyages, should be obliged to make oath before the Lord High Chancellor, 
that all he intended to print was absolutely true to the best of his knowledge; for then the 
world would no longer be deceived as it usually is, while some writers, to make their 
works pass the better upon the public, impose the grossest falsities on the unwary reader 
(Book IV, Ch. XII: 272). 
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One must question just how trustworthy Gulliver is as he doth protest far too much. This 
is the classic backhanded satirical admission that everything the reader has just been told 
is totally false. But beyond this, it also serves as a reminder that travel writers have been 
charlatans for as long as voyages to places near and far have been documented. 
According to Percy G. Adams it was not necessarily out of a commitment to veracity or 
scientific documentation that the information coming out of travel writing gradually 
became more firmly rooted in empirical fact. Rather “as time went by travellers became 
more and more accurate as they could more easily expose each other or expect less 
gullible readers” (Adams 1983: 78). The historian Anne Talbot’s claim that Locke sought 
to use travel literature as a bank of data with which to study human social behaviour in 
the Baconian tradition would mark the great philosopher as such a gullible reader (Talbot 
2010). Indeed, some of the material he used to substantiate claims regarding the 
connection of tyrannical government to cannibalism, for example, were based on 
fraudulent reports by either outright fakers or travellers and intellectuals who simply 
misunderstood their experiences (Thomas 2020: 63).  
Swift’s sceptical presentation of travel is also deeply rooted in the tradition of 
scholastic natural philosophy to view firsthand experiences as epistemologically dubious 
(Swann 2001: 60). Locke was not unaware of the possibility of the latter outcome, 
detailing as much in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, but might not have been 
impervious to leaning on questionable tales in the composition of his own works. Locke 
might have utilised such tropes simply because they were familiar to his audience and 
thus made for good rhetorical substance for the purposes of the grander philosophical 
objective at hand. If the latter were the case, it would buttress the Swiftian portrayal of 
travel fantasy as useful only insofar as it can be used to nudge the reader toward a greater 
truth, rather than as a bank of scientific data. 
One gets the sense that Swift seeks to critique the predatory nature of travel 
writers for duping a knavish public, but only because they do so without using the format 
to provide genuine insight and instruction into current and perennial matters. Gulliver 
himself is, in the words of Alan Chambers, “a slippery paradigm a authorial embodiment, 
comically adrift in fierce seas that bear on him against the odds” (Chambers 1995: 129). 
The 1735 edition of Swift’s works by the Dublin publisher George Faulkner included a 
portrait of Gulliver that bears far more than a passing resemblance to Swift himself. 
Under the portrait is the quote from Horace, “splendide mendax,” which Swift biographer 
Leo Damrosch loosely translates to nobly mendacious (Damrosch 2013: 359). Brilliant 
liar is perhaps a more directly accurate translation, but Damrosch’s point is well made 
nonetheless. Swift nobly lies to the reader as to the factual nature of the text, and Gulliver 
spreads half-truths through prideful and deluded ideas of English politics and society. 
The spreading of these of half-truths or untruths for a good cause is valuable, whereas 
deceiving readership with fictitious travel tales is purely frivolous at best and outright 
damaging at worst. Platonic noble lies clearly factor into Swift’s satiric calculus, insofar 
as we can take him as viewing people as open to improvement or correction through 
literature and/or experience. 
Shaftesbury alludes to as much in his “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author” from 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times of 1711 by identifying that the 
extension of politeness is threatened by individuals’ manners and disposition being 
harshened by a steady diet of fantastical voyager’s tales featuring monsters, barbarians 
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and wars (Shaftesbury 2000: 153). However, he also recognises that bald facts can be 
most problematic to the wellbeing of readers. The enduring phrase “lies, damn lies, and 
statistics”, popularly but probably dubiously attributed to Mark Twain, expresses this 
sentiment exactly. Supposed facts do not operate as a singular radiating sun that improve 
all who are informed of them. Indeed, Shaftesbury reminds us that “facts, unably related, 
though with the greatest sincerity and good faith, may prove the worst sort of deceit. And 
mere lies, judiciously composed, can teach us the truth of things beyond any other 
manner” (Shaftesbury 2000: 153). This also points toward the problem with using 
documentation of travel as the basis of scientific instruction. Not only is the evidence 
gathered by travelers highly suspect, but the degree of truth imparted by an abstract 
presentation of facts could also be very low and even harmfully so.  
Of significance here, also, is Gulliver’s claim that “a traveller’s chief aim should 
be to make men wiser and better, and to improve their minds by the bad, as well as good 
example of what they deliver concerning foreign places” (Book IV, Ch. XII: 272). Insofar 
as travel writing can be educational, it might well have to lie to do so, and if readers are 
to enhance their character by reading of Gulliver’s misadventures it ought to be through 
questioning to what benefit these travels were to Gulliver himself. If travel writing might 
only be of benefit by highlighting bad examples of misadventure and folly, then travel 
itself is clearly not a particularly edifying experience in a great number of instances. The 
possibility of improvement and the extension of a positive example to readers is not 
precluded, but that the present narrative contains a litany of woe and foolishness, the 
intended message ought to be clear. 
 Throughout Gulliver’s Travels it is clear that the intersection of the revolutionary 
tendencies in science, politics, and religion are at the forefront of Swift’s concern. All 
turn on a faith in the human capacity of perception and experiential learning. All appeal 
to speculative first order values that push back against that what has come before. In the 
case of radical dissenting Protestantism, scripture provides a firm basis upon which to 
build. The ambiguity of human interpretation renders this inherently unstable and prone 
to endless permeation and mutation, however. This dynamic energy forges a logic of 
permanent revolution “that push Protestant movements to reject prior versions of 
themselves” (Simpson 2019: 345). 
My reading of Gulliver’s Travels is that Swift does not decry all travel in all 
circumstances, but rather highlights the incoherence of a worldview that assumes 
individuals are destined to achieve self-liberation outside the guiding and limiting 
structures of a rigorous educational process within organic society. Ideas of travel as an 
emancipatory self-directed path to edification can prey upon the prideful arrogance of 
individuals such as Gulliver who are too weak to resist the temptations of private pleasure 
and indulgence afforded by voyaging abroad. Furthermore, this is nested within a wider 
narrative of progress that sees such individual prerogative as both inherently beneficial 
and an important facet of the unfurling of the singularly emancipatory power of self-
directed edification. This is not to say that travel cannot be a simple pleasurable affair or 
even operate as precisely the type of transformative educational experience. My 
estimation is that Swift is highly aware of these potentialities but is resolute in his 
skepticism that neither the innocuous nor the transcendent is the default or mean vantage 
point on travel from which we ought to generalize. The dogmatic insistence that the 
changeability of the traveller (recognised by all who ponder the effects of travel) 
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correlates perfectly and invariably with the teachability of the individual toward 
edification remains today essentially an article of faith. Insofar as travellers are educated 
by their experiences, it remains as likely for their instrumental reason to be further 
facilitated than it is that the singular sun of illuminating reason expands their 
consciousness toward righteousness and virtue. This dissertation originally argues that on 
the question of travel, Swift’s text indicts the assumption that progress (as an edifying 
process of change) is inevitable or necessarily something that all individuals in all 
circumstances can autonomously partake in. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The major contribution of this dissertation is to consider Gulliver’s Travels as a book 
about travel, and not just a book of travel or a pastiche on travel writing. In taking 
Gulliver’s Travels’ presentation of travel as a matter of serious political concern, aspects 
of Swift’s contribution to the history of political thought are cast in a new light. 
Understanding, for example, that the critique of modernist science is also a criticism of 
the ordering of travel for the purposes of data collection and objective documentation is 
an angle of the text little explored up to now. Most importantly, this dissertation has 
sought to highlight how Swift uses travel as a lens through which to open a wider critique 
of the centrality of individual experiential learning as proof of the inevitable march of 
progress. 
A brief note on some potential limitations of this dissertation. There are a great 
many references, allegories, and allusions throughout Gulliver’s Travels. So much so 
that, for reasons of space and parsimony, a substantial number of these have not been 
engaged and addressed in the present work. It was necessary to use my judgment in 
considering what to pay closer attention to, and what was interesting but not especially 
relevant or required in order to generate the argument identified in this dissertation. No 
doubt some threads that could either contribute to or detract from the persuasiveness or 
incisiveness of my argument have been missed or insufficiently examined. This is most 
likely unavoidable when dealing with a text so substantially rich in references to other 
material and also the source of centuries of secondary literature and commentary of every 
standard and from an almost impossibly wide range of vantage points. It is for this reason 
that the voyage to Lilliput receives considerably less analysis than do the other three 
voyages. The satire in Lilliput is significantly more topical and allegorical than that found 
in the other books and is thus less concerned with the perennial questions discussed in 
this dissertation. I hope that the present work has judiciously navigated the trade-offs 
necessary in seeking to closely engage the text on its own terms, but also comprehend 
and explain relevant context and criticism without excluding vital material in the name of 
crafting a parsimonious argument. 
It is also incumbent to recognise that Swift’s criticism of political ideas associated 
with Enlightenment and Modernist thought in Gulliver’s Travels is primarily found in the 
form of the presentation of ideas that at the time of his writing had yet to congeal into the 
set of principles that we recognise today as liberalism. Therefore, it is important to 
reiterate that Swift can never be taken as an overt critic of liberalism as a coherent and 
articulated political philosophy or ideology. Swift is never speaking directly either to 
liberals or about liberalism. To suggest otherwise would be anachronistic. However, 
important intellectual currents such as individualism, experiential edification, and 
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scientific and technological optimism are thoroughly engaged throughout Gulliver’s 
Travels in a fashion that does shed fruitful light on how we might think of their later 
political application. It is not necessarily a direct comparison in every instance, but the 
analytical implications are worthy of consideration. 
Tocqueville recognised that the capacity to allow individuals and collectives to 
make repairable mistakes is an incredible privilege, infrequently known in the long arc of 
history (Tocqueville 2000: 216). Swift’s experience of religious and political tumult 
implanted a firm disbelief in the possibility of the luxury of granting such license. David 
Runciman, professor of politics at Cambridge University, has written of how modern 
democracies’ capacity to muddle through crises tend to generate a false confidence that 
no problem or crisis is too big for their institutional capacity for conflict resolution etc. 
(Runciman 2018: 293). This “confidence trap”, as Runciman dubs it, is endemic 
throughout what Swift saw in emerging Modernist thought. It is not at all the case that the 
idea of the rational, autonomous, and self-interested individual who edifies themselves 
and other through experiential learning is a complete and total myth, but it is also readily 
apparent that this is not the reality for many if not most people in most times and places. 
Ultimately, while Swift can be indisputably read as an anti-pluralist conservative, 
criticisms of modernist currents in science and politics from this perspective found in 
Gulliver’s Travels highlights ways in which ignoring Locke’s advocacy for education 
toward freedom requires an orderly process may have rather undesirable consequences. 
Swift would undoubtedly be seen as an enemy of Karl Popper’s “Open Society.” 
But, Popper, as explained by his greatest interpreter Bryan Magee: 
 
Regards living first and foremost a process of problem-solving he wants societies which 
are conducive to problem-solving. And because problem solving calls for the bold 
propounding of trial solutions which are then subjected to criticism and error-elimination, 
he wants forms of society which permit of the untrammelled assertion of differing 
proposals, followed by criticism, followed by the genuine possibility of change in light of 
criticism (Magee 1973: 74). 
 
It is clear that for Swift, life is not about the active and continuous solving of problems, 
and that even if it was, Popper’s transposition of the scientific method to political life 
ought to be troubling regardless, given the scientific project’s tendency toward 
absolutism. Outside of the careful and prudent stewardship of human leadership tethered 
to tangible values, the technological imperative can easily run amok. 
Throughout this dissertation I have extracted and amplified the argument made in 
Gulliver’s Travels that instrumental reason is chiefly a facilitator of vice, and that it ought 
not to be confused with the more holistic and transcendental reason of the ancient 
tradition to which Swift saw himself allied to. The text offers a humble reminder for 
modern thought not to confuse instrumental reason for practical wisdom. In this regard, 
Swift can be read to offer a timely reminder that what is sometimes presented as the 
transparent and falsifiable process of knowledge acquisition achieved by hypothesis 
testing is not spared the human preponderance to faction and polarization, as has been 
made abundantly clear by partisan discourse around most if not all pressing problems 
confronting modern democracies from climate change to pandemic response. The most 
lucid scientific projectors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries signalled their 
awareness that the transparent methodology, process of falsification, and open debate 
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facilitated and encouraged by science would only maintain its utility if it were 
accompanied by codes of gentlemanly behaviour (Schleck 2012: 54). An important 
insight offered by Swift here is that scientific methodology divorced from prudence is 
always at risk of degenerating into the disastrous combination of feckless dogmatism and 
political tyranny of Laputa.  
Despite acknowledging Swift’s insight and value as a political thinker, this 
dissertation understands ideas concerning the capacity and potential for each individual to 
live a meaningful and productive life in line with their own conception of the good to be 
of profound merit. Modern proponents of counter-Enlightenment thought such as Patrick 
J. Deneen are hyperbolic14 at best in arguing that liberalism has failed, even Swift would 
recognise as much. As a second-order belief system that can facilitate conflict resolution 
and mediation between recalcitrant first-order belief systems liberal political ideals have 
furnished a platform for the most prosperous and peaceful societies humanity has ever 
known. From a Swiftian perspective, however, it is not entirely off base to highlight how 
crude versions of universalist Lockean principles can ring hollow when they stray further 
and further from the local experience which ought to be conceived as “bound to and 
ultimately an expression of the universal and eternal, the divine and the sublime” 
(Deneen 2018: 193). Montesquieu and Adam Smith, among other more fully formed 
liberal thinkers of the later eighteenth century, however, already anticipated and 
attempted to address these problems of reconciling political individualism with a concern 
for the vitality of community and associations to human flourishing. Thus, long before 
contemporary critics on both the left and right emphasized them, liberals after Swift 
would endeavour to identify and address the potential pitfalls of liberalism while in the 
process of articulating their theories. Ultimately, Swift’s value here is to highlight 
through the foolish optimism of Gulliver the difference between Locke’s understanding 
of the need to balance a spirit of liberty with an orderly education toward the 
development of moral character and a purely naïve faith in linear progress. 
 I have sought in this dissertation to demonstrate how Gulliver’s Travels can be 
read to present the risk in assuming that one’s desires are necessarily borne of 
conscientious origin and therefore beyond reproach. Swift’s text also highlights the risk 
of uncritically universalizing what may well be inherently contingent and particular, such 
as an individual’s potential for edification through experiential learning. Swift would 
have seen himself as broadly in line with a type of Lockean liberalism, but one in which 
individualism is embedded within a firm communitarian base. In contrast, a version of 
Lockeanism that is more radical in its individualism and totalizing in its presentation of 
the inevitability of scientific and technological progress is ultimately the most profound 
victim of the Irishman’s satirical prowess. 
In Politics Vs. Literature (1946), George Orwell pondered if his political 
disagreement with Swift was sufficiently strong so as to discount the literary value of 
Gulliver’s Travels. Orwell concluded that despite the rancour he took from Swift’s 
political ideas, the text was nonetheless a valuable contribution of a particular perspective 
in the long arc of the raging historical struggle “between progress and reaction” (Orwell 
1946). It was Orwell’s position that although Swift may have been on the wrong side of 
history as he saw it, the anarchic imagination of his reactionary politics was simply of too 
 
14 A didactic tone adopted as an editorial decision to match the so-called “culture wars” of our present 
moment, no doubt. 
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high a literary quality to be discarded. He also commends Swift’s sincerity as a 
representative of counter-Enlightenment reaction against the forces of progress. In this 
regard, Gulliver’s Travels remains a captivating political text because its arguments 
resonate far beyond the confines of its originating context. If the perpetual question of 
progress versus reaction is as real as Orwell suggests, Gulliver’s Travels offers as 
nuanced and prescient iteration of his side of the debate as one is likely to find. In his 
own lifetime Swift did agitate in intellectual debates concerning the values of ancient 
versus modern modes of thinking that could potentially be mapped onto the struggle 
imagined by Orwell, but Gulliver’s Travels seems to suggest that any assumption of 
progress is nearsighted folly. This call to humility retains its potency. 
It is highly ironic that many public intellectuals whom today summon the spirit of 
Swift in agitating for a communitarian conservatism that he might endorse do so from an 
explicitly Catholic perspective. Regardless of substantive overlap in criticisms of 
elements of what would later congeal into political liberalism, an affiliation with 
Catholicism would instantly disqualify anyone from consideration for anything other than 
a good lambasting by the fiercely partisan temperament of the good Dean of St. Patrick’s. 
Swift was not a bridge-building compromiser, and his political vision is generally 
conditioned by a rather grim and pessimistic opinion of humanity. The kind of political 
coalition-building between groups with a core issue or two in common would be 
anathema to Swift. Even if he agreed on the issue at hand, two broken clocks being right 
at the same time of day is no basis upon which to entrust anyone with political power. His 
critique of Enlightenment optimism on the matter of experiential education, the potential 
for progress through modernist science, and political individualism are all predicated on 
the low ceiling he identifies for the substantial majority of real people in the real world, 
abstract notions of potential be damned. We might applaud his firm commitment to 
principle, but this position is wholly incompatible with the pluralist and inclusive society 
that this writer sees as a moral absolute. Swift’s insights, penetrating (and frequently 
troubling) though they are, would require serious dilution in order to be politically 
actionable outside of the context of authoritarianism and thus must be condemned on that 
basis.  
Whereas Swift’s criticism of travel may point toward deeply concerning 
authoritarian controls over who has the ability to move freely about the world, it is also 
incumbent to acknowledge that a significant amount of today’s travel is much more than 
frivolous indulgence in the name of shallow cosmopolitanism. Eighteenth-century 
advocates of cosmopolitanism as a pivotal facet of polite society would likely not 
recognise any particular benefit accrued by modern tourism, for example. The work of 
the economist Paul Collier indicates that while mass migration has not produced adverse 
effects to local populations of receiving countries. Crucially, however, he points to the 
likelihood of significant negative consequences for those who would be left behind in the 
world’s poorest countries, and substantial psychological suffering for those who make the 
move to pursue opportunities in new lands (Collier 2015: 245). Thus, while it is 
unquestionably highly undesirable to roll back the liberal democratic facets of 
governance that make freedom of movement possible (not least for the many commercial 
and cultural benefits that result), it is also the case that travel is not a universal, obvious, 
and singular good. It can exact a toll on all involved. This is not to equivocate migration 
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with the type of travel for the purposes of edification under analysis in this dissertation, 
but rather to reaffirm that travel in general is something that ought not to be taken lightly. 
Swift’s vision runs contrary to Emily Thomas’ rosy presentation of The Meaning 
of Travel as a pursuit through which philosophers from early modernity onwards 
expanded human understanding in such a fashion that renders the benefit of travel to be 
universal. In the anarchic and fantastic world of Gulliver’s Travels Swift might ironically 
actually offer a more realistic portrayal of the edifying possibilities of travel. If travel is 
to constitute individual edification via experiential learning Swift demands of us to take 
seriously the proposition that it will only do so as the final stage of an orderly education, 
and the conditions for this to occur are not easily met. Nonetheless, Locke’s ideas for 
structuring the educational properties of travel toward the positive aspects of human 
potential for a life of a responsible freedom informed by our reason offers both a more 
palatable and pragmatic approach than does Swift’s overwhelmingly pessimistic vision. 
The Irishman’s satire is radically grim in its hope for human improvement such that it 
makes channeling anything other than a highly regressive, restrictive, and authoritarian 
political agenda from the text impossible. This is not to say that Gulliver’s Travels does 
not have much to offer as a striking and profound explication of counter-Enlightenment 
reaction to nascent Modernism, Rather, it is incumbent to acknowledge that its political 
character is as disturbing as it is captivating. Swift’s critical presentation of the 
inevitability of progress and development through autonomous experiential education 
does, however, offers a valuable counterweight to unchecked assumptions that expanding 
our experiential horizons necessarily accompanies an equal expansion of our moral 
faculties. 
In musical terms, one must thoroughly learn how to play the melody before 
improvising an audacious jazz solo. Of course, the latter laudably aims toward the true 
height of the art form but without sufficient grounding in the fundamentals of melody and 
technique, it will be little better than meandering cacophony. Autodidacts do exist but 
both the moderate perspective offered by Locke and the extreme imagery of Swift 
caution that generalizing to all from that basis is foolish. It is far from impossible for 
experiential learning to lead to the development and honing of practical wisdom but 
assuming this applies to a population as a whole is representative of a more naïve 
degraded Lockeanism than the more measured advice proffered in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education. The instructive value of Gulliver’s Travels is that it forcefully 
embeds one possible disastrous consequence of such a facile optimistically permissive 
approach to the educational properties of travel in a captivating and imaginative satire. 
Insofar as one is seeking to induce and/or extend their capacity as a reasonable person, 
travel might assist this process by remedying the ignorance that a problematically 
parochial existence may inculcate. However, as the King of Brobdingnag shows us, it is 
not impossible to be a meaningfully reasonable person without having travelled, even if 
one’s potential as a completed gentleman will not be met. We might do well to heed the 
warning of seeing the shallow remedying of facile ignorance in the experience of 
worldliness as the extension of genuine understanding and extension of humans’ rational 
nature. Locke teaches us that not all travel is edifying, and the conditions necessary for it 
to be so require conscious ordering at societal level. Thus, in the worst-case scenario 
outlined by Gulliver’s Travels, Swift forces us to confront the possibility that the 
ignorance incurred by a parochial existence may ultimately be more desirable that the 
 120 
shallow worldliness masquerading as enlightenment found in a traveller who has seen the 
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